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Schlenker and Leary (1982) and Clark and Wells (1995) each propose two highly influential 
models of social anxiety disorder with important implications for theory and treatment.  In 
the current study, overlapping and competing cognitive components of these theories were 
tested with a focus on understanding the socially anxious (SA) individual’s mental 
representation of self, and its relation to the experience of anxiety in a social situation.  
Unacquainted pairs of non-socially anxious individuals (n = 61 pairs) and mixed pairs of 
highly SA and non-socially anxious (NSA) individuals (n = 101 pairs) participated in a “get 
acquainted” and a structured problem-solving task.  All participants rated both their 
expectations for making specific impressions as well as the importance of making those 
impressions.  All participants also rated how anxious they felt, how anxious they thought 
they appeared, and how anxious their partners appeared during the interaction.  While all 
participants believed it was important to make a positive impression, SA individuals 
expected they would make an overall less positive impression than NSA participants.  All 
individuals reported increased anxiety when ratings of impression importance were higher 
than expectation ratings (test of Schlenker and Leary’s [1982] model).  While self-ratings of 
anxious appearance were similarly influenced by interoceptive information for both SA and 
NSA individuals (test of Clark and Wells’ [1995] model), for NSA individuals who had a 
high tendency to attend to publicly observable aspects of their body, the relation between 
arousal and self-reported appearance was particularly robust in comparison with that for SA 
individuals.  SA individuals as a group were rated by partners as appearing more anxious 
than NSA participants.  Overall, NSA participants’ ratings of a desire for future interaction 
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with SA and NSA partners were comparable.  Implications for theory, measurement concerns 
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1.1 Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social phobia or social anxiety disorder is one of the most prevalent mental health disorders 
and the most commonly experienced anxiety disorder (Pollack, 1999).  Characterized by an 
intense and persistent fear of social and performance situations (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), the individual with social phobia fears behaving in a humiliating way 
(Wells, 2000).  Not surprisingly, the fear of being appraised negatively by others often leads 
these individuals to avoid evaluative and social events (Strahan & Conger, 1998).  If the 
socially anxious (SA) individual tends to fear most social situations, he or she is likely to be 
experiencing the generalized sub-type of social phobia.  Fear of a specific situation (e.g., 
eating in public places, public speaking) characterizes the second more specific sub-type of 
this disorder.  In either case exposure to the feared social or performance situation almost 
always results in intense anxiety (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  This anxious 
reaction likely includes physical symptoms, such as sweating, blushing, or heart palpitations.  
The socially phobic individual is in an unenviable position: he or she fears being embarrassed 
and looking anxious in social settings, yet invariably experiences intense anxiety in such 
situations.  The SA individual’s reaction results in added fear that anxious arousal will be 
noticed which in turn may lead to more embarrassment, further negative evaluation, or loss 
of status (Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1990).   
Most people fear being embarrassed when meeting a new individual or while 
performing a public speech.  While these experiences may result in similar anxious reactions, 
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such as trembling or blushing, the non-social phobic’s experience is unlikely to be of the 
same degree as the individual with social phobia (Wells, 2000).  In addition to the anxious 
arousal and avoidance of feared situations, the socially phobic individual has marked distress 
about having the phobia itself.  Adults with social phobia are aware that their fear is 
excessive or unreasonable, and experience clinically significant disruption to their social, 
occupational or daily routine (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Without treatment, 
this disorder is associated with considerable lifetime distress and disability (Chapman, 
Mannuzza, & Fyer, 1995; Pollack, 1999). 
1.2 Cognitive Models of Social Anxiety  
One of the most influential cognitive models of social anxiety is that of Clark and Wells 
(1995).  Clark and Wells describe their model of social phobia as a unique synthesis of 
earlier models including the theories of Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985), Leary (1983b) 
and Salkovskis (1991).  As a result of previous experiences and innate behavioural 
predispositions, SA individuals are believed to develop specific assumptions about 
themselves and others which are then activated during social interactions.  Moreover, during 
these interactions Clark and Wells suggest that socially phobic individuals are inclined to 
shift their attention inward and use self-monitoring of interoceptive information—that is, 
bodily sensations and feelings—to infer how they appear to others.  The SA individual is 
primarily worried about looking anxious; he or she is concerned that the other person with 
whom he or she is interacting will see him or her as being anxious.  Clinical observations 
suggest that these individuals commonly report the belief that looking anxious is equal to 
being incompetent or stupid.  Not surprisingly, this tendency for a negatively biased 
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perspective and self-focused attention leads individuals to become increasingly vigilant about 
looking anxious (i.e., more self-focused).   
 In Clark and Wells’ (1995) cognitive model of social anxiety, they suggest that “the 
core of social phobia appears to be a strong desire to convey a particular favorable 
impression of oneself to others and marked insecurity about one’s ability to do so” (p. 69).   
In an earlier self-presentation model of social anxiety, first outlined by Schlenker and Leary 
(1982, p. 645; also presented in Leary, 1995), it is suggested that social anxiety occurs when 
individuals “are motivated to make a desired impression on others but doubt they will do so.”  
Clark and Wells briefly recognize the role of impression expectations in their model, yet do 
not recognize the precise contribution of Schlenker and Leary!   
 In the Schlenker and Leary (1982) model, individuals are considered to be fearful of 
or worried about not being able to “pull off” their desired social impressions.  Anxiety occurs 
in a social situation when people do not expect to meet desired impressions.  To clarify, this 
model does not imply that individuals always want to make “good” impressions or expect to 
make negative impressions, as often misinterpreted (Leary & Kowalski, 1995).  Individuals 
can experience social anxiety even when they are making good impressions (or not appearing 
anxious), if it is not the desired or particular impression they expect to convey.  The main 
issue is a discrepancy between how important it is to appear a certain way and the 
expectations for such an appearance. 
1.3 Impressions: Importance and Expectations 
What type of impressions do SA individuals want to make and what type of impression do 
they expect to make?  DePaulo, Epstein and LeMay (1990) showed that SA individuals 
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engage in “innocuous sociability” (Schlenker & Leary, 1982, p. 655) in socially evaluative 
situations.  This behaviour typically includes nodding, smiling, expressing agreement, rarely 
interrupting, asking questions of others, and seldom volunteering information about oneself.  
Oakman, Gifford and Chlebowsky (2003) found that highly SA individuals do want to come 
across as warm and submissive, consistent with an innocuously sociable presentation.  
During an interaction, SA individuals appear to act in this manner with a newly acquainted 
individual, but Oakman et al. report that highly SA individuals think they appear cold and 
submissive during such a task.  Similarly, Leary, Kowalski and Campbell (1988) showed that 
SA individuals expected to make more negative impressions than non-socially anxious 
(NSA) controls during brief and short interactions (for example, after split-second, a 5-
minute get-acquainted task and following a 15-minute interaction).  Specifically, SA 
participants expected to be judged as less friendly, socially skilled, warm, open, well-
adjusted and interesting than NSA participants.  The goal of the SA individual in an 
interpersonal situation might be to avoid making a bad impression, rather than actively 
making a good impression on interactants (Schlenker & Leary, 1982; 1985).  This suggests 
that irrespective of the type of impressions, SA individuals do not expect to meet their own 
goals.  
 Wallace and Alden (1991) also demonstrated that SA individuals expected their 
performance to fall short of the expectations of others; despite the fact that they believed 
their abilities were equal to the abilities of most individuals.  In this study, men low and high 
in social anxiety were asked to rate their ability to meet or exceed three standards of 
performance—their own, the performance of the average subject, and experimenter’s 
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standards—only men low in social anxiety expected they would exceed all three standards.  
In comparison, highly SA men expected to meet their own personal standards and match the 
standards of the average subject, yet fail to meet the standards of the experimenter and 
others.  It is important to emphasize that the highly SA men’s and low SA men’s ratings of 
the average person’s achievement ability and experimenter standard were not significantly 
different.  Rather, highly SA men rated their personal standard as significantly lower than the 
experimenters’ in comparison to low SA men.   On the surface, this finding implies that SA 
individuals are “harsh critics” of themselves, likely endorsing biased internal standards of 
performance, and the belief that they cannot meet others’ standards.   It is also possible that 
individuals at the low end of a social anxiety dimension hold standards that are “out-of-tune” 
with the standards that most other people hold for themselves—a positivity bias!  In 
particular, these individuals with low levels of social anxiety believe that their ability to 
succeed in an interaction exceeds all other standards, even that of the average person.  
There are a number of reasons why SA individuals may be concerned with making a 
negative impression.  Leary (1983b) argues that avoiding social exclusion, one of the most 
important human drives, is responsible for this behaviour.  Avoiding disapproval could also 
explain why individuals with social anxiety may behave in a withdrawn or innocuous way in 
socially evaluative situations (DePaulo et al., 1990).  The strong desire to convey a particular 
impression may result from a belief that one is in danger of behaving in an incompetent and 
unacceptable fashion.  More importantly, the individual with social anxiety believes that 
unskilled behaviour would result in disastrous consequences such as loss of status and worth, 
embarrassment and ultimately, rejection (Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1990).  Appearing 
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anxious to others is feared by the SA person, since visibility of anxiety is believed to convey 
incompetence in social situations.  Purdon, Antony, Monteiro and Swinson (2001) examined 
how the judgments of personal characteristics (e.g., intelligence, attractiveness) are affected 
by the perception of anxiety in others.  Purdon et al. found that in general participants’ 
perception of a target individuals’ intelligence, ambition, reliability or mental health was not 
affected by his or her anxious appearance.  However, highly SA participants judged 
individuals with visible signs of anxiety as less attractive and as having less strength of 
character than non-anxious individuals.  Clearly, to the individual with SA making a negative 
impression has dire consequences for likeability overall. 
 Not surprisingly, concerns about making a negative impression or behaving in an 
unskilled manner also influence the SA individual’s level of anxiousness and consequently, 
socially relevant behaviours (Otto, 1999).  For example, if an individual with social anxiety 
believes he or she will say something inappropriate during a conversation, he or she may be 
so deeply engaged in monitoring his or her own thoughts before speaking that attending to 
the partner’s speech is unmanageable.  This belief results in additional anxious arousal, likely 
increases the risk of making “social” mistakes (e.g., forgetting what a conversational partner 
said!) and perpetuates the fear of making unfavourable impressions.  DePaulo et al. (1990) 
have shown that SA individuals are more likely to speak about themselves in pallid and 
boring ways, and this tendency makes them less interesting to others.  Undoubtedly, the 
importance one puts on making a particular impression can influence the actual impression 
he or she makes on others.  
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 Attempts to curb anxiety in social interactions, or “safety behaviours,” can also have 
further deleterious effects on impression formations.  The process of monitoring one’s 
thoughts could be considered a type of safety behaviour.  Other safety behaviours include, for 
example, avoiding eye contact, rehearsing sentences before speaking or talking only briefly 
with the intention of preventing oneself from behaving awkwardly (Alden & Bieling, 1998).  
Although safety behaviours serve to lessen anxiety during anxiety-provoking social 
situations, in the long run they are believed to upkeep negative expectations by serving as 
what Otto (1999) describes as “lucky escapes” (p. 15).  To illustrate, if Sally is concerned 
about her hands shaking during a conversation; she may clench a cup to disguise the 
trembling.  Nonetheless, her underlying negative beliefs—that an unsteady hand is a sign of 
appearing anxious and that appearing anxious is equivalent with incompetence—still exist.  
Such experiences also lead to further avoidance of social interactions on the whole, as well as 
the continued use of other safety behaviours during social encounters.   
 Without a doubt, understanding the role of impression importance and expectations is 
essential in appreciating cognitive models of social anxiety.  Two key models, Schlenker and 
Leary’s (1982) and Clark and Wells’ (1995), make distinctive predictions about the role of 
expectations for and importance of social impressions in this disorder.  Schlenker and 
Leary’s model implies that social anxiety will occur whenever a person’s expectations for 
making an important impression are discrepant from their beliefs about making that 
impression.  Therefore, many individuals are likely to experience anxious symptoms during 
social situations whenever an incongruity occurs between these beliefs and their 
expectations.  Clark and Wells’ model, on the other hand, suggests that only highly SA 
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individuals believe that they are likely to act in an unskilled and unacceptable manner before 
entering a social situation.  That is, they hold a negatively-biased expectation of themselves 
prior to an interaction.  Although these predictions vary, it is possible to empirically test the 
role of impression importance and expectations, and the implications for these both models. 
 Ultimately, to understand social anxiety disorder, the role of impression importance 
and expectations must be explored.  This need would be in addition to understanding the role 
one’s actual experience—that is one’s beliefs about how they presented during an interaction 
plays in this disorder.  Schlenker and Leary make few predictions about the role of anxiety 
during an interaction and subsequent influence on future expectations.  In contrast, Clark and 
Wells’ (1995) theorize that individuals with SA hold negatively biased expectations and that 
these views are then believed to be exacerbated by the invariable presence of somatic 
symptoms of anxiety—that is interoceptive information—in a social encounter.  Again, these 
differences are testable and exploring these concepts will assist in explaining key features of 
a cognitive model of social anxiety.  
1.4 Investigating Clark and Wells’ (1995) Model  
At the time of publication, Clark and Wells (1995) reported that no studies directly 
investigated whether social phobics use interoceptive information when developing an 
impression of how they are viewed.  To date, there is indirect evidence consistent and 
inconsistent with this model from studies of attentional, perspective-taking and memory 
biases in SA individuals.  
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1.4.1 Indirect Evidence for Clark and Wells’ (1995) Model 
1.4.1.1 Self-Focused Attention  
Heightened self-focused attention in SA individuals has been repeatedly cited as evidence for 
Clark and Wells’ (1995) model (Spurr & Stopa, 2002).  If individuals with high levels of 
social anxiety can be shown to have a tendency to be more self-focused (often implied by the 
absence of other-awareness), Clark and Wells’ interoceptive hypothesis would be supported.  
However, an important distinction can be made between two kinds of self-focused attention.  
Private self-consciousness refers to a person’s tendency to focus internally and reflect on 
inner thoughts and feelings (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975).  In contrast, public self-
consciousness is associated with a tendency to be concerned about making a good impression 
on others (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  According to the Clark and Wells’ model, social anxiety 
should be clearly associated with a tendency to be concerned about how others view oneself 
and a tendency to be more internally self-focused (i.e. both public and private self-
consciousness).  Fenigstein et al. (1975) found that social anxiety correlates with public self-
consciousness (r[452] = .21, p < .01), but not private self-consciousness (r[452] = .11, ns).  
Likewise, Hope and Heimberg (1988) demonstrated that public, not private, self-
consciousness is associated with social anxiety (r[44] = .68, p < .00 and r[44] = -.12, p > .05, 
respectively).  Of note, Hope and Heimberg showed that there were individual differences in 
levels of public self-consciousness among their highly SA sample, suggesting that high 
public self-consciousness is not a “prerequisite” for social anxiety disorder.   
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Understanding the role of heightened self-focused attention in social anxiety research  
becomes increasingly muddled given the possibility that being in a state of anxiety or distress 
causes heightened self-focused attention (e.g., Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone & Rachmeil, 
1990), rather than self-focused attention bringing about anxiety—as Clark and Wells (1995) 
would predict.  Woody (1996) appears to have completed one of the first studies examining 
the causal role of self-focused attention in social anxiety disorder (Brown & Stopa, 2007).  
Participants were asked to give a speech about themselves or about another participant 
standing before an audience.  She found that self focus increased visible anxiety (rated by 
individuals with social phobia and non-anxious observers), consistent with the Clark and 
Wells’ (1995) model, but this only occurred when participants were in a passive role during 
the task.  Self-focused attention did not affect social performance as might be expected.  
Bogels and Lamers (2002) criticized Woody’s study noting a lack of a control group, leaving 
it unclear if a similar result would be found for individuals with moderate or low levels of 
social anxiety also.    
Following Woody (1996), Bogels and Lamers (2002) conducted a study examining 
self-focused attention with the inclusion of a control group.  They showed that increased self-
awareness led to higher reports of social anxiety for both individuals high and low on a fear 
of blushing scale.  (Interestingly, increased task-focused attention was shown to reduce 
subjective social anxiety).  Bogels and Lamers also examined whether the effects of 
attentional focus would mediated by trait levels of social anxiety and the type of social 
feedback information provided.  Specifically, they expected that increased self-focused 
attention would lead to higher anxiety symptoms when there is positive social feedback and 
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only for those individuals with high trait levels of social anxiety.  According to Clark and 
Wells (1995) such a mediation relation should exist for SA individuals only, as it is believed 
that excessive self-focused attention leads to ignorance of positive social feedback.  In 
contrast, Bogels and Lamers found that self focus alone led to negative social evaluations and 
this was independent of trait levels of social anxiety.  In sum, the studies of Woody (1996) 
and Bogels and Lamer (2002) do not provide strong support of Clark and Wells’ predictions 
of a unique and unfavourable role of self-focused attention for individuals with social 
anxiety.  
1.4.1.2 Negative Attentional Biases   
Another avenue of empirical investigations for Clark and Wells’ (1995) model comes from 
studies examining attentional biases away from negative social cues in highly SA and social 
phobic individuals.  Clark and Wells suggest that SA individuals’ tendency for self-focused 
attention leads to the use of interoceptive information to judge oneself, at the expense of 
attending to the behaviour of others (e.g., audience members, interaction partners).  They 
suggest that individuals with SA would hold a bias away from attending to “threatening” 
negative social cues in experimental and real-world paradigms.  However, the literature 
examining such attentional biases is inconclusive and susceptible to external validity 
concerns (Amir & Foa, 2001).   
Studies in support of a negativity bias have compared attention to threatening and 
non-threatening words using “emotional” Stroop tests and dot-probe paradigms (for reviews 
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see Mathews, 1997 and Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).1  For example, Yuen 
(1994 as cited in Clark & Wells, 1995) used a modified version of MacLeod, Mathews and 
Tata’s (1986) dot-probe task with emotional faces to demonstrate that high social anxiety is 
associated with an attentional bias away from negative social cues—consistent with Clark 
and Wells (1995) predictions.   Subsequently, Mansell, Clark, Ehlers and Chen (1999) 
replicated and extended Yeun’s (1994 as cited in Clark & Wells, 1995) findings, suggesting 
that SA individuals show an attentional bias away from positive and negative emotional 
stimuli.  Finally, using a similar paradigm, Bradley, Mogg and Lee (1997, experiment 1) 
failed to find any attentional bias in individuals scoring high on the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson and Friend, 1969).  These key studies demonstrate the 
inconsistent support for Clark and Wells’ beliefs about attentional biases away from negative 
cues in such experimental attention tasks. 
Similar inconsistent evidence for attentional biases is also found with other visual 
search tasks believed to more closely replicate real-word scenarios (yet with weak external 
validity).  Recently, Eastwood et al. (2005) gave a face-in-the-crowd visual search task to 
individuals with generalized social phobia.  Participants were asked to find the unique face 
image (either positive or negative) in an array of images as accurately and quickly as 
possible.  Individuals with social phobia tended to locate negative faces faster than positive 
                                                 
1 Both Stroop and dot-probe tests are widely used measures of interference and allocation of 
attention.   An emotional Stroop test involves the presentation of emotional words in place of the 
typical colours, with slowness in response times to emotion words believed to be a result of emotional 
relevance of the target presented.  A typical dot-probe test would involve the brief presentation of two 
targets one above the other, followed by a dot in one of the spatial locations of the targets. An 
emotional dot-probe task would use faces depicting emotions, and differences in reaction times to 
detecting the dot indicative of emotional biases. 
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faces, suggesting a bias towards detecting negative information is present.  In contrast, 
Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez and Gordon (2003) examined the visual attention of individuals 
with and without social phobia.  Participants’ patterns of eye movements and fixations to 
face stimuli were examined.  In comparison with controls, individuals with social phobia 
tended to avoid fixating on salient facial features, such as targets’ eyes, and overall spent less 
time fixated on any specific features.  Again, these studies do not make clear conclusions in 
understanding the role of attentional biases in social anxiety disorder.  
Finally, attentional biases have also been studied in experimental paradigms with 
stronger external validity, yet with similarly inconsistent support for Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
model.  For example, Veljaca and Rapee (1998) report that individuals with social anxiety 
are more accurate at detecting negative audience behaviours than individuals with low social 
anxiety.  Seventeen SA participants and 14 individuals low in social anxiety (all female) 
were asked to present a 5-minute speech to an audience composed of confederates and the 
experimenter.  Audience members were trained to behave in a friendly but reserved manner 
and exhibit specific positive and negative socially evaluative behaviours, such as smiling or 
yawning at a rate of one behaviour per minute.  While presenting the speeches, participants 
indicated when they detected positive or negative behaviours with hand-held devices.  In 
comparison to low SA participants, high SA individuals were better at detecting negative 
social response from an audience.  Overall, all these studies of biases highlight the 
uncertainty in understanding the role of self-focused attention in this disorder.   
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1.4.1.3 Perspective-taking   
Perspective-taking studies are typically used to examine the presence of biases in SA 
individuals’ memory of social encounters, providing another way in which self-focused 
attention can be indirectly examined.  According to the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, SA 
individuals are likely to remember social events from an observer perspective that is from an 
external point of view (rather than “through their own eyes”) because they are not attending 
to external events.  A number of studies have been shown to provide support for this aspect 
of Clark and Wells’ model.  For example, Wells, Clark and Ahmed (1998) asked 12 social 
phobics and 12 normal controls to recall an image from a recent social situation and non-
social situation in a counterbalanced manner.  Participants were asked to rate the degree of 
observer versus field perspective in their images, that is, whether they were entirely looking 
out through their own eyes (i.e., field perspective) to entirely observing themselves from an 
external point of view (i.e., observer perspective).  In comparison to normal controls, socially 
phobic individuals were more likely to take an observer perspective in social situations and a 
field perspective in non-social situations.  Wells and Papageorgiou (1999) extended these 
findings using a similar procedure, but with anxious controls (i.e., patients with blood/injury 
phobia).  Again, only participants with social phobia used the observer perspective when 
recalling an image of a recent anxiety-provoking social situation.   In general, these findings 
suggest that SA individuals are not attending to information outside of themselves, but seeing 
themselves as an outsider in the field would (i.e., perspective of the observer rather than of 
the field).  Overall, the presence of such perspective taking biases is considered indirect 
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evidence that the SA individual is focused on the self (i.e., internally self-focused) during a 
social interaction.  
The role of the observer and field perspective during an in vivo rather than recalled 
event has also been examined.  Coles, Turk, Heimberg and Fresco (2001) examined the use 
of the observer versus field perspective on anxious arousal and self-ratings of performance.  
High and low SA participants completed a 2-minute speech either while being asked to take 
either a field or observer perspective.  For both groups, using an observer perspective was 
associated with more safety behaviours, more frequent negative thoughts and worse self-
evaluation compared to using the field perspective.  Although not significant, there was a 
trend indicating that only the observer perspective was related to increased anxious arousal.  
Coles et al. were unable to compare self evaluations of performance with independent ratings 
(due to low inter-rater reliability); however, they predicted that in comparison to NSA 
participants, SA individuals’ self-ratings would be worse than true “observer” ratings.  In 
combination with evidence indicating that people with social phobia are also prone to 
spontaneous images of social situations from the observer perspective (e.g., Hackmann, 
Surawy, & Clark, 1998), this suggest that individuals with social phobia are not paying 
attention to, and thus not recalling, external information.   
1.4.1.4 Memory Biases 
Tests of memory for details of social interactions has also been reported by Clark and Wells 
(1995) to serve as support that SA individuals tend to focus inwardly during a social event.  
Once again though, the findings are inconsistent across similar studies.  Hope, Heimberg, and 
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Klein (1990) showed that highly SA individuals’ memory for details of social interactions 
was poorer than low SA individuals.  Kimble and Zehr (1982) and Daly, Vangelisti and 
Lawrence (1989 as cited in Wells, 2000) found similar results.  In contrast, Stopa and Clark 
(1993) found no differences in memory for the social environment for SA individuals, 
anxious controls and normal controls.  Following an interaction with a confederate, 
participants were asked to freely recall the conversation and were presented with a 
recognition memory test of stimuli present during the interaction (e.g., an umbrella in room, 
the number of rings on confederate).  If SA individuals were engaging in increased self-
focused attention, they were expected to have memory deficits in their recall of the 
conversation or environment in comparison to control participants.  No differences emerged 
between groups on either the free recall or recognition tests.  Similarly, Rapee, McCallum, 
Melville and Ravenscroft (1994) failed to find any biases for negative/threatening 
information in a series of four studies examining recall and recognition memory.  Clark and 
Wells’ model predicts that SA individuals focus inwardly during interactions and that this 
tendency affects their memories for information in such interactions.  However, this brief 
summary of studies of memory biases emphasizes the difficulty in finding non-equivocal 
support for the inward-focus aspect of the Clark and Wells’ model.  
 To reiterate, at the time of publication, Clark and Wells’ (1995) cited numerous 
studies that indirectly support their view that social phobics use interoceptive information 
when developing an impression of how they are viewed.   However, a review of studies since 
that time—specifically examining attentional bases, perspective taking, and memory biases 
studies—repeatedly demonstrates inconsistencies with this literature.   
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1.4.2 Direct Evidence for Clark and Wells’ (1995) Model 
To adequately examine how SA individuals experience and judge themselves in social 
situations, we have to directly examine the development of self-perceptions.  Typically, this 
type of research compares the self-ratings made by SA and NSA individuals, or compares the 
SA individuals’ rating of themselves with the ratings made of them by an interactant or 
observer during a social interaction.  Clark and Wells’ (1995) model proposes that the SA 
individuals’ self-perspective is distorted in comparison with the ratings made by others.  
They suggest that distortion is the result of invariably heightened level of anxious symptoms 
experienced by the SA individual, and use the distortion literature to support their argument 
that attention to anxiety leads to an inaccurate perspective.  A brief review of studies with 
direct evidence for Clark and Wells’ (1995) model is described below.  Again, the direct 
evidence in support of Clark and Wells’ model is mixed.   
One of the earliest studies in support of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model comes from 
Clark and Arkowitz (1975).  In their study, Clark and Arkowitz compared the self-
evaluations of high and low SA men following an open-ended conversation with a female 
confederate.  The conversations were audio-taped and trained judges rated performances in 
terms of (visible) social anxiety and social skills for participants and confederates (note, that 
the same dimensions were used in self-evaluation ratings).  Discrepancy scores between 
judges’ mean ratings and participants’ mean ratings were calculated.  In comparison to low 
anxious individuals and confederates, participants high in social anxiety tended to 
overestimate the level of anxiety visible in their performance in comparison to judges’ 
ratings; however, the one-tailed t-test results only approached significance (t[12] = 1.60, p < 
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.10).  Social skills were underestimated in comparison with judges’ ratings for high SA 
individuals, while low anxious controls overestimated their social skills.  Consistent with 
Clark and Wells’ model, highly SA participants felt and believed they presented as more 
anxious than as judge by others.  Of note, the judges’ ratings were based only on audiotapes 
of the conversations, and therefore, inform us of discrepancies in self-ratings of verbal 
performance, and not visibility of anxious appearance per se.  For the most part, Clark and 
Wells’ model seems to include a more broad view of self-perspectives of anxious 
appearance.  
 A study by Rapee and Lim (1992) examined visibility of anxiety and has repeatedly 
been cited as evidence for distorted perception of social performance (e.g., Alden, Mellings 
& Ryder, 2001; Clark & Wells, 1995).  Rapee and Lim examined self and observer-ratings of 
performance in individuals with social phobia in comparison with non-clinical controls.  
Twenty-eight people with social phobia and 33 non-clinical controls presented an 
unrehearsed speech in front of an audience composed of social phobic and non-social phobic 
controls.  Participants and audience members rated speech performance specifically (e.g., 
kept eye contact with audience) and globally (e.g., generally spoke well).  Social phobics 
tended to have greater discrepancies between self- and observer-ratings in comparison with 
controls, yet this difference was only detected for global, not specific, ratings of 
performance.  It is important to highlight that all participants’ self-ratings were worse (i.e., 
more negative) than observer-ratings rather than only those ratings from SA individuals.  The 
role of experiencing anxiety in the development of self-perceptions remains unclear.  
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 Another study in support of Clark and Wells’ (1995) discrepancy theory was a study 
by Alden and Wallace (1995).  They demonstrated that social phobics overestimated the 
visibility of their anxiety following a 5-minute interaction with a confederate in comparison 
with non-social phobic controls.  Behavioural ratings of the participants’ non-verbal signs of 
anxiety, positive non-verbal behaviours, verbal behaviours, and likeability, were completed 
by the participant, confederate and experimenter.  Alden and Wallace found that in 
comparison with the experimenter ratings, both SA and control participants overestimated the 
visibility of their anxiety and underestimated their likeability regardless of the way the 
interactant presented (e.g., warm and friendly versus cold and unfriendly).  In addition, social 
phobic individuals overestimated their anxious behaviour more than control subjects.  As 
with the previously described studies, the artificial nature of the interaction (e.g., use of a 
confederate), plus the use of only one independent observer, clearly limits the external 
validity of the study.   
 The above three studies suggest that SA individuals may hold a pervasive tendency to 
be negative in their self-evaluations; yet, there is also evidence to the contrary.  For example, 
in Strahan and Conger’s (1998) study, high and low SA men were videotaped while being 
interviewed by an attractive woman.  There was no difference in self-ratings of content, 
fluency, nonverbal competence, and global competence between high SA and low SA 
groups.  Woody and Rodriguez (2000) also failed to find evidence of distorted self-
perception.  In their study, SA participants’ ratings were similar to observer-ratings, in 
comparison with control participants’ overestimates of how well they performed during an 
interaction.   This latter finding suggests that SA individuals may not hold a pervasive 
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negativity bias; rather NSA individuals may hold a tendency for a positive bias in their self-
evaluations!  Similar evidence for NSA individuals to make positive interpretations in 
ambiguous situations has been produced (see Hirsch, Mathews & Clark, 2007 for recent 
review). 
 To this point, the studies described focus on understanding the SA individuals’ self-
perceptions relative to outside perspectives or in comparison to NSA individuals.  In one 
way, Clark and Wells (1995) might argue that SA individuals’ experience of interoceptive 
anxiety is so overwhelming that they expect it to “leak out” and be readily visible to others—
more so than actually judged by observers in a situation—leading to discrepancies in 
perspectives.   However, the evidence to date serves as only indirect correlational evidence 
indicating that SA individuals’ self-perspectives may be the result of using interoceptive 
information.  There are some studies that do examine self-perspectives and the particular role 
of anxious arousal in the development of these views.  Once again, the evidence in support of 
the Clark and Wells’ model is inconclusive.   
 McEwan and Devins (1983) examined the role of anxious arousal, self-ratings and 
observer-ratings in what they believed to be more naturalistic settings than most studies.  
Highly SA and NSA participants were asked to rate how publicly noticeable they believed 
their anxiety was to others.  Friends of the participants were also contacted and asked to rate 
visibility of anxiety of the participants in everyday settings.  The sample of highly SA 
participants were also divided into those experiencing low and high somatic symptoms (as 
measured by the Bodily Change Form; Tyrer, 1976).  Only individuals who reported a 
tendency to experience a high number of somatic symptoms during social situations tended 
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to overestimate visibility of their anxiety in comparison with judgments made by friends.  
This finding suggests that SA individuals who experience high arousal and awareness of 
somatic symptoms may be relying on their internal arousal to make estimates of their level of 
visible anxiety.  SA individuals who experience low arousal are expected to make more 
accurate predictions of their visibility of anxiety.  It is important to note that individuals were 
reporting on anxiety in everyday interactions, and the tendency to believe anxiety was visible 
was not directly measured during a controlled social encounter. 
Mansell and Clark (1999) attempted a similar investigation of interoceptive awareness 
during controlled experimental encounters.  In Mansell and Clark’s study, high and low SA 
individuals made global and specific self-judgments about their appearance and performance 
following a 2-minute speech to a video camera.  These judgments were compared with 
observer-ratings of the taped speech.  Participants also rated the degree to which they noticed 
bodily sensations (using the Autonomic Performance Questionnaire; Bergman & Johnson, 
1971) during the speech.  The results indicate that highly SA participants overestimated the 
degree to which they appeared anxious.  Moreover, self-ratings were correlated with the 
degree to which participants noticed body sensations for only the high SA group.  These 
results are consistent with Clark and Wells’ (1995) hypothesis that highly SA individuals use 
interoceptive information to make global judgments about how they appear.  Interestingly, 
participants also made specific ratings about their behaviour during the speech (e.g., left long 
gaps during conversation).  Correlations between specific negative ratings and perception of 
body sensations were similar for high and low SA individuals (r = .69 and .67, respectively).  
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This suggests that SA individuals and those low in social anxiety equally attend to 
interoceptive information when making judgments about specific negative behaviours.   
Mellings and Alden (2000) also found evidence that SA individuals overestimated the 
degree to which they appeared anxious in comparison with observer-ratings, likely as a 
consequence of increased self-focused attention and decreased external focus.  In their study, 
individuals either high or low in social anxiety were involved in a conversation with a 
confederate.  Participants completed measures of anxious appearance (i.e., eye contact, 
pauses in speech, fidgeting), self-focused attention, anxiety-related physiological symptoms, 
and open-ended and structured recall of information from the conversation.  Highly SA 
individuals were found to be more self-focused and to report significantly more anxiety-
related sensations than their low SA counterparts.  In comparison with objective ratings of 
their anxious appearance, all individuals were found to overestimate the appearance of 
anxiety-related behaviour (e.g., fidgeting)—although the overestimation bias was greater for 
high SA than low SA participants.  The difference between subjects’ self-ratings and 
objective ratings of anxiety was positively correlated with self-focused attention scores and 
negatively correlated with recall of information from the conversation.  In sum, only 
participants who reported more self-focused attention were likely to judge themselves as 
more anxious than reported by observers and to recall less information about their partner.  
Mellings and Alden argue that the increase in self-focused attention likely makes anxiety-
related behaviours more salient than external information.  Although the finding is consistent 
with Clark and Wells’ (1995) predictions, the contributing role of anxiety-related 
physiological symptoms in these judgments was unclear.  In addition, the overestimation bias 
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shown by SA individuals was in comparison to individuals at the extreme low end of a social 
anxiety measure. 
 In a similar study, Alden and Mellings (2004) examined sources of information in 
individuals’ ratings of their performance during a conversation.  Twenty-five individuals 
with generalized social phobia and community controls interacted with a confederate for five 
minutes and then made ratings of their global performance.  They were also asked to rate the 
degree to which they used self-related information (verbal behaviour, anxiety-related 
behaviour, pro-social behaviour and subjective anxiety) and partner-related information 
(partner interest, partner comfort) to arrive at their decisions.  In comparison with the control 
group, participants with social phobia reported that their self-judgments derived heavily from 
self-related, rather than partner-related information.  Specifically, individuals with social 
phobia used inner emotions (subjective anxiety) and how anxious they believed they 
appeared (anxiety-related information) when making judgments.   These sources of anxiety 
are consistent with the interoceptive hypothesis of Clark and Wells (1995) suggesting that 
SA individuals largely ignore information from others when deriving how they appear.  
 As shown above, the tendency for SA individuals to overestimate appearance of 
anxiety relative to observer-ratings has been demonstrated repeatedly with mostly 
correlational studies.  Papageorgiou and Wells (1997 as cited in Mansell & Clark, 1999) 
presented findings at the British Association for Behaviour and Cognitive Psychotherapy that 
included an experimental manipulation.  High and low SA participants were told that their 
heart rate had increased prior to engaging in a socially evaluative conversation.  Low SA 
individuals made accurate estimates about how they appeared to others, while high SA 
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individuals underestimated how well they came across.  Papageorgiou and Wells suggest that 
either the increased awareness of or attention to somatic symptoms (viz., heart rate) leads 
highly SA individuals to make distortions in self-perception relative to the views of others.  
However, the inference from this study is provisional, as we do not know what type of 
ratings participants would make without the experimental manipulation in place.   
In a follow up study, Wells and Papageorgiou (2001) once again attempted to 
demonstrate experimentally that interoceptive information affects the SA individuals’ self-
perceptions.  Eight individuals diagnosed with social phobia were asked to converse with a 
confederate.  Prior to the conversation, subjects were told that their pulse rate had either 
increased or decreased.  Participants who were told that their pulse rate increased 
experienced more anxiety and more self-focused attention than participants in the decreased 
pulse-rate condition.  The participants in the increased pulse rate group also reported more 
idiosyncratically derived negative beliefs, such as “I’ll blush and people will think that I am 
anxious” during the conversation.  Observers rated participants in the decreased condition as 
less visibly anxious than participants in the increased pulse rate group.  Despite the small 
sample size, these findings initially appear to lend support to Clark and Wells’ (1995) model.  
However, it should be noted that Wells and Papageorgiou did not measure actual increases or 
decreases in participant pulse rates.  According to the Clark and Wells’ hypothesis SA 
individuals are believed to be using current interoceptive information in their self-ratings; 
that is, individuals who have lower levels of anxious arousal should report less visible 
anxiety.  In this experiment, it is not clear if the explicit manipulation caused an increase or 
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decrease in participants’ heart rates, nor how this may have affected their perceived level of 
anxious arousal and subsequently their self-perceptions.   
In 2002, Papageorgiou and Wells repeated this study while monitoring heart rates to 
control for potential effects of the feedback manipulation on actual arousal, using individuals 
low and high on social anxiety (i.e., bottom and top quartile of selection measure).  They 
showed that there were no effects of feedback from the manipulation.  Papageorgiou and 
Wells report that these results were consistent with Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, such that 
individuals provided with information stating their heart rate increased reported worse 
performance than individuals who did not receive this manipulation.  It should be stressed 
that this study shows that the belief that one’s heart rate increased, that is an overt shift in 
attention to internal information—not the presence of interoceptive arousal per se—was 
associated with the development of self-appearance judgments.  The latter finding would be 
consistent with Clark and Wells’ model as they argue that individuals with social anxiety use 
their arousal in making erroneous judgments.  
1.5 Role of Self- and Body-Consciousness in Self-ratings of Appearance    
A number of the studies described above imply either that SA individuals may be more 
sensitive than NSA individuals to interoceptive information when making self judgments of 
performance or that SA individuals may hold beliefs that internal information (such as 
thoughts and feelings) is readily available for others to detect.  The question of whether SA 
individuals are more aware of internal sensations in comparison with NSA individuals 
remains unexamined.  More importantly, the basic question of whether sensitivity to 
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interoceptive information is related to judgments about anxious appearance has also not been 
explored.   
 Individuals high in private body-consciousness are inclined to focus on internal 
sensations, and attend to this information more than individuals low in this trait (Miller, 
Murphy & Buss, 1981).  In contrast, individuals high on public body-consciousness are 
inclined to focus on observable aspects of body (e.g., appearance, manner, style of 
behaviour).  As an aside, private body-consciousness is moderately correlated with private 
self-consciousness (r = .37 to .45 for men and women respectively, p < .01), and considered 
to be a distinct personality disposition.  On the other hand, public body-consciousness and 
public self-consciousness are more strongly correlated (r = .71 and .66 for men and women 
respectively, p < .01), suggesting these scales are measuring similar personality constructs 
(Miller et al., 1981).  Miller et al. demonstrated that individuals who are high on private 
body-consciousness are more sensitive to changes in their bodily state (following caffeine 
ingestion) than individuals low on this trait.   
In harmony with Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, one might suspect that highly SA 
individuals are prone to focusing on internal sensations.  That is, we would expect that SA 
individuals would be predisposed to focus on appearance and outward behaviour (viz., public 
body-consciousness) and inclined to focus on internal sensations (viz., private body-
consciousness).  On the contrary, Miller et al. (1981) note that private and public body-
consciousnesses traits are unrelated to social anxiety (r ranges from .1 to .15, ns).  Using a 
larger sample (n = 266), Leary and Kowalski (1993) found a significant correlation (p < .01) 
between social anxiety and body-consciousness; yet, the strength of the correlation was weak 
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(r = .16).  The above findings do not support the view that SA individuals are predisposed to 
be more aware of internal sensations, although it is possible that SA individuals only have a 
tendency to focus on internal sensations during social interactions (as addressed below). 
To understand the role tendencies to focus on external and internal information may 
play in Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, a review of often confusing terms and literature 
related to self focus is required.  Self focus can be public or private and situational (a.k.a., in-
situation) or trait-like (i.e., dispositional; Govern & Marsch, 2001).  Public self-awareness is 
a situational tendency to focus one’s attention on observable aspects of self, akin to private 
self- and body-consciousness, but examined in the moment (Govern & Marsch, 2001).  
Similarly, while private self- and body-consciousness are considered dispositional features 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975), private self-awareness is the situational tendency to focus on 
internal (non-observable) information (Buss, 1980).  Public self-awareness has been 
repeatedly shown to be induced through various manipulations, such as presence of a video 
camera (e.g., Alden, Teschuk & Tee, 1992) or full-length mirror (e.g., Webb, Marsh, 
Schneiderman & Davis, 1989 as cited in Govern & Marsch, 2001).   Private self-awareness is 
typically induced when individuals are asked to speak about themselves and focus on 
thoughts and feelings (e.g., Webb et al., 1989 as cited in Govern & Marsch, 2001). 2   
                                                 
2 The literature on self-awareness becomes increasingly difficult to disentangle as many of 
the key variables as mentioned are both dispositionally and situationally measured, as well 
as identified by outwardly different scales that have only marginal differences (Govern & 
Marsch, 2001).  The overlap between self-focused attention, body- and self-consciousness, 
and awareness will become clear as an example of this problem.  In the current study, we use 
the term ‘self-awareness’ to refer in general to the collective tendencies to experience body- 
or self-consciousness.  
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Ostensibly, these private and public self-awareness states and traits (i.e., self- and 
body-consciousness) are important factors contributing to Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, as 
it is believed that SA individuals experience increased self focus during social interactions, 
simultaneously developing negative self-impressions.  George and Stopa (in press, as cited in 
Brown & Stopa, 2007) showed that public self-awareness increased for both high and low 
SA individuals following two types of self focus manipulations (mirror and video) during a 
conversation with a stooge.  As well, private self-awareness decreased for the low SA 
individuals and was unchanged for the high SA group during the interaction.    
 Social psychology provides two concepts that may provide insight into how SA 
individuals develop these impressions: illusion of transparency and spotlight effect.  The 
illusion of transparency phenomenon suggests that people tend to overestimate the extent to 
which others can read their internal states (Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky, 1998).  This 
systematic bias—believing that one’s thoughts, feelings, and emotions are detectable by 
others—is demonstrated in studies examining distortions between self- and observer-ratings 
of performance (Brown & Stopa, 2007).  Lederman, Savitsky and Gilovich (1998) note that 
individuals recognize that internal information is not readily available to others, yet continue 
to hold the belief that their thoughts and emotions are visible.  Gilovich et al. suggest that 
individuals “anchor” their judgments of how they appear to others based on their own 
subjective experience.  Although individuals try to take the perspective of others when 
making these judgments, they remain egocentrically biased (Gilovich and Savitsky, 1999).  
Spotlight effect refers to one’s tendency to overestimate how much others attend to one’s 
own external appearance (Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky, 2000).  This could, for example, 
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include believing that everyone will notice your awkward haircut or stained clothes, and 
overestimating how often this would actually happen. 
Both the illusion of transparency and spotlight effect phenomena are usually 
measured by comparing individuals’ estimates of internal or external states to an observers’ 
rating (quite similar to the Clark and Wells’ [1995] discrepancy literature; Brown and Stopa, 
2007).   It is important to stress that these phenomena are not specific to individuals with 
high levels of social anxiety; rather they are shown to affect all individuals.  Brown and 
Stopa report that they provide the only study examining the spotlight effect and illusion of 
transparency for individuals with moderate to high social anxiety.  Overall they found that 
these individuals experienced more spotlight effect in high social-evaluation (i.e., high 
evaluative threat) than low social-evaluation (i.e., low evaluative threat) conditions, and that 
the experience of the spotlight effect was not positively associated with trait social anxiety 
levels (as expected).   Illusion of transparency effects were also present, but surprisingly not 
influenced by type of social-evaluation.  They compared this latter finding to those shown for 
NSA individuals by Vorauer and Ross (1999), noting that illusion of transparency increased 
under high socially threatening conditions.  Given the consistency in illusion of transparency 
levels across evaluative conditions for SA individuals, Brown and Stopa suggest illusion of 
transparency phenomenon may be a more trait-like feature of social anxiety disorder.  They 
add that self-awareness leads to illusion of transparency effects and imply that self-awareness 
is also more trait-like than believed.  Finally, Brown and Stopa conclude that the Clark and 
Wells’ model may provide a reasonable framework to determining the type of internal 
information that is required to develop a representation of how anxious one looks.  However, 
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they state that Clark and Wells’ model would likely benefit from inclusion of internal and 
external focusing of attention tendencies (such as spotlight effect and illusion of 
transparency); factors that have been neglected in their theory.  Nevertheless, these studies 
alert us to consider that attentional processes, such as a tendency to focus on internal 
information, may not be exclusive to only highly SA individuals.  
 In sum, to develop a strong understanding of the kinds of mental representations 
individuals with SA hold about themselves, we need to investigate the role anxious arousal 
plays in developing these representations and explore the role of trait-like features that might 
influence anxious symptomatology.  As reviewed, indirect studies (viz., perspective-taking, 
memory biases) and direct studies of self-perception have yielded mixed support for Clark 
and Wells’ (1995) model of social anxiety.  Although the role of anxious arousal has been 
explored in limited studies, there is little known about how other trait-like individual 
differences in self-awareness might affect the relation between interoceptive information and 
self-perceptions.  The influence of trait-like symptoms on anxious arousal has not necessarily 
been examined with other investigations of self-perspectives.  Clearly, further investigation 
that integrates these key areas is required.  
1.6 Limitations with Current Studies 
The preceding review of studies highlights a number of methodological limitations with the 
existing literature.  These limitations include the widespread use of only confederates (e.g., 
Alden and Wallace, 1995), control groups composed of individuals very low on social 
anxiety (e.g., Clark and Arkowitz, 1975), scripted “unnatural” interactions (e.g., Mellings 
and Alden, 2000) and small sample sizes (e.g., Wells and Papageorgiou, 2001).   As well, 
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participants’ self-ratings are frequently compared to the ratings made by others in the 
interaction or blind observers (e.g., McEwan & Devins, 1983; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000), 
but rarely are comparisons made by both parties within and outside of the direct interaction.  
Finally, while visibility of anxious appearance of others is believed to have dire 
consequences, the role of the raters’ own anxiety when making judgments is commonly 
overlooked (e.g., with the use of blind observers only). 
1.6.1 Operational Definitions and Levels of Measurement 
One major obstacle to understanding self-perspectives remains.  Concise and consistent 
operational definitions of fundamental concepts do not exist.   The operational definitions of 
the important constructs such as performance, appearance and impression are muddled.  For 
example, there is no widely agreed upon criteria for “performance”—as this term has been 
used to describe anything from speech dysfluencies (e.g., Mansell & Clark, 1999) to social 
skills (e.g., Clark & Arkowitz, 1975).  Anxious appearance may include signs of visible 
anxiety, such as blushing or shakiness or simply “appearing anxious” (e.g., Mellings & 
Alden, 2000).  In addition, the term impression is inherently vague and loosely defined (e.g., 
DePaulo et al., 1990; Purdon et al., 2001).   
The interchangeability and muddling of key constructs in determining one’s mental 
representation of self is further complicated by the use of global ratings (e.g., “success in 
interaction,” “appeared nervous”) and/or specific ratings (e.g., fidgety, frequency of pauses in 
speech) that vary in their definitions across studies (Rapee & Lim, 1992).  Although one 
might expect specific ratings to be accurately reflected by composites of “global” or overall 
ratings, our understanding of the empirical relation between relevant global and specific 
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ratings is generally assumed, but largely untested.  Without acknowledgement of the 
difficulties in defining the nature of one’s “mental representation” of anxiety, we risk further 
challenges in comparing studies and developing conclusive support for any model.   
1.6.2 Role of Partners in Interactions 
To fully understand the type of impression the individual with social anxiety wants to make, 
expects to make, and role of anxiety in the development of this impression during an 
interaction, we need to examine the impression made on the “others” in the interaction.  
Blind observers of experimental situations are often included in studies to address this 
concern.  However, the observers’ impressions of participants are undeniably different than 
those individuals within the interaction—that is, individuals who come with their own biases 
and anxieties, and are experiencing the interaction first hand.  The informative and pivotal 
role partners play in social interactions is repeatedly overlooked in many studies given the 
difficulty in controlling partners’ behaviours.  Nonetheless, this control is at the expense of 
truly being able to generalize the results for individuals with social anxiety to “real life” 
situations.  We know individuals with social anxiety are concerned about being evaluated and 
suspect that such worries have a costly impact on the impression made on others (e.g., 
DePaulo et al., 1990).  Furthermore, SA individuals may fear rejection by others, yet the 
question of whether they are “rejected” by others is unconfirmed.  Again, a comprehensive 
test of impression and mental representation development for the SA individual must include 
an assessment of the others experiencing the social interaction.    
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1.7 Current Study 
The present study addresses both Schlenker and Leary (1982) and Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
models by examining the SA individual’s mental representation of self, and its relation to the 
experience of anxiety in a social situation.  Highly SA individuals were compared to 
individuals who had within normal levels of social anxiety, what we refer to as non-socially 
anxious (NSA; note, these individuals are explicitly not individuals extremely low in social 
anxiety).  These unacquainted pairs of NSA individuals and mixed pairs of highly SA and 
NSA individuals participated in an unstructured “get acquainted” task and a structured 
problem-solving task.  In general, we expected that an unstructured familiarity task would 
draw for affiliative behaviour from participants, while structured tasks may provide 
opportunities for leadership or behaviour related to dominance to also emerge.  The main 
variables of interest were participants’ impression expectations, ratings of how anxious they 
felt in the situation, how anxious they believe they appeared to their partner, and how they 
were actually viewed by others in the situation and those observing (via videotapes of the 
interaction).    
This study was designed to answer a number of questions.  First, Schlenker and 
Leary’s (1982) prediction was tested, that is, whether anxious arousal occurs when 
individuals desire to make a particular impression but doubt their ability to do so.  It was 
expected that individuals report increased anxiety when there is a discrepancy between their 
ratings of impression importance and expectations.  This model is tested without distinction 
between SA and NSA individuals; however, the role of trait social anxiety was also 
examined in an exploratory way.  Unlike Schlenker and Leary’s model, the Clark and Wells’ 
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model does make different predictions for SA individuals and NSA individuals.  Specifically, 
they expect that SA individuals (by definition) experience more anxiety in social situations 
than NSA individuals and that, unlike NSA individuals, SA individuals rely heavily on this 
anxious experience when deriving how they appear to others.  This component of the Clark 
and Wells’ model was tested, and role of trait levels of self-awareness in individuals’ 
development of mental representation of self were investigated.  It was predicted that self-
reports of arousal and appearance should be associated with a tendency to be concerned 
about how others view oneself and a tendency to be more internally self-focused (i.e., public 
and private self-consciousness) during an interaction that would seemingly increase both 
public and private situational focus tendencies.  Finally, the types of impressions SA 
individuals actually make on others in an interaction and on those uninvolved and observing 
the social situation were examined.  It was suspected that SA individuals would be judged as 
appearing more anxious than NSA individuals by both partners and observers, and that 
anxious behaviour (i.e., more observable anxious appearance) would be associated with 
rejection by others (while controlling for raters’ own anxious arousal levels).  
 Although many studies have examined SA individuals’ self-perceptions of 
appearance, the current study provides a number of methodological improvements on past 
research.  Many studies use interactions that are artificially scripted (as with many “back-
and-forth” reciprocal-task paradigms), while the current study did not.  Rather, both an 
unstructured and structured task was used allowing for the opportunity to naturally draw for 
different behaviours during a brief interaction.  Moreover, all partners were NSA individuals 
(i.e., not stooges or confederates) with the intention of improving external validity.  Further, 
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the experience and arousal level of partners during the interaction and the impact on key 
study variables were examined.  Unlike many previous studies, the comparison group was 
composed of NSA individuals who scored close to the mean on a scale of interaction anxiety, 
rather than participants with low levels of social anxiety.  It is expected that most people find 
getting-to-know-you interactions with a stranger somewhat anxiety-provoking and hope to 
make a positive (or at minimum, non-negative impression); however, it is suspected that low 
SA controls may experience interactions in a manner unlike NSA or SA individuals (e.g., 
low SA individuals might not care about the impression made or hold unreasonably high 
confidence about making good impressions).  In addition to having NSA partners examine 
the anxious appearance of participants, ratings from trained observers blind to the study 
hypotheses were obtained.  Unlike many other studies, this design provides the opportunity 
to examine participants’ self-perceptions while controlling for the perspectives of partners 
and outside observers.  Finally, in this study anxious arousal and appearance from a global 
and more specific viewpoint was examined along with the relation between these often 






In total, 430 university students (270 female, 160 male) were invited to participate in this 
study over the course of four terms.  The participants were enrolled in introductory 
psychology at the University of Waterloo and received partial course credit for their 
participation.  Participants completed a measure of their trait interaction anxiety (IAS; Leary, 
1983a, Table A1 in Appendix A) in a mass-testing context separated from the laboratory 
study.  Socially anxious participants were selected from those who scored more than one 
standard deviation above the mean (M = 43, SD = 12) on the IAS (i.e., > 55), and participants 
were considered NSA if they scored within one-half standard deviation of the mean (37 to 
49).  While we did not make specific predictions about participants’ gender, we hoped to 
minimize anxiety due to “attractiveness” by using same sex couples, and all pairs consisted 
of same-gendered NSA individuals or one SA and one NSA individual.  Pairs of SA 
individuals were not included in the study design because there was concern that interactions 
between pairs of SA individuals would provide limited information (e.g., insufficient verbal 
exchange).  Furthermore, all participants were rated by their partners, and the current design 
ensured that all partners were NSA individuals. 
Although we invited over 400 students to participate in the study, the study sample 
excluded a number of participants at various levels of analysis.  A subset of 16 pairs 
scheduled to participate did not appear as expected; however, we retained their IAS 
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information (used in examining IAS psychometric properties).  One of the participants in 26 
of the scheduled pairs did not appear as expected.  We obtained pre-interaction measures for 
the present participant (and these measures were included where appropriate in the pre-
interaction analyses), and used IAS information for the missing partner.  In addition, for two 
of the scheduled dyads the camera was not functioning at the time of the interaction.  One of 
these pairs completed the pre-interaction measures only and were included in pre-interaction 
analyses, while the other pair was dismissed from the study prior to completing any 
additional measures and excluded from all but IAS psychometric analyses.  Upon completion 
of the study, we discovered that one pair of individuals was already acquainted and nine pairs 
were composed of both SA individuals.  These participants were not fully eliminated from 
the study sample; rather they were included in any pre-interaction analyses and excluded 
from any (post-interaction) dyad analyses. 
Further, for 11 participants, scores on the IAS did not fall into one of the two ranges 
identified above as a result of experimental error in selection.  Six of these participants had 
IAS scores within the middle range (between 51 and 55) with partners who had IAS scores 
that fell in the NSA range.  These individuals were categorized as SA participants, kept in the 
study sample and flagged for evidence of deviance in further analyses.  For two pairs, the 
IAS score for one participant in the pair was below the IAS range for NSA (i.e., IAS scores 
of 34 and 35)—these participants were included in the NSA group and also flagged for 
evidence of deviance from normality (described further in Normality and Outlier Analyses 
sections below).  In one case, social anxiety status was unclear for both participants, as IAS 
scores fell between 51 and 55.  In addition, for one participant the IAS score (i.e., 22) was 
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more than two standard deviations outside of the NSA range.  In effort to simplify analyses, 
the latter two pairs of cases were included in some analyses (e.g., psychometrics of pre-
interaction measures), but excluded from most analyses that required categorization of social 
anxiety status (i.e., group comparisons).  
Finally, 124 participants (28.8% of original sample) from one term of the study were 
videotaped without audio; and thus were not included in any analyses requiring observations 
from observers.  In sum, the final “complete” sample or effective N consisted of 101 pairs 
(63.6% female) of SA-NSA individuals (including 58 pairs with observations from coders) 
and 61 pairs (36.4% female) of NSA-NSA individuals (including 43 pairs with observations 
from coders).  Overall, our goal was to minimize the number of cases that needed to be 
eliminated in particular analyses without compromising study design.  
2.2 Measures 
Although we collected a number of measures (e.g., social skills, degree of self-disclosure) in 
the study, we were primarily interested in examining the relation between impressions 
expectations, anxious arousal and judgments of appearance.  Therefore, the descriptions 
below are limited to measures used in the current study.  Additional measures included in the 
study are outlined in the Procedure section. 
2.2.1 Descriptive Measures   
2.2.1.1 Trait Social Anxiety   
Participants were selected based on their social anxiety score as assessed by the Interaction 
Anxiousness Scale (IAS; Leary, 1983a; Table A1 in Appendix A) distributed during mass 
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testing.  The IAS is a self-report measure of dispositional social anxiety, which demonstrates 
high test-retest stability over a two-month period and high internal consistency (Leary and 
Kowalski, 1993).  We found high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha rating of .82, 
for the full sample of SA and NSA participants combined.   
2.2.1.2 Private and Public Self- and Body-Consciousness 
Four measures of trait self-awareness were included.  The private and public items of the 
Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975; Table A2 in Appendix A) were 
administered to assess individual differences in private and public self-consciousness (i.e., 
tendency to be more internally self-focused and a tendency to be concerned about how others 
view oneself, respectively).  The 10 items on the private scale and seven items on the public 
scale load above .40 with their appropriate factor (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  The test-retest 
reliabilities over a two-week interval were .79 and .84 for the public and private subscales, 
respectively (Fenigstein et al., 1975).  Participants were asked how well each statement (e.g., 
“I reflect a lot about myself”) describes them on a 5-point Likert scale. 
 Items from the private and public subscales of the Body-Consciousness Scale (BCS; 
Miller et al., 1981; Table A2 in Appendix A) were combined with the SCS since the 
instructions for each measure were identical.   Individuals who score high on public body-
consciousness are inclined to focus on observable aspects of body, while those high in 
private body-consciousness are inclined to focus on internal sensations.  The items for the 
private and public factors on the BCS have factor loadings above .39 with their respective 
factors.  The two-month test-retest reliability for the private BCS is .69 and .73 for the public 
 
 40 
BCS subscale (Miller et al., 1981).  In our sample, we found internal consistency reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s alpha) ranging from .61 to .85 for the group of participants across all subscales.  
Table B1 in Appendix B lists reliabilities for subscales of BCS and SCS for SA and NSA 
participants.   
2.2.1.3 Impression Importance and Expectations Scale 
Prior to meeting their partners, participants were asked to rate how important it was for them 
to make a positive impression during the interaction on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not 
at all important”) to 6 (“Extremely important”; adapted from Leary et al., 1998).  In addition 
to this global impression rating, participants were asked to make detailed specific impression 
ratings based on 10 general descriptors adapted from Leary et al. (1998) and Stopa and Clark 
(1993).  That is, participants were asked how important it was for them to appear, warm, 
assertive, courteous, humourous, polite, (not appear) embarrassed, (not appear) awkward, 
comfortable, interesting, and secure using a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all 
important”) to 6 (“Extremely important”).  Participants were also asked to rate the extent to 
which they believed they would display these 10 characteristics during the interaction using a 
6-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all”) to 6 (“Extremely”). Instructions and items are 
listed in Table A3 in Appendix A.  Internal consistency reliabilities ranged between .71 and 
.86 for these scales, and can be found for SA and NSA participants in Table B1 in Appendix 
B.   
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2.2.2 Dependent Measures 
2.2.2.1 Self-report of Anxious Arousal and Appearance.  
Participants made global (1-item) and specific (i.e., multi-item) ratings about their anxious 
symptoms and appearance during the interaction.  At the global level, participants were asked 
to rate how anxious they felt during the interaction and how anxious they believed they 
appeared, on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all anxious”) to 6 (“Extremely 
anxious”).   
Specific Anxiety Symptoms (SAS; Table A4 in Appendix A) and Overt Signs of 
Anxiety (OSA-Self; Table A5 in Appendix A) scales were developed for the study.  The SAS 
asked participants to indicate to what extent they experienced 31 common physiological 
symptoms of anxiety and agoraphobia (adapted from Wells, 1997; Papsdorf & Alden, 1998; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  The self-reported OSA asked participants to rate 
to what extent they believed they displayed 20 overt or visible signs of anxiety, such as “low 
eye contact,” and “repeating words” on a 6-point scale (adapted from Clark and Arkowitz, 
1975; Papsdorf & Alden, 1998; Stopa & Clark, 1993).   
2.2.2.2 Partner- and Observer-report of Anxious Appearance  
Partners and observers also made global and specific ratings about participants’ anxious 
appearance during the interaction.  At the global level, partners and observers were asked to 
rate how anxious they believed the participant appeared, on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 
(“Not at all anxious”) to 6 (“Extremely anxious”).  Observers made the global rating of 
appearance immediately after watching the first 5-minute “get-acquainted” task.  A partner- 
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and observer-version of the OSA (OSA-by Partner and OSA-by Observer, respectively) scale 
was also developed, using the same items as the self-report version, with modifications in 
instructions (e.g., “Please rate how anxious your partner/participant appeared during the 
interaction according to the following descriptors”).   
2.2.2.3 Desire for Future Interaction 
The participant’s willingness to engage in future interaction with his or her partner was 
assessed with the Desire for Future Interaction Scale (DFI; Coyne, 1976; Table A6 in 
Appendix A).  This 8-item scale reflects a participant’s degree of liking of their interaction 
partner and has been shown to have high internal consistency (Papsdorf & Alden, 1998).  
Cronbach’s alpha rating was .91 for the combined group.  Internal consistency reliabilities 
for SA and NSA participants can be found in Table B2 in Appendix B.   
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were contacted by telephone and pairs of unacquainted participants of the same 
gender were invited to the lab to participate in a problem-solving task with a partner.  They 
were informed that they would solve a problem with another first-year psychology student 
and that the interaction would be videotaped. 
Each participant was met in the waiting room and individually invited to one of the 
laboratory rooms to complete a series of pre-interaction descriptive measures.  These 
included a trait measure of interpersonal behaviour, private and public body- and self-
consciousness, and a depression screener.  Participants also rated how important it was for 
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them to make a positive impression during the upcoming interaction and their expectations 
for making a positive impression. 
The pre-interaction questionnaires were collected and participants were introduced to 
one another in the following manner: 
“[Participant 1 name], I would like to introduce you to your partner for 
today’s task [Participant 2 name].3  [Participant 2 name] is also a student in 
first year psychology.  Please take the next five minutes to become more 
familiar with each other.  If you are not sure what you should talk about, you 
could discuss, for example, your family, friends, program at school or any 
other interests.” 
The videotape recorder, which was placed in the corner of the room, was turned on.  The 
experimenter informed the participants that she would return in five minutes and left the 
room. 
 After the familiarity task was complete, the experimenter returned and asked the 
participants to spend the next 10 minutes solving a desert-survival task (Phipps, 1991) 
together.  The task consists of reading a short passage in which participants are asked to 
imagine that they are stranded in the desert following a bus crash.  As two of eight members 
of a geology club, the participants are asked to make two decisions: whether to stay or 
attempt to leave the isolated crash site and whether or not to hunt for food.  Participants were 
also required to rank order a list of items that were salvaged from the crash site.  The 
                                                 
3 Participant order (i.e., 1 or 2) was based on which of the participants was already seated in 
the experiment room. 
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experimenter left the participants to solve the task and record their answers together, while 
the videotape recorder continued to record the interaction.  
 When 10 minutes had passed, the experimenter returned and collected the answers.  
Participants were informed that they would now be separated to complete a number of 
questionnaires about themselves and each other.  Participants were reminded that any ratings 
made would not be shared with one another.  They were asked to fill in the questionnaires in 
the order in which they were given, and to avoid going back and changing their answers.   
Once separated, participants were provided with a series of questionnaires to complete.  
Although not all questionnaires were used in the current study, this questionnaire package 
included global ratings of how anxious they felt, they thought they appeared, and believe 
their partner appeared during the interactions.  Participants also made global ratings about the 
success of the tasks and overall social skills of themselves and their partners (not used in 
current study).  Participants rated the degree to which they experienced a number of anxious 
symptoms, and also rated the visibility of these symptoms (latter rating was not used in 
current study).  A list of characteristics related to social performance was provided, and 
participants were asked to rate how well the adjectives described themselves and their 
partners (on separate scales, neither were used in current study).  A list of overt signs of 
anxiety was also included, and participants were asked to rate to what extent they and their 
partner displayed these qualities during the interaction.  Participants then completed a 
situational measure of their interpersonal style and their partners’ interpersonal style (not 
used in current study).  The degree to which participants liked their partner, felt similar to 
 
 45 
their partner and felt included during the interaction were also assessed (latter two ratings 
were not used in current study).  Both participants completed all measures.  
 The level of familiarity between the two participants was assessed at the end of the 
study.  Participants were asked to rate how familiar they were with their partner prior to 
meeting during the experiment (e.g., roommate, acquaintance, stranger).   
 Two groups of six observers who were blind to participants’ trait social anxiety and 
the experimental hypotheses viewed the recorded interactions and independently assessed 
participants’ anxious appearance, social skills, level of self-disclosure, and degree to which 
participants made a positive impression and performed successfully during the tasks.  
Observers rated the extent to which participants displayed overt signs of anxiety.  Social 
skills and situational interpersonal behaviour was also assessed.  All observers received 10 to 
12 hours of training for coding, which included reviewing measures, practicing coding and 
discussing and revising discrepancies amongst coders.  The observers were upper-year 
undergraduate psychology students and were paid for their services.  The first group of 
observers completed coding for 44 pairs of participants (29 SA-NSA dyads, 15 NSA-NSA 
dyads); the remaining participants were coded by a second group of coders (29 SA-NSA 
dyads, 28 NSA-NSA dyads). 
2.4 Statistical Analyses 
The sample was naturally divided into three groups—SA participants, NSA participants who 
interacted with other NSA participants (NSANSA), and NSA participants who interacted with 
SA participants (NSASA).  We completed comparisons of descriptive and dependent 
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measures across these groups using one-way ANOVAs.  An alpha level of p < .05 was used 
for these analyses with Bonferroni adjusted p values to avoid inflation of Type I error.   
To examine the relation between anxious arousal and self- and other-reported 
appearance, we compared correlations and used moderated multiple regressions.  All 
regressions were completed with SPSS Version 14.   While it was possible to distinguish the 
participants in the mixed SA-NSA dyads, the participants in the NSA-NSA pairs were non-
distinguishable, and therefore, interchangeable.  That is, both members of the NSA-NSA pair 
were from the same category (Griffin & Gonzalez, 1995) and each person served as both a 
“participant” and “partner of a participant” in the study.  Given the interchangeability of the 
NSA-NSA group, we adjusted the development of the correlation matrix used in the 
regression analyses to account for dependencies (Gonzalez & Griffin, 1997).  This is 
discussed further in the Distinguishable and Non-distinguishable Dyads section of the 
Results. 






3.1 Data Screening and Preparation 
The following sections summarize the data screening and preparation measures.  This 
includes an examination of incomplete and missing data, departures from normality, outlier 
analyses and reliability of measures.  We also examined the factor structure of our core 
dependent measures in an attempt to reduce the number of variables and succinctly describe 
the structure of these measures.  
3.1.1 Incomplete and Missing Data 
Given the discrepancy between the number of participants initially invited to participate in 
the study and those who completed the study, we examined the IAS scores and ages for 
potential differences across these groups.  Participants in the “did not show” category were 
on average the same age as participants who completed the study (t = .21, p > .8).  We did 
not find any differences in the IAS scores for SA or NSA absent participants when compared, 
respectively, to SA or NSA participants who were present (both t = 1.9, p > .24).  Further, the 
percentage of participants who were SA was similar across the missing and present samples 
of participants (32.7 and 35.0%, respectively).  
 Next, we examined missing data at the global (1-item) level for participants who 
completed the interaction.  Participants completed four global measures (impression 
importance, self-rating of anxious feeling, self-rating of anxious appearance and a rating of 
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partner’s anxious appearance).  The percentage of missing items was examined together for 
SA and NSA participants because the frequency of missing global items did not vary across 
groups (all t < .57, ns).  The global impression rating was missing for over 13% of the 
participants who completed the interactions.  The missing data was likely due to poor 
placement of the item on the page, as the item was difficult to distinguish from the 
instructions on the page.4  We did not find any difference in the trait social anxiety scores for 
participants missing global impression ratings (t = .29, ns) and therefore, chose to keep this 
variable in the analysis.  Post-interaction global measures were present for all participants 
who completed the study with the exception of two participants for whom the package of 
measures was missing a number of scales.  Observers completed one global measure 
(anxious appearance) and the percentage of missing scores was less than 1.5% in total when 
observers were examined independently; however, we used an average of the observers’ 
scores in all analyses (as described below).  
 For multi-item measures, we developed averaged composite scores based on the sum 
of items in each scale if 90% of the items were completed.  We examined the percentage of 
missing values for the pre-interaction scale totals (IAS, BCS, SCS, impression importance 
and expectation scales) and post-interaction scale sums (SAS, OSA-Self, OSA-Partner).  The 
percentage of missing items was less than 1% for pre-interaction scales and less than 1.6% 
                                                 
4 We could do additional investigations to see if the missing impression global rating was 
related to other variables such as trait social anxiety, impression and expectations total 
scores or missing completely at random (i.e., MCAR analysis).  As we did not expect this 
variable to be missing for reasons other than poor placement, we excluded such an analysis.  
Moreover, we were usually interested in the specific total score for impression ratings, 
rather than this 1-item global measure. 
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for the post-interaction scales completed by participants.  There were no incomplete scales at 
the observer level for the overt signs of anxiety scales (i.e., OSA-Observer).  Given that the 
percentage of missing data was within normal limits (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) we did not 
complete any further adjustments to the sample data.  
3.1.2 Normality and Outlier Analyses 
3.1.2.1 Univariate Normality 
Univariate normality was explored by examining absolute values of univariate skew and 
kurtosis and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality (i.e., as a goodness-of-fit test of the 
sample distribution).  Guidelines provided by Kline (1998) suggest that absolute skew values 
greater than three and absolute kurtosis values between 10 and 20 may be indicative of 
deviance from normality.  (West, Finch, and Curran [1995] provide more conservative 
criteria, reporting skew values above two and kurtosis values above seven as problematic).  A 
summary of the skew, kurtosis, Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and significance values for 
the total scale and subscales are provided in Table C1 in Appendix C. 
 We began by examining normality at the item level for the global measures and each 
of the multi-item scales.  There were no items with skew or kurtosis values in identified 
problematic ranges for any of the global measures or at the item-level for the IAS, BCS, 
SCS, Impression and Expectation scales.  For the SAS scale we found over 10 items to have 
skew values above three and kurtosis values above 10.  It is important to note that this scale 
includes a number of items with particularly low endorsement rates (as it was meant to be an 




exhaustive list of anxiety and panic symptoms), and we were not overly troubled by the 
distribution at the item level.  Further we used the SAS scale total score as our dependent 
variable, and the skew and kurtosis values for the total score were in an acceptable range.  
(We discuss the distribution of this scale in more detail in the Univariate Outlier Section).  At 
the item-level we also found indicators of non-normality for two items on the OSA-Self and 
five items on the OSA-Partner scale.  Once again, we were most interested in item totals for 
these scales, and these measures were within the appropriate ranges for each of the OSA 
scales.  Of note, there was no evidence of deviance for the total scores for these multi-item 
scales using either of the skew and kurtosis criteria described above.  
There were a number of scales for which we would not expect a normal distribution 
in our combined sample and these totals were identified as non-normal by the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic (e.g., IAS score).  For the IAS score in particular we expected a bimodal 
distribution due to our method of participant selection.  As well, for scales with low 
endorsement rates of items, such as the SAS scale, we expected to find a positively skewed 
distribution.  Therefore, we informally examined distribution plots of the total scores against 
the normal curve to have a better understanding of how the sample may violate normality for 
the primary scales and to determine if additional measures (e.g., transformations) were 
required.  (See Figure C1 in Appendix C for detailed explanation and distribution of SAS 
scale with Normal Curve).   In brief, we decided to leave scales with non-normal 
distributions (e.g., SAS) untransformed given our sample size and difficulties with 
interpretation of transformed variables.  In addition, the usefulness of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z statistic is conservative in that the “null hypothesis is likely to be rejected with 
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large sample sizes when there are only minor deviations from normality” (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007 p. 80).  
3.1.2.2 Univariate Outliers 
We began with a preliminary analysis of outliers at the univariate level by identifying cases 
with scores more than three standard deviations away from the mean (Z-score > 3.29, p < 
.001; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  For the single-item global measures completed by 
participants we found one outlier on the anxious feelings measure.  
We then analyzed the number of outliers present for total scores on the multi-item 
scales and found that the percentage of outliers was less than half of one percent (n = 12) for 
all of the scales.  Only seven of these outliers occurred on measures used as independent 
variables.  In addition, given the floor effects and generally low endorsement rates on some 
of the scales, many of the “outlier” cases are of interest in subsequent analyses.  We choose 
not to arbitrarily exclude these cases; as outliers are not always influential cases—and clearly 
influential cases are what are of concern in most analyses.  Rather, we completed influence 
analyses5 for the regressions of global and specific variables (section 3.1.6) and the tests of 
Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) model (section 3.4).  The key regressions were completed with 
and without the inclusion of identified influential cases and both results are reported only 
when a discrepancy was found. 
                                                 
5 To examine for the presence of influential cases, standardized DFBETAS were produced 
from the regression analyses, and cases that were more than two standard deviations away 
from the norm (i.e., with absolute values greater than two) were identified.  These cases were 
dropped from the analysis and the regressions were re-done.  We only report results of each 
analysis if a discrepancy in significance level was found.    
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3.1.2.3 Multivariate Outliers 
Given the high number of combinations of multivariate variables, we began by completing a 
multivariate analysis of all of the scales of interest using AMOS 6.0.  All of the variables 
(i.e., total and global scores) were simultaneously entered to examine the Mahalanobis 
distance (d-squared) for each observation, along with Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate 
kurtosis.  This analysis requires complete data for all variables, therefore, missing values 
were imputed using mean substitution (less then 5% of the data was estimated).  
First we ran the analysis including all variables6 except the variables completed by 
observers as this was not present for the full set of participants.  Using a chi-squared 
distribution with p < .001 and degrees of freedom based on the number of variables in the 
sample, we identified a critical value (X2 critical = 37.70, df = 15) for the analysis.  Seven 
participants (one SA participant; six NSA participants) were thus identified as multivariate 
outliers using this criterion.  The analysis also provides a significance value for each 
observation, and these same seven outliers were identified as deviant from the sample using p 
values of less than .001 (this is considered a conservative value [Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007]).  This analysis was repeated with the subset of participants who were examined by 
observers also (X2 critical = 40.79, df = 17) and we found that two of the outliers identified in 
the latter analysis had already been flagged in the full sample, in addition to two more 
                                                 
6 We ran the following analyses with and without the IAS total scores included as we knew 
this scale was bimodally distributed.  The observations identified as outliers were unaffected; 




participants (1 SA; 1 NSA participant).  Therefore, in total, 11 individuals were identified as 
multivariate outliers (three of whom were previously identified as univariate outliers). 
Values of Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis above 1.96 suggest significant 
non-normality (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999), and not surprisingly, given the number of 
outliers, we found high values for this indicator on both of the multivariate normality 
analyses with and without observer variables included (34.96 [c.r. = 13.76] and 32.79 [c.r. = 
9.54], respectively).  Note, that Mardia’s coefficient is hypersensitive as sample size 
increases (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999).  We re-ran the multivariate normality analysis with 
the identified outliers excluded and Mardia’s coefficient appeared to remain elevated for the 
analysis with and without observer variables included (25.07 [c.r. = 9.54] and 18.94 [c.r. = 
5.42]).7   
3.1.3 Reliability  
The internal consistency reliabilities (Cronbach’s alphas) are provided in Tables B1 and B2 
in Appendix B for all measures completed by participants (range .61 to .91).  We also 
examined the observers’ ratings of target participants within each coding group and found 
high reliability for anxious appearance at the global and specific levels (.85 to .86; Table B2 
in Appendix B).    
                                                 
7 While we could complete all the analyses with this flagged group of 11 outliers in the 
sample and again without them present (i.e., reporting discrepant results), the rational for 
such a step is unconvincing and the steps for systematically examining this protracted and 
potentially fruitless.  Arbitrarily removing this group would result in excluding participants 
who were not identified as outliers for a particular regression analysis (although they were 
identified as outliers on an unrelated regression).  In addition, to identify the exact 
combination of variables for which the participants were identified as multi-variate outliers 
would include testing each possible variable grouping, clearly an onerous task. 
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3.1.4 Factor Analysis 
Prior to examining the core hypotheses of the study, we conducted a closer inspection of the 
factor structure of our dependent measures at the specific level for a number of reasons.  
First, as most of the dependant measures were uniquely developed for the current study, we 
were interested in examining the structure or classification of these measures (potentially 
reducing the number of variables used) and establishing if these structures were comparable 
for SA and NSA participants.  Second, we were interested in determining how well global 
items and the parallel total and factor scores of the multi-item specific measures correlated in 
this sample.  Ultimately, we were interested in whether the relation between global and 
multi-item anxious arousal and appearance scores was moderated by trait levels of social 
anxiety (as discussed in Global and Specific Measures section).  
 For the specific-item scales, a series of principal components factor analyses with 
varimax rotation were conducted.  For each scale, SA and NSA participants were included as 
one sample, and parallel analyses (with 100 random cases generated) were completed to 
determine the number of factors to extract (O’Connor, 2004).  The number of factors 
extracted was based on criteria provided in Hayton, Allen and Scarpello (2004).  Specifically, 
the quantity of factors was determined by the highest factor with an eigenvalue at or above 
the mean eigenvalue found at the 95th percentile for the random data group.  
Given that the full sample was asymmetrically composed of NSA participants (62.6% 
of sample), we also ran the parallel analysis separately for the SA and NSA groups as an 
informal check of the predicted factor structure (i.e., number of factors).  It is possible that 
the factor structures of key measures are different for SA and NSA individuals—implying 
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that these groups use the measures of interest in different manners.  We did not expect to find 
differences across groups, but discuss the findings for each scale below.  Further, in the 
following section, the variance explained, the number of factors extracted and factor structure 
are described for each variable of interest.  (Table 1 lists items by factor; Rotated component 
matrices are provided for all scales in Tables D1 to D6 in Appendix D) 
3.1.4.1 Impression Importance Scale   
The parallel analysis for the self-reported impression importance scale suggested a two-factor 
model, and the subsequent factor analysis indicated that 57.33% of the variance was 
explained.  The first factor was composed of items (6, 7, 8 and 10) reflecting a 
Confident/Non-anxious impression importance.  The second factor included strong loadings 
of items related to behaving in a warm, polite and courteous manner.  These behaviours are 
similar to those seen in making an innocuously sociable impression, or as Schlenker and 
Leary (1982) coined “Innocuous Sociability” and so named.  One item—“it is important for 
me to appear interesting”—appeared to load on both factors, while another item—“it is 
important for me to appear assertive”—did not load on either factor.  Informal inspection of 
factor loadings revealed similar factor structure for the SA and NSA groups.  
3.1.4.2 Impression Expectations Scale 
Parallel analysis for the self-reported impression expectations scale suggested a three-factor 
model, in which 63.97% of the variance was explained.  Factor One consisted of items 
reflecting an expectation to be warm, courteous and polite, in a manner of Innocuous 
Sociability.  The second factor consisted of items representing a desire to promote a 
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Dominant/Confident social impression (i.e., assertive, humorous, comfortable, interesting).  
Finally, the third factor reflected a desire to not appear anxious (Items 6, 7; reverse score of 
awkward and embarrassed).  Item eight (comfortable) appeared to load moderately strongly 
with Factor Two and Three; while Item 10 (secure) did not load strongly on any factor.  
Again, similar factor structures emerged when the groups were analyzed separately.  
3.1.4.3 Specific Anxiety Symptoms (SAS) Scale 
Data reduction techniques described above resulted in a five factor model for the SAS scale, 
accounting for 49.36% of the total variance.  The first factor was predominantly composed of 
items consisting of derealization symptoms (Item 8, 10, 12, 20, 29, and 30).  Factor Two 
included items mainly describing blushing symptoms (Item 14, 18, 23 and 31).  The third 
factor was comprised of symptoms of shaking (Item 1, 3 and 22).  The fourth factor consisted 
of three items related to cardiac symptoms and feelings of dizziness (Items 9, 13, 21).  The 
fifth factor was composed of four items—nausea, lightheadedness, chest pain and 
numbness—each with strong and unique loadings.  Several items did not have unique 
loadings on any of the five factors.  In addition, we examined the factor structure in separate 
factor analyses for the NSA and SA groups and found differences in the factor structures 
across groups.   
 We suspected that the factors described above may be a misrepresentation of true 
factor structure, and instead, indicative of potential item artifacts.  An inspection of the M 
and SD for the items on the SAS scale for both the SA and NSA groups revealed a number of 
items with low endorsement, and attenuated range and/or low variability.  For example, for 
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items 7, 13, 17, 19, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30, the majority of respondents (i.e., > 90%) choose a 
value of “1” (floor effect), while less than 10% of the sample selected higher values.  
Therefore, we re-examined the factor structure of this scale after eliminating these nine 
items, and found the factor structure reduced to three components.  Factor One primarily was 
composed of items (1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 21, 22) describing symptoms of shaking and trembling.  
Factor Two (Items 8, 10, 11, 12, 24, 29) was composed of derealization and cognitive 
symptoms of anxiety, and the third factor mainly described symptoms of Blushing/Feeling 
Flushed (14, 18, 23, 31).  When we completed a separate factor analysis for the NSA and SA 
groups with the subset of items, the three anxious arousal factors appeared to re-emerge as 
expected from the combined analysis, with minor differences for a few items.   
3.1.4.4 Overt Signs of Anxiety – Self, Partner, Observer   
At the self-report level (OSA-Self) we extracted four factors explaining 54.31% of the total 
variance.  The first factor consisted of items describing Speech Dysfluencies (Items 5, 6, 7, 
8).  Factor Two was composed primarily of Visual Signs of Anxiety—such as shaking, or 
appearing stiff (Items 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16).  The third factor was mainly composed 
of a couplet of items (2 and 3) indicative of Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness.  The fourth factor 
had high loadings for items of Initiation of Interaction during the conversation (Items 19 and 
20), and a moderate loading for a third related item (18, loading of .41).  Informal inspection 
of the factor structure, when run independently for the two groups, revealed similar item 
loadings.   
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The factor structure for the OSA scale when completed on partners’ behaviour (OSA-
Partner) consisted of two factors.  The first factor had a number of high and unique loadings 
(Items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16) which seemed to combine the visible, 
dysfluent speech and self-manipulation signs of anxiety factors described above for OSA-
Self.  The second factor consisted of four items (9, 17, 19, and 20) regarding Conversational 
Style.  The total variance explained in these two factors was 42.85%.  Again, loadings of 
items for the SA and NSA groups were similar.   
 The OSA scale when completed by observers (OSA-Observers) reduced to a four-
factor structure, explaining 56.14% of the total variance.  Factor One include seven items (1, 
4, 9, 15, 17, 19, 20) which combined symptoms of Conversational Style and facial distress 
signs.  The OSA-Self Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness factor also appears to reemerge as Factor 
Two in this model (Items 1, 2, 3, 11).  The third factor appeared to be composed of three 
items (10, 12, and 14): “my voice appeared to be trembling,” “I appeared short of breath” and 
“I appeared to be perspiring,” collectively considered Tremulousness.  Factor Four (Items 5, 
6, 7, 8) included four items describing Speech Dysfluencies.8 
 A summary of the factor structure for each of the dependent measures is provided 
below (Table 1) for the combined group and separately for the SA and NSA participants.  To 
highlight the primary items on each of the factors, the summary includes items with factor 
scores at or above .5 on its respective component.  In sum, it appears that the overall factor 
                                                 
8 We would not expect the observers to use the OSA scale differently for the two groups 
based on trait social anxiety of the participants.  Therefore to reduce number of analyses, we 
chose not to complete the analysis separately for the SA and NSA groups for the OSA-
Observer scale.   
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structure is similar for both SA and NSA groups, with minor differences in loadings of one to 
four items across factors.9 
 
Table 1. Factor Structure for SA, NSA and Combined Groups 
 Factors 
Scale Factor One Factor Two Factor Three Factor Four 







    
Combined 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 1, 3, 4, 5     
NSA only 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 1, 3, 4, 5     
SA only 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 1, 3, 4, 5, 9     







 Non-Anxious   
Combined 1, 3, 5  2, 4, 8, 9 6, 7   
NSA only 1, 3, 5  2, 4, 8, 9 6, 7   
SA only 1, 3, 5  2, 4, 8, 9 6, 7   
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9 We could have completed a formal test of the factor structure across SA and NSA groups 
(i.e., CFA with stacked models) but did not have a priori reasons to believe the structures 
should be different across groups.  Further, this series of group analysis is decidedly a side 




         








Combined 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 21, 
22, 
8, 11, 10, 12, 24, 
29 
14, 18, 23, 31   
NSA only 1, 3, 9, 11, 21, 22 8, 10, 15, 29 14, 18, 23, 31   
SA only 1, 2, 3, 4, 15, 22 11, 12, 16, 24, 
29 
9, 14, 18, 21, 
23, 31 
  
     
OSA - Self Speech 
Dysfluencies 







Combined 5, 6, 7, 8 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 
18, 19, 20 2, 3, 11 
NSA only 5, 6, 7, 8 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 
19, 20 2, 3, 11 
SA only 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 17 12, 13, 14 18, 19, 20 2, 3, 8, 11 
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Combined 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
16 
9, 17, 19, 20     
NSA only 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
16 
9, 17, 19, 20     
SA only 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 14 
9, 17, 19, 20     












 Combined 1, 4, 9, 15, 17, 19, 
20 
1, 2, 3, 11 10, 12, 14 5, 6, 7, 8 
 
3.1.5 Factor Score Development 
We used a unit-loading weighted method to calculate factor scores (e.g., Cattell, 1952).  We 
recognized that this traditional method is susceptible to factor score indeterminacy and high 
inter-factor correlation (Grice, 2001), and therefore, evaluated the use of alternative 
regression weighted methods (e.g., Grice and Harris, 1998).  Unit-loading procedures are less 
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susceptible to shrinkage (Wackwitz & Horn, 1971) and are computationally simple.  In 
addition, unit-loading methods transfer easily to “real-world” or clinical use; for example, 
tallying up a client’s degree of blushing symptoms versus idiosyncratically weighting 
proportion of similar symptoms.  Moreover, in Grice and Harris’ (1998) Monte Carlo study 
evaluating alternative methods, unit-loading procedures were similar to regression weighted 
scales on their validity criterion (i.e., correlation of test and true factors scores).10  Unit-
loading estimates were more valid than unit-regression estimates with low sample size and 
medium complexity.  Further, we felt that our measures were not developed in a construct-
driven manner (i.e., based on a solid theoretical definition), but rather were content-driven, as 
we want to assess an exhaustive sample of relevant content.  We composed factor scores by 
weighting all items with coefficients greater than .3 (or less than -.3) equally.  Items with 
negligible loadings (i.e., coefficients between -.3 and .3) were excluded.  
It is important to highlight that the data investigations presented thus far were 
required to examine and simplify the structure of key measures in the current study; these 
were only preliminary analyses of the current study’s main tests.  In brief, we learned that for 
the most part the data is complete, and acceptable levels of reliability were demonstrated.  
There was some minor evidence of non-normality; however, methods to adjust for these 
deviances were reviewed.  Finally we completed a series of factor analyses and developed 
factor scores to use in further investigations.   
 
                                                 
10 Of note, the correlations between unit-loading weighted factors (used in this study) and 
respective regression weighted factor scores varied from .66 to .98. 
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3.1.6 Global and Specific Measures 
The following set of analyses examines the relation between global ratings and their 
corresponding specific rating scales.  As previously noted, the purpose of this analysis was to 
examine how well the anxious arousal and appearance global and multi-item specific 
measures (total scores and factors) correlated in this sample and whether such a relationship 
was a function of trait social anxiety.11 In particular, these analyses allowed us to determine 
if SA and NSA individuals were likely to use these key measures in a similar manner.  As 
well, we hoped to determine if global and specific dependant variables should be examined 
independently in the study’s core analyses—as each type of variable may be assessing 
different and valuable information.  (For example, a global 1-item face-valid rating [e.g., 
“How anxious did you feel?”] may not be directly predicted by total scores for specific 
ratings or composites of items [i.e., “I felt tense;” “I felt sweaty”—discussed further below]).  
These investigations were completed for the dependent variables used in the study’s key 
analyses of interest (i.e., tests of Schlenker and Leary, [1982] and Clark and Wells’ [1995] 
models).  
The global/specific variables of interest were the self-measure of anxious arousal 
scale and the self-, partner- and observer-reported anxious appearance scales.  For each of 
these pairs of variables, we carried out a two-step multiple regression with scores on the 1-
item global measure of interest as the dependent variable.  Predictors included degree of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
11 We could have compared independent correlations of global and specific ratings for the SA 
and NSA groups but choose to use the trait social anxiety measure as a continuous variable 
to increase power in these explorations.  
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social anxiety measured by the total IAS score centered on the mean of the NSA group12 and 
total score from the specific scale (entered on the first step) and the interaction of social 
anxiety with the total score (entered on the second step).  We also completed another two-
step multiple regression for each global variable predicted by IAS scores and factor scores of 
the specific measures (entered on the first step) and the interaction of social anxiety with 
each of these factors (entered on the second step).  The results of each of the series of 
regressions are summarized below.  The unstandardized and standardized coefficients, R2, 
adjusted R2, and F values with significance are provided in Table E1 in Appendix E. 
3.1.6.1 Anxious Arousal 
In the first analysis, the global measure of anxious feelings was regressed on the specific 
symptoms of anxiety (SAS) scale total and IAS trait scale (Step 1) and the two-way 
interaction of SAS and IAS (Step 2).  The regression (R2 = .25; F[2, 313] = 52.60; p < .00) 
and test of the two-way interaction were significant (R2change = .01; F[1, 312] = 5.68; p = .02).  
The regression showed that global ratings of anxiety were significantly predicted by specific-
ratings (Beta = .58; t = 9.98; p < 00) and by trait social anxiety (Beta = .49; t = 2.41; p = .02) 
in Step 1.  The significant interaction suggests that the relation between global ratings of 
anxiety and the specific measures varies as a function of trait social anxiety, such that the 
                                                 
 
12 We centered the IAS score using the mean from the NSA group, rather than the mean of the 
whole group.  Although this is not common practice, we recognized that the mean score for 
the whole sample had a meaningless value—as it was outside the range of both groups.  With 
this modification, nonessential collinearity is still reduced by centering of the variables and 




relation is less strong at higher levels of trait social anxiety (Beta = -.51; t = -2.38; p = .02).  
Overall about a quarter of the variability in global ratings is predicted by the specific-ratings, 
while the addition of the interaction results in a significant increment in R2; however, the 
magnitude of change is minor (less than 1% of the variance).  
 We replaced the SAS with each of the factor scores to determine if any of the specific 
factors were more strongly correlated to the global item.  In the following regressions, we 
examined the global feeling measure scale predicted by the IAS trait social anxiety scale and 
the three factors for SAS scale (Step 1) and the two-way interactions of trait social anxiety 
and the interaction with each of the three factors (Step 2).  The regression was significant at 
the first step (R2 = .27; F[4, 311] = 29.27; p < .00) and the test of the interactions as a group 
were significant also (R2change = .02; F[3, 308] = 3.02; p = .03).  In Step 1, two factors of the 
SAS scale were significant predictors of the criterion (Factor One [Shaking/Trembling]: Beta 
= .33; t = 3.66; Factor Two [Derealization/Cognitive symptoms]: Beta = .25, t = 3.01, both p 
< .001).  Social anxiety was not a significant predictor of global anxious arousal in Step 1 
(Beta = .00; t = .05; p > .05).  This suggests that degree of globally-reported anxiety is not 
affected by trait levels of social anxiety—individuals do not report more global anxiety 
simply because they experience more trait social anxiety.   
Interestingly, in the second step of the regression model, trait social anxiety became a 
significant predictor of global anxious arousal (Beta = .49, t = 2.87, p < .01), along with the 
first two factors again.  There were no significant interactions present when the predictors 
were partialled on each other.  Therefore, we re-ran the regressions with all of the main 




effects in Step 1 and each of the interaction terms separately in Step 2 (i.e., three separate 
analyses), to determine which interactions were significant (without partialling on the other 
interaction terms).  The interaction of Factor One (Shaking/Trembling) and trait social 
anxiety was significant (Step 2: R2change = .01, Fchange [1, 310] = 5.72, p = .02), such that as 
trait social anxiety increases, the strength of the relation between this first factor and 
reporting of anxiety globally decreases (Beta = -.35, t = -2.39; p = .02).  In other words, more 
chronically SA individuals are less likely to use symptoms of shaking and trembling in their 
judgments of global anxious arousal.  Once again, the magnitude of the contribution of the 
interaction term to the prediction of global anxious arousal was miniscule (i.e., approximate 
increase in variance explained by addition of interaction was less than four percent).  In sum, 
this indicates that there is little evidence to suggest the relation of global to specific ratings 
varies strongly across groups for self-reported anxious arousal.  (See Figure E1 in Appendix 
E for graphical representation of the relation between the global and specific scales for each 
of the significant factors described above).  
3.1.6.2 Anxious Appearance  
In the next set of analyses, the global measure of anxious appearance was regressed on the 
specific measure of anxious appearance (OSA-Self) and the IAS.  Step 1 was significant (R2 
= .18, Fchange [2, 313] = 33.45, p < .00), while the two-way interaction was not significant 
(R2change =.001, Fchange [1, 312] = .32, p > .05).  Global measures of anxious appearance 
increased as a function of number of symptoms reported (Beta = .41, t = 7.82; p < .001), but 
was unrelated to trait social anxiety (Beta = .02, t = .05; p > .05).  This suggests that only 
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about 18% of the variance in global ratings of anxious appearance is explained by the 
specific OSA-Self total score. 
When global anxious appearance was regressed on trait social anxiety and the four 
factors of the OSA-Self scale (Step 1) and the interaction of trait social anxiety and each 
factor (Step 2), the regression was significant (R2 = .23, F = [5, 310] = 18.73, p < .001) in 
Step 1, but not in Step 2 (R2change = .005 , F = [4, 306] = .541, p > .05).  Specifically, there 
was no main effect for social anxiety, Factor One (Speech Dysfluencies) or Factor Four 
(Initiation of Interaction; all Beta < .08, t < 1.3, p > .05).  Two main effects were found for 
Factor Two (Visual Signs of Anxiety; Beta = .29, t = 3.94, p < .001) and Factor Three 
(Initiation of Interaction; Beta = .17, t = 2.46, p = .015).  This suggest that Visual Signs of 
Anxiety (Factor Two) and Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness factors (Factor Three) were the 
strongest predictors, yet altogether the factors only explain about 23% of the variability in 
self-report of global appearance for all participants. 
  We also examined if participants’ ratings of the global anxious appearance of their 
partner varied as a function of their own social anxiety status and the OSA-Partner scale 
(Step 1), and the interaction of these two variables (Step 2).  This regression was significant 
in the first step only (R2 = .23, F[2, 312] = 46.73, p < .00).  Specifically, global ratings of 
partners’ appearance was a function of the specific OSA-Partner scale (Beta = .47, t = 9.60, p 
< .00), and not the raters’ own trait social anxiety (Beta = -.07, t = -1.43, p = .15).  Using the 
factor scores, both of the OSA-Partner factors were found to be significant predictors of the 
global measure of anxious appearance of partners (Factor One [Visual Signs/Dysfluent 
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Speech] Beta = .37, t = 6.02, p < .001; Factor Two [Conversational Style]: Beta = .14, t = 
2.23, p =.03).  No significant interactions were found in Step 2 (both t < .44, p > .05).     
Finally we completed similar regression analysis for global and specific measures 
completed by observers; however, we excluded social anxiety status as a predictor of the 
participant in the following analysis as we would not expect the relation to vary as a function 
of the participants’ trait social anxiety.  The one step regression of the global measure 
regressed on the specific measure for the anxious appearance was significant (R2 = .38, F [1, 
194] = 118.13, p < .001; Beta = .62 t = 10.69, p < .001).  We also regressed the four OSA-
Observer factors on the global measure and found the regression to be significant (R2 = .40, 
F[4, 191] = 31.41, p < .001).  Specifically, the first two factors of this scale were significant 
predictors (Factor One [Conversational style]: Beta = .54, t = 8.38; Factor Two [Self-
manipulation/Fidgetiness]: Beta = .25, t = 4.43, both p < .001) while the other two factors 
were not significant (both Beta less than .1, t < 1.14, p > .25).  In sum, about 40 percent of 
the variability in this model for OSA-Observer is explained by these four factors. 
 Overall, the results of this series of regressions suggest that the relation between 
global and specific ratings of arousal and of appearance (self-, partner-, and observer-
reported) falls within a weak to moderate range.  The composite items and totals of the 
specific scales do not completely explain participant- or observer- global (1-item) ratings; the 
variance explained ranged from 17 to 39 percent.  Further, when factor scores were 
examined, particular sets of items appeared to be relatively stronger contributors in 
explaining the variance in the models examined.  In particular, factor scores for ratings of 
Shakiness/Trembling and Derealization/Cognitive symptoms of anxiety were stronger 
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contributors in the explanation of the variance for the global measure of anxiety than factors 
representing symptoms of blushing.  Factor Two (Visual Signs of Anxiety) and Factor Three 
(Initiation of Interaction) of the OSA-Self scale were more strongly related to global ratings 
than the other two factors (Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness and Speech Dysfluencies).  Ratings 
of global measures did not seem to vary as a function of trait social anxiety alone, nor was 
the relation between specific and global ratings mediated by trait social anxiety.  The 
exception to this latter finding occurred when the interaction between trait social anxiety and 
the total score for the SAS scale was examined.  The interaction was found to be significant; 
however, the magnitude of the relation was weak, such that the variance explained only 
increased by one percent.  Given the above findings—specifically, the imperfect relation 
between global and specific ratings—we examine global and specific ratings separately in the 
following core study analyses.  
3.2 Demographic and Descriptive Measures 
In our initial analyses of demographics, we separated the participants into three groups: SA 
participants, all the NSA participants who interacted with other NSA individuals (NSANSA) 
and NSA participants who were partnered with SA individuals (NSASA participants).  
Participants ranged from 17 to 25 years of age.  A one-way ANOVA conducted on age 
resulted in no significant group differences (SA: M = 19.39, SD = 1.46; NSANSA: M = 19.29, 
SD = 1.23; NSASA: M = 18.98, SD = 1.15; F[2, 321] = 2.77 p =  .06).   
 Given that we did not use a traditional “high” versus “low” participant sampling 
procedure, we tested whether SA participants’ IAS scores were significantly higher than 
NSA participants and the NSA partners.  As expected, NSANSA and NSASA participants’ IAS 
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scores did not differ from each other, but were significantly lower than IAS scores of SA 
participants (SA: M = 59.10, SD = 4.39, NSANSA: M = 42.56, SD = 3.34; NSASA: M = 42.28, 
SD = 3.25, F[2, 321] = 716.02, p < .00).  We did not expect any other differences in pre-
interaction measures for NSA partners of SA participants and NSA participants, and 
therefore, collapsed these groups for the following pre-interaction analyses and many of this 
study’s core tests.  
 Independent sample t-tests were completed on the Body-Consciousness Scale (BCS; 
Table A2) and Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Table A2).  SA participants were not 
significantly different from the NSA group on the private BCS, public BCS and private SCS 
measures (all t[319] < -.69, p > .21); however, groups were significantly different on the 
public SCS measure (SA: M = 26.44, SD = 5.24, NSA: M = 25.15 SD = 4.86; t[319] = -2.16, 
p = .03).  Although we found a significant difference for this trait, it is important to draw 
attention to the minor magnitude of the difference in group means (i.e., less than 1/5th of the 
pooled standard deviation estimate).  Means and SDs of all dependent and descriptive 
measures for both groups of participants can be seen in Table F1 in Appendix F).   
A two-way ANOVA was completed for all descriptive measures and revealed no 
gender by group interactions (all F < 2.5; p > .05).  As noted, we did not make specific 
predictions about participants’ gender but hoped to minimize anxiety due to “attractiveness” 
by using same sex couples. We recognize that this assumes participants were heterosexual, as 
we did not ask about sexual preferences.  We chose not to include gender as a predictor for 
each additional analysis, and felt these initial analyses support the likelihood that gender 
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differences at the participant level were absent or minimal.  Further, we had no a priori 
predictions about gender differences.  
3.3 Levels of Perception: Self-, Partner- and Observer-ratings 
A series of independent samples t-tests were completed to compare anxious arousal and 
appearance for self-perceptions of SA and NSA individuals who interacted with a NSA 
individual13 and ratings by partners and observers (See Table F1 for Means, SDs and p 
values).  When asked how anxious one felt during the interaction on a single item scale, SA 
and NSA individuals tended to report similar levels of anxiety (SA: M = 2.28, SD = .89; 
NSA: M = 2.13, SD = .10; t = 1.28, p > .05).  When asked to report on intensity of specific 
symptoms (SAS), SA individuals tended to report more anxious arousal than NSA 
individuals (SA: M = 39.77, SD = 9.63; NSA: M = 36.77, SD = 8.50; t = 2.57, p = .01).   
In terms of observable anxiety, SA individuals reported that they thought they 
appeared more anxious than NSA individuals according to the specific scales (SA: M = 
43.36, SD = 12.35; NSA: M = 38.50, SD = 9.46; t = 3.49, p < .01), but not according to the 
global scales (SA: M = 2.52, SD = 1.0; NSA: M = 2.32, SD = .90; t = -.57, p > .05).  Partners 
reported that SA individuals appeared more anxious, at both the global (SA: M = 2.39, SD = 
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1.16; NSA: M = 2.03, SD = .95; t = 2.46, p = .02) and specific levels (SA: M = 35.83, SD = 
10.57; NSA: M = 31.57, SD = 8.48; t = 3.29, p < .01).  A similar pattern was seen for 
observers’ reports of anxious appearance at global (SA: M = 3.03, SD = .75; NSA: M = 2.62, 
SD = .59; t = 3.52, p < .01) and specific levels of measurement (SA: M = 40.74, SD = 5.29; 
NSA: M = 38.47, SD = 3.86; t = 2.93, p < .01). 
The correlations of self-, partner- and observer-ratings of appearance were also 
examined (see bold correlations in Table G1 in Appendix G) and found to be non-significant 
and weak overall, with the exception of two significant (positive) correlations.  NSA 
individuals’ self-report of global anxious appearance was significantly correlated with 
observers’ global rating of appearance (r = .29, p < .01) and the relation between observer 
and partner ratings of anxious appearance for SA individuals (r = .29, p < .05) was 
significant.  In brief, this suggests that anxious appearance varies by rater—even when 
analogous criteria are being used—and neither self-, partner- or observer-ratings are strongly 
associated. 
                                                                                                                                                       
13 We also compared NSA individuals who interacted with a SA partner to NSA individuals 
from NSA-NSA dyads on post-interaction measures, including anxious arousal and 
appearance at global, specific and factor levels.  There were no significant differences in any 
of these measures (all p > .05) with one exception.  NSA individuals who partnered with SA 
participants were rated as significantly more anxious looking on Factor Two (Self-
manipulation/Fidgetiness of the Observer-rated OSA scale (M = 9.74, SD = 2.17 and M = 
8.86, SD = 2.08, p = .02); however, upon further inspection the magnitude of the difference 
was small (about ½ of the pooled standard deviation estimate). In overlooking the small 
difference, this finding suggests that NSA individuals may find it less pleasant to interact with 
highly SA individuals as they experience more visible anxiety than those NSA participants 
who interact with other NSA partners.  
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3.4 Schlenker and Leary’s Model 
Prior to examining the main Schlenker and Leary (1982) hypotheses, we examined mean 
score differences between groups on the pre-interaction measures of interest: global 
impression, impression importance and expectations, and the respective factor scores for the 
latter two measures.  The means are provided in Table F1 in Appendix F for the SA 
individuals and all NSA individuals.  Independent sample t-tests (all Bonferroni adjusted p < 
.05 for total of 39 t-tests; p < .001) revealed mean differences for the impression expectations 
measure (and its Factor Two: Dominant/Confident), such that SA individuals expected to 
make a less positive presentation (i.e., lower expectation scores) than NSA individuals.  In 
contrast, SA individuals did not differ from NSA individuals on their ratings of how 
important it was to make a particular impression (i.e., overall positive impression).   
 
3.4.1 Difference Score Methodology 
Schlenker and Leary (1982) predict that social anxiety occurs when a discrepancy exists 
between an individual’s desire to make a particular impression and his or her expectations to 
make such an impression.  We examined this self-presentation model through a series of 
hierarchical/polynomial regressions.  In theory, this model should apply to all individuals; 
hence we ignored group status in the first series of analyses and then included the IAS trait 
social anxiety measure as a continuous predictor variable in the regression.   
One way to examine Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) model would be to create a 
variable that accounts for the difference between one’s impression importance total score and 
expectation score, and then test if anxious symptoms increased as a function of increases in 
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this “difference score” for both SA and NSA individuals.  However, difference score 
methodology is fraught with numerous difficulties (e.g., Edwards, 2001), with a primary 
problem being ignorance of the component measures.  An alternative to difference scores is 
the use of polynomial regression in which the two component scores are included as 
predictors, and the test of the difference between these scores is treated as a hypothesis to be 
tested (Edwards, 2001).   
Edwards and Parry (1993; Edwards, 1995) provides a series of constrained and 
unconstrained equations that explain how difference scores can be represented in the 
regression.  When there is one predictor composed of the difference between two component 
scores (X and Y), the regression equation is: Z = b0 + b1(X-Y) + e (Equation 1a), where Z is 
the outcome measure and e is a random disturbance term.  This specifies that outcome Z is 
positively related to the difference between X and Y.  If expanded, this equation, Z = b0 + 
b1X - b1Y + e (Equation 1b), depicts a positive relation between Z and X, and a negative 
relation between Z and Y, with the constraint that the coefficients on X and Y are equal in 
magnitude (b1 = b1).  This constraint can be removed by allowing the coefficients for X and 
Y to vary (i.e., be of different magnitudes, b1 and b2) in the following equation, Z = b0 + b1X 
- b2Y + e (Equation 2).  Subsequently, the regression equation can be extended to account for 
possible increases in X and Y in either a positive or negative direction when the difference 
score is included as a quadratic equation Z = b0 + b1(X-Y)2 + e, (Equation 3a), expanded as Z 
= b0 + b1X2 - 2b1XY + b1Y2 + e, (Equation 3b).  Finally, the following equation relaxes the 
constraint on the coefficients to be the same for the higher order curvilinear and interactive 
terms, and includes coefficient variability for the appropriate lower-order terms, Z = b0 = b1X 
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- b2Y + b3X2 - b4XY + b5Y2 + e, (Equation 4).  Edwards and Parry (1993) provides 
systematic methodology to interpret coefficients from the more complicated quadratic 
equation; however, they note that most difference score relationships can be represented by 
either a linear or quadratic equation (Equations 2 and 4, respectively).   
3.4.2 Test of Schlenker and Leary  
In the following set of analyses, we ran a series of regressions in which participants’ report of 
anxious symptoms was a dependent variable.  In addition to trait social anxiety, predictors 
included impression importance and expectations.  We had a number of ways to examine the 
dependent and predictor variables (i.e., global, total and factor scores), therefore, we 
completed a series of regressions with modifications in variable type.  (See Table H1 in 
Appendix H for a detailed summary of the regression statistics).  Of note, these analyses 
were completed for the full sample of 202 participants—independent of their dyad status 
(i.e., SA-NSA or NSA-NSA) as the predictors were all completed prior to the interactions 
and would be unrelated to dyad type.14    
  We began by regressing the SAS total score on the impression importance and 
expectation total scores (Equation 2).15 We found the regression to be significant (R2 = .06, F 
[2, 313] = 10.64, p < .01), revealing that impression importance was positively related to 
                                                 
14 While anxiety ratings were completed following the interaction, all participants (whether 
SA or NSA) interacted with NSA partners.  As further described, we choose to examine trait 
levels of anxiety rather than complete separate analyses for SA-NSA and NSA-NSA dyads.   
 
15 We centred all the predictors on the whole sample mean with the exception of IAS (centred 
on the NSA group mean as described in Footnote 9).  The factors and global outcome 




symptoms of anxiety (Beta = .25, t = 4.18, p < .01) and expectations were negatively related 
(Beta = -.21, t = -3.48, p < .01).  This supports the prediction that increased anxiety is a 
function of holding higher impression importance and lower expectations to depict a positive 
impression.  We repeated this regression substituting the SAS with the global measure of 
anxiety, and found a similar pattern of results.  The full model was significant (R2 = .02, F [2, 
313] = 3.99, p = .02) and the coefficients for the self-reported impression importance and 
expectations variables were in the same direction as above but of lower magnitude (Beta = 
.16, t = 2.61, p = .01; Beta = -.12, t = 2.05, p = .04, respectively).16   
We then examined a plot of the residual standardized predicted value for the SAS 
total regression described above for indication of a possible quadratic relation between the 
component scores.  Although we did not see any suggestion of a quadratic function, to 
confirm this finding we choose to examine the unconstrained model depicted in Edwards and 
Perry’s (1993) Equation 4.  The regression included SAS regressed on the impression 
importance and expectations (Step 1, same as the first regression described in paragraph 
above) and the second-order terms: impression importance squared, expectations squared and 
the product of the two components (entered in Step 2).  The regression was significant in the 
first step as expected given it was unchanged from the previous regression (same R2 and 
main effects).  The second step was not significant (R2change = .07, F[3, 310] = 1.18, p = .32), 
suggesting that the difference score does not hold a quadratic relation with the dependent 
variable.  A test of the R2change associated with adding the polynomial coefficients to the 
                                                 
16 We also replaced the impression total score with the global impression importance score 
in the regression predicting anxious symptoms and found similar results. 
 
 77 
model revealed a non-significant difference in R2 (R2diff = .05, CI.95: -.003 to .11).  Again we 
repeated these regression analyses with global self-reported ratings of anxious feelings 
regressed on the same predictors and found a similar pattern of results.   
Next, we examined the Schlenker and Leary (1982) model using the factor scores 
from the impression and expectations scales.  For example, we tested whether there was a 
similar pattern of results when self-reported anxious arousal was regressed on the Innocuous 
Sociability factors of the impression importance and expectation scales.  We decided to 
complete this next set of analyses with the total score for the SAS scale as our dependent 
variable, rather than completing each analysis with the global anxiety measure also.  Given 
that we found stronger effects with this multi-item score and a moderate correlation between 
these measures (approximately r = .50), this decision reduced the number of redundant tests 
and Type II error.  In this series of analyses we regressed SAS total score with an impression 
importance factor score and expectation factor score (using the constrained model, Equation 
1).  We did not include all possible combinations of impression importance and expectation 
factors (See Table 2 below).  Rather, we included the two factors representing Innocuous 
Sociability on the importance scale (Impression Factor Two) and expectations scales 
(Expectations Factor One).  Factor One of the importance scale (Confident/Non-anxious) and 
Factor Two of the expectation scale (Dominant/Confident) were also tested together.  As 
well, we tested the Non-anxious expectation factor (Expectations Factor Three) with each 
importance factor separately, for a total of four separate regressions. (See Table H1 in 




Table 2. Combinations of Impression Factors used in Regression of Anxious Arousal 
Regression Importance Factor Expectations Factor 
   
A Innocuous Sociability (Factor Two) Innocuous Sociability (Factor One) 
B Confident/Non-anxious (Factor One) Dominant/Confident (Factor Two) 
C Innocuous Sociability (Factor Two) Non-anxious (Factor Three) 
D Confident/Non-anxious (Factor One) Non-anxious (Factor Four) 
 
 All of the regressions were significant (all R2 > .06, F [2, 313] > 9.50, p < .001) 
except for the regression of SAS scale on Innocuous Sociability factors of the Impression 
Importance and Expectations scales (Regression A: R2 = .01, F [2, 313] = 1.55, p = .21).  
(That is, the discrepancy between high importance attached to Innocuous Sociability 
importance factor and expectation scores of making an innocuously sociable impression was 
not related to experience of anxiety).   For the significant regressions, the coefficients for the 
importance factors were in the positive direction as expected (all Beta > .14, t > 2.48, p < .05) 
and the expectation factors in the negative direction (all Beta < -.12, t < -2.12, p < .05).  In 
sum, these results suggest that the experience of anxiety increases when an individual 
believes it is important to portray a Confident/Non-anxious impression, but does not expect 
to be able to pull off a Dominant/Confident impression (Regression B).  As well, experience 
of anxiety is also a function of the discrepancy between expecting to appear anxious but 
believing it is important to make an innocuously sociable (Regression C) or Confident/Non-
anxious impression (Regression D). 
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   Again, we examined the possibility of a quadratic relation between the three pairs of 
importance and expectations factor scores found to be significant in the above regressions.  
We completed a series of two-step regressions which included the interactions of the factors 
in the second step (squared and product terms entered as shown in Edwards and Perry’ 
[1993] Equation 4).  The relation between factors of Innocuous Sociability importance and 
Non-anxious expectations was shown to be linear (Regression C), that is, there was no 
evidence of a quadratic function.  There was also no evidence of a quadratic relation between 
the Confident/Non-anxious Impression Importance and Non-anxious Expectation factors 
(Regression D; both regressions R2change < .01 in the second step of the model F [2, 313] < 
.62, p > .05).    
We found a significant test of the higher-order interaction terms in Step 2 of the 
model when the Confident/Non-anxious factor of the impression scale and the 
Dominant/Confident factor of the expectations scale were tested with the unconstrained 
model (Regression B).  Specifically, we found all the coefficients, except the square of 
Impression Factor One, to be significant (Step 2: R2change = .03, F [3, 310b] = 3.84, p = .01).  
To understand the relation between these two factors and anxiety, we plotted the 
unstandardized regression equation at different (low, medium and high) levels of the 
Impression Factor One (IMP F1; 1 SD below the mean, at the mean, and 1 SD above the 
mean, respectively) with the Expectation Factor Two (EXP F2) included.  In effort to 
simplify the presentation with only minor adjustments to the equation, we first re-ran the 
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regression without the Impression Factor One (IMP F1) squared term in the model. 17  The 
original equation was only slightly modified, as shown below:  
Original equation: Z = 36.96 +.39(IMP F1) + -.31(EXP F2) + .01(IMP F1)2 + -
.08(IMP F1 X EXP F2) + .10(EXP F2)2  
Modified equation: Y = 37.151 + .39(IMP F1) + -.31(EXP F2)+ -.07 (IMP F1 X EXP 
F2) + .10(EXP F2)2   
Figure 1 depicts the relation between self-reports of anxious arousal and one’s 
expectations to depict a Dominant/Confident impression.  High arousal was associated with 
low expectations for appearing Dominant/Confident.  In particular, individuals who believed 
it was important to appear Dominant/Confident experienced more anxiety, and specifically 
anxiety levels increased quadratically, as expectations for a Dominant/Confident impression 
decreased.  Although the overall change in contribution to variance explained was small 
(R2change = .03), the significant increase in Step 2 indicates that 50% more of the total 
variance explained in Step 1 (R2 = .06) is accounted for by the addition of the interaction 
effect in Step 2.  This finding suggests that individuals with high importance ratings are 
likely to report more anxious symptoms as their expectations decrease to a stronger degree 
than individuals with lower impression importance scores.  Figure 1 below also suggests that 
when expectations to make a Dominant/Confident impression are very high (i.e., > 25 on 
factor), lower importance ratings of making a Confident/Non-anxious impression are more 
strongly associated with reports of anxious symptoms (i.e., steeper slope).  
                                                 
17 Note, the R2change difference across the simple and higher order model was not significantly 





Figure 1. Prediction of self-report of anxious arousal from expectations to depict a 
Dominant/Confident impression mediated by Confident/Non-anxious importance ratings at 
low, mean and high levels (- 1 SD, mean, + 1 SD, respectively) 
 
In sum, the findings reported in this section suggest that there is a tendency for 
anxious arousal to increase as a function of the discrepancy between one’s ratings of the 
importance of an impression and beliefs about making such impressions.  Specifically, when 
an individual rates high importance in making a Confident/Non-anxious impression, but does 
























not expect to be able to make a Dominant/Confident impression (a discrepancy between 
these scores), the degree of anxiety increases during a social situation.  As well, expecting to 
appear anxious but believing it is important to make an impression of Innocuous Sociability 
or Confident/Non-anxious impression leads to higher levels of anxiety.  Finally, we have 
evidence that the relation between anxious arousal and expectations of making a 
Dominant/Confident impression varied as a function of one’s beliefs about how important it 
was to make such an impression.   
3.4.3 Role of Trait-level Social Anxiety 
In the next set of analyses testing the Schlenker and Leary (1982) model, we included trait 
social anxiety as an additional predictor, as we were interested in examining if the relation 
between anxious arousal and impression scores varied as a function of chronic trait levels of 
anxiety.  (A detailed summary of the regression statistics are provided in Table H1 in 
Appendix H).  For the following analyses, we again regressed SAS total score on the 
impression importance and expectations total scores and also included the trait social anxiety 
measure as a predictor (Step 1).  We were particularly interested in the interaction of trait 
social anxiety (i.e., W) with the difference measure (W*[X-Y]).  This was tested by including 
two interactions in Step 2: trait social anxiety by impression importance, and trait social 
anxiety by impression expectations.  The corresponding unconstrained regression equation 
becomes: 
  Z = b0 + b1X - b2Y + b3W + b4WX - b5WY + e.   
Note that the product of impression and expectation scores is not included in this equation as 
we continue to predict that a linear relation exists between these two components and have 
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removed this term for simplification.  The regression was significant in the first step (R2 = 
.08, F[3, 312] = 9.31, p < .001), but the test of the interactions was not significant in the 
second step (R2change < .01, F[2, 310] = 1.09, p > .05).  As expected, impression importance 
and expectation main effects were found to be significant and in the expected directions 
(comparable to the regression without trait social anxiety entered).  Trait social anxiety was a 
significant predictor (Beta = .15, t = 2.51, p = .01), such that increased trait social anxiety 
was associated with increased reports of symptoms of anxiety.  We also repeated these 
regressions using the factor scores as predictors with the inclusion of trait social anxiety but 
no interaction effect was found.  We did not find any interactions of trait social anxiety with 
the component measures (all R2change < .01, F [2, 312] < 2.05, p > .05; as tested in Step 2).  
All in all, these regression findings indicate that the relation between impression and 
expectations discrepancies and anxiety experienced during an interaction does not appear to 
be moderated by trait levels of social anxiety.   
3.5 Clark and Wells’ (1995) Model 
3.5.1 Distinguishable and Non-distinguishable Dyads 
Unlike the Schlenker and Leary (1982) model, the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model makes 
distinct predictions for SA individuals in comparison to NSA individuals.  Specifically, in the 
current task, by default, SA individuals should be more likely to experience symptoms of 
anxiety than NSA individuals.18  Further, SA individuals are expected to attend more to such 
                                                 
18 Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) theory may also be consistent with such a prediction, but 
only if just individuals with high trait levels of social anxiety held discrepant impression 
importance and expectations (and NSA individuals did not). Then as a group, SA would 
individuals would be expected to experience more anxiety than NSA individuals.  
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symptoms when they derive how they appear to others in comparison to NSA participants. 
Therefore, to examine this specific aspect of the Clark and Wells model, we compared SA 
participants to NSA participants in the study.  In particular, we compared SA individuals who 
interacted with NSA partners to NSA individuals who also interacted with NSA partners (i.e., 
NSAnsa members).  We neglect the NSA participants (i.e., NSAsa members) who interacted 
with SA participants at this time, primarily for ease of calculations and to avoid difficulties 
with additional dependencies in the models.19 (See Table F1 in Appendix F for means, SDs 
and t-test significance values). 
In the first test of the Clark and Wells (1995) model, we examined the development 
of self-reported appearance as a function of internal sensations and appearance as reported by 
the partner (or observer; Figure 2), through a series of regressions.   
 
Figure 2. Model of Clark and Wells’ (1995) interoceptive hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
19 As previously noted, we tested whether NSA participants (who interacted with SA partners) 
were different in kind to NSA participants who interacted with other NSA participants, and 
found they were not.  Independent samples t-test revealed no differences in mean values for 















We were most interested in the relationship between anxious arousal and self-
reported appearance, path (a), in an effort to test the Clark and Wells (1995) interoceptive 
hypothesis.  According to the model above, if the interoceptive hypothesis is supported, we 
would find that path (a) is strong for SA participants and weak for NSA participants.  
Observable or “actual” anxious appearance, as measured by both partners and observers in 
the model (i.e., Other-reported Anxious Appearance), was also included as another source of 
information that participants could use when making self-judgments of their appearance 
(serving as a mediator in the relation of arousal and self-reported appearance).  We expect 
that path (b) should be weak for SA and NSA participants, as internal arousal (e.g., tension, 
upset stomach) should not be visibly noticeable to others.  It is possible that the way in which 
participants appear to their interaction partners (i.e., partner-reported anxious appearance) 
may influence participants’ judgments of their own appearance, path (c); for example, 
partners’ perceptions could “leak-out” during an interaction through their behaviour and be 
“read-by” the participants as they make self-ratings of their own appearance.  Therefore, we 
choose to draw a causal (rather than a mutual influence or unanalyzed correlational path) 
between other-reported anxious appearance and anxious arousal, path (b), and with self-
reported anxious appearance, path (c).  We believed during an interaction, one’s anxiety level 
is the “cause” of anxious appearance as seen by others (independent of the predicted 
weakness of this path (b), and how one believes he or she appears should not influence 
others’ ratings.  Such a representation of the model would also allow for an opportunity to 




test for differences in path coefficients in the model when partners versus observers were 
used.  If a mediation effect occurred, it should take place only for partners’ reports, as only 
partners’ beliefs about participants’ anxiety level can “leak-out” during an interaction (as 
observers are removed from the interaction).  It is important to note that this view is a 
simplification of the relationship between actual and self-reported appearance, and a side 
issue relative to the core test of the interoceptive hypothesis in this population.  In sum, we 
expect a (non-zero, positive) correlation between self-reported and actual appearance, path 
(c), for both types of participants when judged by partners and observers, although clear 
theoretical support is lacking for the specific types of dyads (i.e., SA-NSA) used in this 
study.  
For the mixed dyads (SA-NSA), we could clearly identify the socially-anxious 
“participant” of focus and the non-socially anxious “partner” in the analyses.  In contrast, for 
the NSA-NSA pairings, each individual served as a participant and partner, and therefore, 
individuals in these dyads were indistinguishable.  One individual could be randomly chosen 
as the participant of focus and the other identified as the partner; however, randomly 
choosing one of the individuals as the participant would reduce the sample size and thus 
reduce power (an error of deletion according to Gonzalez and Griffin, 1997).  As well, 
examining any linear relation between variables collected on individuals in dyads violates an 
assumption of independence and the subsequent tests of significance are incorrect (Gonzalez 
and Griffin, 1997).  
 Gonzalez and Griffin (1997) developed a pairwise approach to examining dyadic data 
using easy to understand Pearson-type correlations in which the interdependence within 
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dyads is accounted for in the significance tests, and individual- and dyad-level information is 
identified.  With slight modifications this method can be applied to both distinguishable and 
exchangeable dyads.   
 
Figure 3.  Pairwise correlations between variables X and Y (person 1) and X’ and Y’ (person 
2) 
 
Figure 3 above illustrates all possible pairwise correlations between two variables, X 
and Y, for any pair of individuals.  In this model, X and Y represent the variables for one 
individual in the pairing, while X’ and Y’ represent the same variables for the other 
participant in the dyad.  The Pearson product-moment correlation (rxy and rx’y’) for variables 
X and Y (or X’ and Y’) could be found in the usual manner when dyads are composed of 
distinguishable participants.  However, when dyads are exchangeable, the tests of 
significance for these associations will be inaccurate; the correct test of significance requires 
information on the intradyadic similarity within X and within Y (Griffin and Gonzalez, 











between the two exchangeable partners in the dyad” (Gonzalez & Griffin, 1997, p. 276) and 
is required to find the correct test of significance for the overall correlations (rxy, rx’y’).  The 
significance of the overall correlations, adjusting for the dependent observations of N dyads, 
is calculated using a Z test where Z = rxy√N1*20 and represents the “effective sample size” 
(Griffin and Gonzalez, 1995, p. 432).   This model also measures the cross-intraclass 
correlation or the strength of the relation between variable X for one individual in the dyad 
and variable Y’ for his or her partner.    
O’Connor (2004) supplies SPSS syntax that provides calculations of the overall, 
pairwise intraclass and cross-intraclass correlations for exchangeable and distinguishable 
dyads.  We used this syntax to calculate the overall individual-level correlations for 
participants in our NSA-NSA group21, and used these correlations to complete the 
regressions described below.  In sum, we used the pairwise approach to find the correlations 
between the variables displayed in Figure 2 (i.e., anxious arousal, self-reported and other-
reported anxious appearance), ultimately to be able to determine the relation depicted by 
paths a, b and c in the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model depicted above.  (See Table G1 in 
Appendix G for overall correlations and significance values for NSA-NSA and SA-NSA 
groups) 
                                                 
20 N1* = 2N/[1 + rxx’ryy’ + r2xy’] 
 
21 As we were interested in the SA participant only for the distinguishable dyads, regressions 
for the SA-NSA dyads were completed in the typical manner, and did not require developing 




3.5.2 A Test of Clark and Wells’ (1995) Interoceptive Hypothesis 
To examine the Clark and Wells’ interoceptive hypothesis we completed a series of separate 
regression analyses for each dyad type.  We then tested if the unstandardized coefficients for 
the SA and NSA participants (BSA, BNSA, respectively) differed significantly by calculating 
the confidence interval (at t = 1.96, p < .05) for the difference between the two coefficients 
[SE(BSA-BNSA) = √([SEBSA]2 + [SEBNSA]2], and testing whether it contained zero (indicating 
a non-significant difference).  
 
Table 3. Regression Models testing Clark and Wells’ (1995) Interoceptive Hypothesis 




Self-reported Anxious Arousal: Global or SAS 
Partner-reported Anxious Appearance: Global or OSA-Partner  
Or 
Observer-reported Anxious Appearance: Global or OSA-Observer 
 
The table above summarizes the dependent and predictor variables in the series of 
regressions completed to investigate the interoceptive hypothesis of Clark and Wells (1995).  
The dependent variable was either global or specific anxious arousal, while the predictor 
variables varied by level of measurement (global or specific) and also by type of other-rater 
(i.e., partner or observer).  There were a number of similar findings when the DV or 
predictors were changed, for example, from global to specific, so only a limited presentation 
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of the typical results is provided.  (See Tables H2[a to d] in Appendix H for full summary of 
regression statistics).  All of the regressions were found to be significant for both the 
exchangeable and SA-NSA dyads, explaining between 24% and 44% of the variance, 
respectively.  Overall, we found that for NSA individuals (paired) with a NSA partner, 
reports of internal sensations were significant predictors in the model and positively related 
to self-reported appearance of anxiety (path [a], Beta = .48 to .65, all p < .00).  For SA 
participants, anxious appearance was also significantly predicted by anxious arousal (path 
[a], Beta = .60 to .66, all p = < .00).  There were no significant differences in the 
unstandardized coefficients of self-reported anxious arousal for SA and NSA individuals in 
this model, suggesting that the relation between internal arousal and self-reported appearance 
at the global and specific level is similar for SA and NSA participants.   
Actual appearance of anxiety as reported by partners was unrelated to self-reports of 
appearance for both NSA and SA individuals (path [c], Beta = .02 to .03, p > .05, for both 
groups), and the test of difference between coefficients for each group was non-significant.   
Similarly, appearance as reported by observers was unrelated to self-report of appearance for 
SA and NSA individuals, with one exception.  Observer-reported anxious appearance at the 
multi-item level (OSA-Observer) was a significant predictor of anxious appearance for the 
SA group (Beta = .22, t = 2.19, p = .03), but not a significant predictor for the NSA group 
(Beta = .04, t = .36, p > .05).  Once again, though, the coefficients were not significantly 
different between types of participants.  
Finally, for the most part, the relation between self-reported anxious arousal and 
other-reported anxious appearance was weak for SA and NSA individuals (path [b], r = -.16 
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to .18 and .11 to .18, respectively, all p > .05).  We found a significant, yet weak relation 
between global self-report of anxious arousal and anxious appearance when globally 
measured by partners (r = .20, p < .01) for the NSA individuals only.  Interestingly, global 
anxious arousal was strongly associated with global appearance as rated by observers (r = 
.95, p > .05); however, the ratings by observers were made immediately after the first five 
minutes of the interaction (while all other ratings were completed after the full interaction 
ended.  This may have influenced this somewhat unexpected finding.  
3.5.3 Role of Self-awareness in Self-reported Appearance 
To examine if trait levels of self-awareness were moderating the relation between arousal and 
self-reported appearance, we completed a series of regressions in which self-reported anxious 
appearance was predicted by anxious arousal and the trait-level self-awareness measure of 
interest (Step 1), the interaction between arousal and self-awareness (Step 2) and partner- or 
observer-reported appearance (Step 3).22  In these series of analyses we were most interested 
in the results of Step 2 (and the main effects of the self-awareness measures in Step 1), as we 
wanted to determine if the relation between self-reported appearance and internal sensations 
was affected by self- or body-consciousness trait measures.23  As with the regression tests 
                                                 
22 Other-reported (partner or observer) appearance was initially entered in a separate third 
step in an effort to isolate the test of the main effect for this variable on anxious arousal and 
to test for differences between the Beta coefficients for partners and observers in this step.  
Following this initial test, in most cases, the variable was entered in Step 1 along with the 
other two main effect predictors as no unique variance or differences were suggested from 
the regression tests. 
  
23 Pearson correlations for IAS and each of the four self-awareness traits are provided for SA 
and NSA groups in Table G1.  When the groups were combined, the correlation between IAS 
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above, we used the global and specific multi-item measures in separate regressions and then 
compared coefficients of the two groups to see if there were differences between SA and 
NSA individuals.  The full regression results are presented in Tables H2 in Appendix H, and 
a summary of the findings is outlined below.  
 
Table 4. Regression Models Examining Self-awareness in the Prediction of Self-reported 
Anxious Appearance  
DV Self-reported Anxious Appearance: Global or OSA-Self 
  
Step 1 Self-reported Anxious Arousal: Global or SAS 
 Self-awareness trait: public or private BCS or SCS 
Step 2 Self-reported Anxious Arousal X Self-awareness trait  
Step 3 Partner-reported Anxious Appearance: Global or OSA-Partner  
Or 
Observer-reported Anxious Appearance: Global or OSA-Observer 
 
When the analyses were completed with global measures for both pair types, none of 
the regressions were significant in Step 2 or 3.24  Therefore, we re-ran the models excluding 
                                                                                                                                                       
and public SCS was .11 and significant at p = .05, while the correlations for the other self-
awareness traits were not significant (r = .02 to .08; all p > .05). 
 
24 As expected, in Step 1, anxious arousal continued to be a significant predictor of anxious 
appearance for both SA and NSA groups.  There were no significant main effects for any of 
the self-awareness measures for the NSA-NSA group (all p > .35).    
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the interaction terms, and collapsing the three main effects in Step 1 in a single-step 
regression.  None of the self-awareness traits were significant predictors of global self-
reported appearance for NSA individuals (all p > .05).  For SA participants, private BCS and 
public BCS were positively related to self-reports of anxious appearance (R2 = .36 to .38, 
Beta = .15 to .18, both p < .07), while private SCS and public SCS were unrelated (both R2 = 
.36, Beta = .02 to .04, p > .66).  Yet, when we compared the coefficients from these four 
regressions across SA and NSA individuals, we found that none of the self-awareness 
coefficients were significantly different between SA and NSA participants.   
A similar pattern of results was found for the regressions in which observer-reported 
global anxious appearance was used in place of partner-reported appearance for SA 
individuals, but not NSA individuals.25  For NSA individuals, global anxious appearance was 
found to be a significant predictor for the model including private BCS (R2 =.46, Beta = .19, 
p = .04) and approaching significance in the other three models (R2 = .45 to .46, all Beta = 
.17, p = .06).  Once again though, the coefficients for observer-reported global appearance 
were not significantly different between SA and NSA individuals, suggesting the weak or 
virtually absent relation between self-reported and observer-reported appearance (with the 
inclusion of self-awareness factors) is similar for both types of dyads.  
 When the regressions were completed with the multi-item measures, we found some 
evidence of an interaction between self-awareness traits and anxious arousal in the prediction 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
25 Recall that for observers the global anxious appearance rating was made immediately 
after the first five minutes of the interaction while partner-reported global arousal was made 
after the interaction was completed.  
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of self-reported anxious appearance.  For all four regressions with the SA individuals, the 
regression model was significant (R2 = .38 to .39, public BCS and private SCS, both p < .04) 
or approaching significance (R2 = .36 to .37, private BCS and public SCS, both p < .07) in 
Step 2.  For the NSA-NSA pairs, Step 2 was only significant in one of the regressions 
indicating an interaction between anxious arousal and public BCS (R2 = .28, Beta = .22, p < 
.001) as well as a main effect for public BCS.  Partner-reported appearance was not a 
significant predictor of self-reported appearance for either dyad type (all p > .05).  Therefore, 
as discussed we re-ran the regressions for both groups in two steps instead of three, with the 
main effects of anxious arousal, self-awareness rating, and partner-reported appearance 
(entered in Step 1) and interaction of self-awareness and arousal (entered in Step 2).    
Overall, the results of the two-step regressions were consistent with the findings 
above.  That is, there were no main effects for the partner-reported anxious appearance or 
trait-levels of self-awareness for SA individuals and as expected, the main effect for anxious 
arousal re-emerged in the prediction of anxious appearance for both groups.  For the SA 
individuals, the R2change in Step 2 for the interaction of trait-levels of self-awareness and 
anxious arousal for each of the four regressions was significant (public SCS and private BCS, 
both p < .04) or approaching significance (private SCS and public BCS, p < .07), but small 
(between .02 and .03; accounting for less than 10% more variance explained with the 
inclusion of the interaction).  The directions for all of these interactions were negative (Beta 
between -.15 and -.18).  Similarly, for the NSA-NSA group, the R2change of .05 for the 
regression including public BCS was significant (p =.01).  While the overall change in 
contribution to the total variance explained was small (R2change = .05), the significant increase 
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in Step 2 indicates that about 18% more of the total variance explained in Step 1 (R2 = .28) is 
accounted for by the addition of the interaction effect in Step 2 for the NSA-NSA dyads.  In 
contrast to the SA participants, the direction of the interaction for NSA individuals was 
positive (Beta = .22).   
Before interpreting the results for each of the groups with the two-step regressions, 
we completed comparisons across the two dyad types.  We compared the coefficients for 
these four regressions at the multi-item level and found that the only key difference between 
SA and NSA individuals was in the interaction coefficient for public body-consciousness and 
arousal predictors, as none of the other coefficients for main effects or interactions were 
significantly different across groups.  As we were interested in understanding how the 
models differed across groups, to truly test the Clark and Wells’ model, we focused on this 
particular finding for public body-consciousness.  We examined the difference in the 
interaction of public BCS and arousal for each group by plotting self-reported arousal as a 
function of self-reported appearance for each dyad-type at different levels of public body-
consciousness (1 SD below mean, at mean, 1 SD above mean).   
Figure 4 below shows the relation between self-reported appearance and arousal at 
different levels of public body-consciousness.  For SA participants, the relation between self-
reported anxious appearance and anxious arousal is not convincingly moderated by trait-
levels of body-consciousness.  Although there was a significant (but weak) interaction effect 
(< 8% increase in variance explained), the three slopes for SA individuals are essentially flat 
at all levels of public body-consciousness.  In contrast, for NSA individuals, the relation 
between appearance and arousal does appear to vary at different public body-consciousness 
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levels such that the slope is steeper for individuals with higher trait levels of public body-
consciousness (i.e., fanning appearance of slopes; again, approximately 18% more variance 
explained).  Nonetheless, the most pronounced difference between SA and NSA 
individuals—at any level of trait public BCS—is the contrast between the relation of arousal 
and appearance.  For NSA individuals the tendency to focus on observable aspects of body 
moderates the relation between self-reported arousal and appearance, such that the relation 
between arousal and self-report of appearance is more strongly associated at higher trait 
levels of public body-consciousness (i.e., steeper slope).  This pattern of results was not 
found for SA individuals.  That is, for SA participants, the relation between self-ratings of 
arousal and appearance is not influenced by the tendency to focus on observable aspects of 
body (e.g., appearance, manner, style of behaviour).  The following equations are depicted in 
Figure 4: 
 SA: Y = 43.48 + .81(SAS) + .02(public BCS) + -.04(SAS X public BCS) 




Figure 4. Self-reported appearance as a function of anxious arousal at low, mean and high 
levels of public body-consciousness (- 1 SD, mean, + 1 SD, respectively).  
 
We also completed the above series of regressions with the multi-item measures by 
replacing appearance as reported by partners with observer-reported appearance.   For NSA 
individuals, the results for the regressions (i.e., R2change and coefficients) were similar to the 
partner regressions, and observer-reported appearance was not a significant predictor of self-
reported anxious appearance.  There were some minor differences in the structure of the 
models for the SA participants as OSA-observer was found to be a significant predictor of 
self-reported appearance (in Step 3; Beta = .21 to .24) and none of the interactions between 
SAS and the self-awareness traits were significant (in Step 2).  Of note, the R2change for 


























(R2change < .06).  We compared the coefficients for the OSA-observer predictor (when entered 
in a separate Step) for SA and NSA individuals and did not find a difference between groups.  
In brief, these findings add to the suggestion that appearance as perceived by partners and 
observers likely varies (and should be duly acknowledged), but also suggests that neither of 
these variables have a particularly strong relation to self-reported appearance. 
3.5.4 Clark and Wells (1995) Summary 
In sum, this section addressed a key component of the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model.  Clark 
and Wells predict that self-reported (but not actual) appearance is strongly related to internal 
sensations for SA individuals.  In our test of this assumption, we found moderately strong 
associations between arousal and self-reported appearance for both SA and NSA individuals.  
This finding was shown at the global and multi-item level of measurement for these 
variables.   In addition, we consistently showed that self-reported and partner-reported 
appearance is not strongly correlated for either SA or NSA individuals.  In contrast, there 
was some suggestion that specific observer-reported appearance was weakly related to self-
reported appearance for SA participants, yet unrelated for NSA individuals. 
In our test of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, we examined the anxious arousal-
appearance relation and the role of self-awareness, as these traits are often overlooked.  At 
the level of global measures, we found little evidence of a relation between any of the self-
awareness measures and self-reported arousal and appearance.  We found some indication of 
an interaction between self-awareness and arousal at the multi-item level in prediction of 
appearance.  For SA individuals, public body-consciousness and private self-consciousness 
were weakly related to the relation between self-reported arousal and appearance.  In contrast 
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for the NSA individuals, the only significant regression demonstrating an interaction was for 
the public body-consciousness, indicating a positive (but weak) influence on the relation 
between arousal and appearance.  Overall this suggests that for NSA individuals, the relation 
between arousal and self-reported appearance is moderated by trait-levels of body-
consciousness (i.e., tendency to focus on observable aspects of body).  That is, we would 
expect NSA individuals with high levels of public body-consciousness to report more 
anxious appearance at high levels of arousal than those with low levels of this trait.  In 
contrast, for SA individuals, levels of public body-consciousness are virtually unrelated to 
arousal and degree of reporting anxious appearance.  Socially anxious individuals’ reports of 
anxious appearance appear to be more “hard-wired” to levels of arousal and not influenced 
by body-consciousness predispositions in comparison to NSA individuals.   
3.6 Anxious Arousal, Appearance and Desire for Future Interactions 
In the final set of analyses, we examined how participants appeared to their NSA partners 
and how that impacted ratings of a desire for a future interaction.  In review, we were 
interested in the types of impressions SA individuals actually make on others in an 
interaction.  SA individuals were predicted to be judged as appearing more anxious than 
NSA individuals by partners, and anxious behaviour was expected to be related to rejection 
by others (while controlling for raters’ own anxious arousal levels).   As mentioned, 
independent sample t-tests revealed that SA individuals were judged as appearing more 
anxious than NSA participants by partners and observers when using global (both p < .02) 
and specific (all p < .002) ratings of anxious appearance (See Table F1 for summary of 
Means and SD).   
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Using the Desire for Future Interaction (DFI) scale as an index of likeability/rejection 
(higher scores are associated with higher likeability, lower scores associated with more 
rejection), we examined the relation between perceived anxiety and likeability.  Although 
there were no mean differences for DFI ratings made by NSA individuals for SA or NSA 
participants (t = -1.13, df = 215, p = .26), we found that DFI was negatively correlated with 
perceived anxiety in one’s partner for NSA individuals who interacted with SA individuals (r 
= -.20, p = .05) and other NSA partners (r = -.22, p = .02).26  Though the effect is small, this 
finding implies that the more anxious NSA individuals perceive their partner to be, the less 
likely they are to desire a future interaction.  Interestingly, perceived anxiety in one’s partner 
was also positively associated with how anxious the partner reported being during the 
interaction.  For NSA individuals partnering with NSA participants, the Pearson correlations 
between DFI and OSA-Self were significant and of moderate strength (r = .46 and .44, both p 
< .01, for global and specific ratings).  A similar trend was found for NSA participants 
interacting with SA individuals (r = .24, p = .02 and r = .45, p < .01, global and specific, 
respectively).  Perhaps the relatively lower correlations for SA than NSA individuals were a 
function of fewer individual differences in OSA-Self ratings for the SA group.  
 In the following regression analysis, we examined the relation between perceived 
appearance and likeability ratings, while controlling for partners’ own level of anxious 
arousal and observer-reported appearance.  We believed that likeability decreased with 
                                                 
26 Correlation significance values were obtained from Gonzalez and Griffin’s (1997) 
pairwise approach for exchangeable dyads which adjusts p-values for interdependence in the 




higher anxious appearance ratings, but suspected raters’ own level of arousal may mediate 
this relation, while controlling for anxious appearance as viewed by observers outside of the 
interaction (as their appearance ratings should not be based on their own level of anxiety).  
Therefore, we completed a regression analysis in which specific anxious appearance (as rated 
by a partner) was predicted from the raters’ anxiety experience, desire for future interaction 
with partner-rating, observers’ rating of anxious appearance (Step 1) and the interaction of 
likeability and raters’ anxious arousal rating (Step 2; using all specific measures only).  The 
regressions for the NSA-NSA exchangeable dyads were completed using Gonzalez and 
Griffin’s (1997) pairwise approach using syntax provided by O’Connor (2004).  Regressions 
for dyads involving SA individuals were completed in the usual manner.  Regression 
coefficients were compared in the same manner described in the Clark and Wells (1995) 
section above.  
The overall model for the regression was significant for NSA-SA dyads in Step 1 (R2 
= .30, F [3, 52] = 7.52, p < .01) and Step 2 (R2change = .07, F [1, 51] = 5.25, p = .03).   
Perceived anxiety in partners was negatively associated with likeability ratings (Beta = -.23, 
p =.05), positively associated with self-reported anxious arousal (Beta = .52, p < .01), and 
unrelated to appearance as judged by observers (Beta = -.07, p > .05).  The additional amount 
of variance explained by including the test of moderation was miniscule (< 1%), yet the 
interaction of arousal and desire for future interaction was significant (Beta = -.26, p =.03) 
and accounted for about 20% more variance explained than in Step 1 alone.  This suggests 
for NSA-SA pairings, the relation between NSA raters’ anxious appearance and likeability 
ratings of their SA partner is weaker as the NSA raters’ anxious arousal increases.  
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 For NSA individuals interacting with other NSA individuals, the regression was 
significant in Step 1 (R2 = .27, F [3, 76] = 9.18, p < .01), but not Step 2 (R2change = .01, F [1, 
75] = .90, p > .05).  Likeability of partners and raters’ own arousal level were significantly 
related to partner-reported anxious appearance (From Step 1: Beta = -.21, p = .03 and Beta 
=.50, p < .01, respectively); while observer-reported appearance was unrelated (Beta = .12, p 
> .05).   For NSA individuals interacting with other NSA participants, raters’ anxious arousal 
did not moderate the relation between likeability and appearance ratings in partners.  The 
unstandardized regression coefficients for the main effects across the two dyad types were 
compared and no significant differences were found across groups.  We plotted the 
regression equations (with observer-reported appearance excluded) to further examine any 

































Figure 5.  Prediction of anxious appearance from likeability mediated by low, mean and high 
levels of raters’ anxious arousal ratings (- 1 SD, mean, + 1 SD, respectively) for NSA-SA and 
NSA-NSA dyads  
 Figure 5 illustrates the relation between anxious appearance ratings and likeability for 
NSA-NSA and NSA-SA dyads at low, mean and high levels of anxious arousal for the rater.  
In general, this graph suggests that the relation between perceived anxiety by partner and 
likeability of partner is negative for both groups, but more strongly negative for NSA 
individuals who interacted with SA individuals.  For NSA-NSA dyads, partner-reported 
anxious appearance shows subtle decreases with increased reports of likeability, but this 
relation is not moderated by arousal levels of the rater.  In contrast, for NSA-SA dyads, the 
relation between likeability and perceived anxiety in partner seems is moderated by level of 
arousal, such that higher arousal in rater is associated with a stronger negative relation (i.e., 
steeper slope).   
Overall, this series of analyses provides several interesting findings.  First, perceived 
level of anxious appearance27 is not predicted by appearance as viewed by observers outside 
                                                 
27 The results presented were for specific multi-item measures. The regressions were also 
completed with all global items only; however, the global results should be interpreted with 
caution as the 1-item appearance rating completed by observers was completed after the first 
5 minutes of the interaction, while partner global ratings of appearance were completed at 
the end of the interaction.   Nonetheless, we found a similar pattern of results for the NSA 
individuals who interacted with the NSA individuals, such that 21% of the variance in 
partner-reported global anxious appearance was explained in the first step of the model and 
there was no indication of a moderation effect of anxious arousal.  Desire for future 
interaction was not found to be a significant predictor of global anxious appearance, while 
raters’ anxious arousal continued to be a significant predictor in the model. For NSA 
partners who rated SA individuals, the interaction of DFI and anxious arousal was not found 
to be significant in the second Step of the model.  As well, in Step 1, arousal was found to be 
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of the interaction.  Partner-reported anxious appearance is negatively associated with 
likeability, such that higher levels of anxious appearance are associated with lower levels of 
likeability (or higher levels of rejection).  Raters’ own level of anxious arousal appears to be 
a strong predictor of perceived appearance in a partner, suggesting that how a participant 
appears to his or her partner (i.e., more anxious appearance) is less related to objectively 
observable signs of anxiety and more strongly tied to anxious symptoms of the rater.  There 
is some indication that when NSA individuals interact with SA individuals, the relation 
between perceived anxiety and likeability is partly moderated by raters’ own arousal level, 
while this is less so for NSA interacting with NSA partners.  Although this latter finding 
should be interpreted with caution as the regression coefficients were compared across dyad 
types and no significant differences emerged.  
3.7 Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine beliefs about impression importance, 
expectations, anxious arousal and anxious appearance for individuals with social anxiety.  
Prior to examining the main predictions in this study, we completed a closer inspection of the 
key variables’ factor structure and compared global and specific measures of key constructs.  
Using the full sample of participants and partners, factor analyses revealed that measures of 
impression importance, impression expectations, anxious arousal and anxious appearance 
held similar factor structures for SA and NSA individuals, implying that trait-levels of social 
anxiety generally do not influence the manner in which these scales are used.  In brief, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
a significant predictor of appearance while DFI was not for NSA-SA dyads.  Global anxious 
appearance as reported by observers was not a significant predictor for either dyad type.   
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factor analyses revealed that the impression importance scale was composed of two key 
parts: Confident/Non-anxious and Innocuous Sociability impression factors; while the 
impression expectation scale included both a Dominant/Confident and a Non-anxious factor, 
along with an Innocuous Sociability factor.  Symptoms of anxiety tended to be grouped into 
three factors composed of shaking and trembling symptoms, derealization and cognitive 
symptoms, and feelings of being flushed or blushing.  For self-reported anxious appearance 
ratings, the analysis revealed four factors composed of speech dysfluencies, visual signs of 
anxiety, interaction initiation actions, and self-manipulation and fidgetiness.    
We also examined how global 1-item ratings of anxious arousal and appearance (i.e., 
self-, partner- and other-reported) related to composite ratings of multi-item scales and 
whether this relationship might be moderated by trait-levels of social anxiety.  The variance 
explained in global ratings by specific measures varied from 17 to 39 percent, with weak to 
moderate positive correlations between these global and specific variables.  Trait-levels of 
social anxiety had weak to virtually no influence on the relation between global and specific 
measures, suggesting that individuals do not simply report more global anxiety because of 
higher levels of trait social anxiety.  When a statistically significant interaction of trait social 
anxiety and specific ratings did occur, the contribution to variance explained was negligible 
(less than one percent).  When factor scores were used in these analyses, the results 
suggested that global anxious arousal is more strongly associated with Shaking/Trembling 
and Derealization/Cognitive symptoms than the Blushing/Feeling flushed factor.  For self-
report of anxious appearance, global ratings were most strongly related to Visual Signs of 
Anxiety and Initiation of Interaction factors.  Finally, for partner-reported anxious 
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appearance both Conversational Style and Visual Signs/Dysfluent Speech factors were 
significantly related to global ratings, but the latter factor was more strongly related to the 
single-item appearance score.  In all, these findings suggest that global anxious arousal or 
appearance ratings are not a simple summation of symptoms of anxious arousal or indicators 
of anxious appearance.  Use of both global and multi-item variables is essential to accurately 
assess perceptions of anxiety and appearance in the current study. 
Before entering a social interaction, SA and NSA individuals hold similar beliefs 
about the importance of making a positive impression.  However, people with social anxiety 
expect to make less positive impressions than NSA individuals prior to an encounter.  During 
a social interaction, SA individuals (interacting with NSA individuals) report more anxious 
arousal than NSA participants.  In general, the degree of anxious arousal is linearly related to 
the discrepancy between overall impression importance ratings and beliefs about making 
those impressions.  A higher discrepancy rating (i.e., impression importance is higher than 
impression expectations) is associated with more self-reported anxious arousal for all 
individuals—independent of trait levels of social anxiety.  This study also found that 
particular types of impressions and expectations for making such impressions were related to 
degree of anxious arousal.  Specifically, the discrepancy between importance and 
expectations for making a Confident/Non-anxious and dominant impression was positively 
related to anxious symptoms.  Expecting to appear anxious but believing it is important to 
make a sociable or Confident/Non-anxious impression also leads to higher levels of anxiety.   
Clark and Wells’ (1995) model of social anxiety predicts that individuals with social 
anxiety have strong desires to form a favourable impression on others, but doubt their ability 
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to do so.  Our finding that SA and NSA individuals want to make similar impressions on 
others is inconsistent with Clark and Wells’ model.  However, these findings are supportive 
of Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) model of social anxiety in which it is predicted that social 
anxiety will occur whenever a person’s expectations for making an important impression are 
discrepant from their beliefs about making that impression, irrespective of the type of 
impression desired.  This suggests that all individuals are likely to experience anxiety in 
social situations, for example, even if they are making innocuous or good impressions, if the 
desired impression and expectations are not “in sync.”  
Clark and Wells (1995) also predict that anxious arousal during a social interaction 
would be strongly related to self-reports of anxious appearance for individuals with social 
anxiety, likely due to a tendency to focus on interoceptive information and be more self-
focused than individuals without social anxiety.  As expected, we found that SA individuals 
experience more anxious arousal and report appearing more visibly anxious than NSA 
individuals.  Interestingly, the current study showed that anxious symptoms were moderately 
related to self-report of anxious appearance for both SA and NSA individuals.  This implies 
that both SA and NSA individuals use interoceptive information to make self-ratings of 
appearance during a social interaction.  And while we found that NSA and SA individuals 
differed in their trait-level tendency to be concerned about making a good impression on 
others, they did not differ in their tendencies to pay attention to internal sensations, thoughts, 
feelings or observable aspects of body.   
We found one key difference in the relation between arousal and appearance based on 
trait-levels of social anxiety.  For NSA individuals, the relation between arousal and self-
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reported appearance was moderated by one’s tendency to focus on observable aspects of 
one’s own body (i.e., trait-levels of public body-consciousness).  That is, increased arousal is 
more strongly related to self-report of appearance (with a positive slope) at higher trait levels 
of public body-consciousness for NSA participants.  In contrast, self-reported appearance for 
SA individuals appears to be more stable across levels of arousal and not shaped by one’s 
tendency to focus on outwardly seen aspects of body. 
In addition to tests of Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) and Clark and Wells’ (1995) 
models, we also completed comparisons of SA and NSA individuals’ arousal, appearance 
and impressions made.  We inspected self-reported appearance ratings and studied how these 
ratings compared to anxious appearance as judged by others both in the interaction and 
observing the interaction.  When participants were asked to make a global rating of anxious 
appearance, SA individuals reported similar levels of anxious appearance as NSA 
individuals.  When asked to rate specific and observable aspects of appearance (such as 
appearing fidgety), SA individuals reported significantly more total anxious appearance than 
their NSA counterparts.  Interestingly, appearance of anxiety as reported by partners was 
unrelated to self-report of appearance for both NSA and SA individuals.  Likewise, observer-
reported appearance tended to be unrelated to self-reported appearance for NSA individuals 
and only weakly related for SA individuals in the positive direction (yet, the difference 
between the groups was not significantly different).  As expected, the relation between 
anxious arousal and other-reported anxious appearance was, for the most part, weak for both 
SA and NSA individuals.   
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All in all, both (NSA) partners and observers reported that SA individuals appeared 
more anxious than NSA participants during the interaction.  In our exploration of how 
anxious appearance might influence impressions made during an interaction, we found that 
as a group, SA individuals were rated as equal to NSA individuals on a desire for future 
interaction scale; yet we found that this rating was weakly but negatively correlated with 
ratings of specific signs of anxious appearance.  In addition, anxious appearance ratings of 
partners were positively associated with the raters’ own level of anxiety.   
We tested what predictors might explain partner-reported anxious appearance ratings 
completed by NSA individuals, finding that rater arousal was the strongest positive predictor.  
Desire for future interactions was negatively associated with anxious appearance ratings, 
such that higher levels of observable anxious appearance are associated with lower levels of 
likeability (or higher levels of rejection); this relation appeared to be moderated by raters’ 
own arousal level for NSA individuals interacting with SA partners.  We also found that 
observer-reported anxious appearance was not a significant predictor of partner-reported 
appearance ratings, suggesting that NSA individuals may not be basing their judgments 






4.1 Study Aims 
This study addressed a number of key questions regarding impressions, anxious arousal and 
visibility of anxiety for the individual with social anxiety.   
1. In what way is anxiety in social situations related to discrepancies between desire to 
make a particular impression and expectations for making that impression?  As well, 
what roles do trait levels of social anxiety play in both impression goals and 
expectation of achieving those goals? (These questions provide tests of Schlenker and 
Leary’s [1982] model.) 
2. How are the symptoms of anxious arousal that are experienced during a social 
interaction related to beliefs about visibility of anxiety for individuals with high trait 
levels of social anxiety in comparison to those with normal to moderate levels of trait 
social anxiety?  Is the relation between self-reported arousal and anxious appearance 
influenced by tendencies to be concerned about making a good impression on others 
or to pay attention to internal sensations, thoughts, feelings or observable aspects of 
body? (These questions provide a test of Clark and Wells’ [1995] model.) 
3. How is visibility of anxiety as reported by partners in a dyad related to the 
impressions made by individuals with social anxiety during an interaction?  What 
factors influence partner-reported appearance ratings of SA and NSA individuals? 
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(These questions constitute an application and extension of Schlenker and Leary’s 
[1982] and Clark and Wells’ [1995] model.) 
4. Finally, how do global ratings of anxious arousal and appearance relate to multi-item 
symptoms and behaviour lists of arousal and appearance, and is such a relation the 
same for SA and NSA individuals?  (This question is an investigation of key 
measurement issues for social anxiety theory.) 
The questions proposed above will be discussed in the following sections.  Implications for 
the models of social anxiety and treatment of individuals with SA will be presented, followed 
by limitations, future studies and conclusions. 
4.2 Impressions: Importance and Expectations 
The first set of questions above stemmed primarily from two vital influences in the 
understanding of social anxiety disorder—the cognitive models of Schlenker and Leary 
(1982) and Clark and Wells (1995).  While each model stresses the importance of cognitive 
beliefs about self and the subsequent influence on social anxiety, there are distinct and 
conflicting predictions from each model.  Schlenker and Leary’s theory hypothesizes that 
social anxiety occurs when individuals desire to make a particular impression, but doubt their 
ability to make such an impression.  Clark and Wells also predict that individuals with social 
anxiety doubt their ability to make their desired impressions.  Yet, they propose that 
individuals with social anxiety want to make “good” impressions on others and expect to 
make negative or less skilled impressions, implying that the invariant experience of social 
anxiety during an interaction stems from poor performance (i.e., making “bad” impressions).   
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In this study, we found support for the key tenet of Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) 
model.  Larger discrepancies between the types of impression individuals find important to 
make and their expectations for making such impressions were associated with increased 
reports of anxiety in social situations.  This finding was irrespective of trait social anxiety 
status, and SA and NSA individuals’ importance ratings for making a positive impression 
overall were similar.  As with Oakman et al.’s (2003) study, we found that highly SA 
individuals wanted to appear innocuously sociable.  In contrast to their study, though, we 
found that NSA individuals believed it was important to appear polite, warm and courteous 
also!  There was no difference in ratings for the importance of appearing confident between 
SA and NSA participants, suggesting that on the whole, both types of individuals believed it 
was equally important to not appear anxious in an interaction. 
The similarity in importance ratings is somewhat surprising, and is likely, in part, a 
function of using individuals who have within-normal levels of social anxiety (i.e., NSA 
participants) as a comparison group.  It was expected that the NSA control participants would 
also experience some interaction anxiety when meeting a stranger and presumably would be 
more variable than characteristically low SA individuals in the types of impressions they 
believed were important to make on others.  If we used the typical comparison group, 
primarily composed of low SA participants who by definition are not worried about the 
impressions they make, we may have found more pronounced differences in importance 
ratings.  Nonetheless, we found that SA and NSA individuals differed on their expectations 
for making particular impressions.  Consistent with Clark and Wells’ (1995) predictions, and 
the findings of Leary et al. (1988) and Walden and Alden (1991), individuals with social 
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anxiety expected to make less positive impressions overall, and in particular expected to 
appear less dominant and confident than NSA individuals during the interaction.  Additional 
theoretical and clinical implications for social anxiety disorder are discussed below.  
Clark and Wells’ (1995) belief that SA individuals want to make “extraordinary” 
impressions was not directly tested in this study as we were unable to compare mean 
impression expectation scores with some other standard outside of the study findings (e.g., 
with the availability of normative scores).  Yet there was some evidence that trait social 
anxiety was positively (albeit weakly) associated with an overall tendency to be concerned 
about making good impressions.  In particular, there was a trend for public self-
consciousness to be higher for individuals with high levels of trait social anxiety.  However, 
when importance for making a positive impression was examined for a specific social 
interaction and immediately prior to that social encounter, it was found that the types of 
impressions individuals with social anxiety want to make are not different in kind from the 
types of impressions that are important to individuals without high levels of social anxiety.  
This serves as evidence that Clark and Wells may be incorrect in their belief that SA 
individuals want to make unrealistic or “exceptional” impressions relative to others.  Once 
more, the discrepancy between valued impressions and expectations for oneself is associated 
with experiencing anxiety in social situations—regardless of the types of impressions 
desired.     
4.3 Anxious Arousal and Appearance  
The role of anxious appearance in understanding social anxiety was examined in a number of 
ways—that is, from the perspective of the target participant, the interactants (e.g., the target 
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participants’ partners in the interaction) and observers of the interaction.  Each of these 
individuals has different levels and types of information available when making judgments of 
visible anxiety.  For the participant, the available information includes internal or 
interoceptive information such as anxious arousal, feelings and thoughts, and external 
information such as partner’s reactions (e.g., as seen in Alden & Mellings, 2004).  Partners’ 
judgments were expected to be based on noticeable information (e.g., speech style) along 
with their own feelings and reactions, while observers should rely more heavily on visible 
information in comparison to partners.  To truly understand the role of anxious appearance in 
this disorder, all of these perspectives should be acknowledged. 
In terms of self-reported anxious appearance, the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model 
makes predictions about how such judgments vary between SA and NSA individuals.  They 
predict that SA individuals rely heavily on symptoms of anxious arousal when judging how 
anxious they appear to others, while individuals without social anxiety would likely use both 
internal and external information to make ratings of how they are seen by others.  Clark and 
Wells believe that a high reliance on interoceptive information leads to inaccurate 
perceptions of anxious appearance for SA individuals when compared to other people’s 
ratings, but they do not acknowledge that individuals without social anxiety may hold a 
“positivity” bias when making self-ratings; Woody & Rodriguez, 2000.  That is, it is possible 
that the individuals without social anxiety perceptions are more positive than the perceptions 




SA individuals, by definition, are expected to experience more anxious arousal in 
social situations and this finding is frequently confirmed in interaction studies (Alden & 
Wallace, 1995; Beidel, Turner & Danc, 1985; Norton & Hope, 2001) including this one.  
This finding alone, though, does not predict that arousal and self-reported appearance would 
be more strongly associated for SA individuals than for NSA individuals.  There is some 
indirect and rather mixed evidence that SA individuals have attentional biases away from 
external social information (i.e., a tendency to attend to themselves), that they tend to see 
themselves from an observer perspective (i.e., from an external point of view; George & 
Stopa, in press as cited in Brown & Stopa, 2007) and that they show memory deficits for 
external information following interactions.  However, these findings also do not fully 
support Clark and Wells’ (1995) interoceptive hypothesis.  The tendency for SA individuals 
to report more anxious appearance than individuals without high levels of social anxiety is 
frequently cited as evidence for Clark and Wells’ interoceptive hypothesis too (e.g., Mansell 
& Clark, 1999; Mellings & Alden, 2000).  Again, these types of indirect studies do not 
confirm that SA individuals’ self-perceptions (e.g. anxious appearance) are primarily tied to 
internal arousal levels.   
Unfortunately, direct tests of Clark and Wells’ interoceptive prediction are rare (e.g., 
McEwan and Devins, 1983; Mansell and Clark, 1999), and typically neglect measurement of 
traits that could influence the relation between anxious arousal and self-reported appearance.  
Such traits include a predisposition to be focused on internal information or a tendency to 
focus on observable aspects of one’s body.  Moreover, we might expect that highly SA 
individuals’ tendency to over-attend to anxious arousal is related to a predisposition to be 
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focused on internal sensations (i.e., sensitive to physiological arousal; Leary & Kowalski, 
1993) and outwardly visible aspects of appearance (e.g., posture, facial features; Fenigstein et 
al., 1975).  In addition, the measures of anxious arousal and anxious appearance widely vary 
across studies, leading to difficulties in making comparisons across the literature.  The 
measurement of these concepts in and of itself is complicated as little is known about how 
commonly used general assessments of anxious arousal and appearance (e.g., “how anxious 
do you think you look?”) compare to summations of specific indicators commonly assessed 
in the laboratory (e.g., eye contact, blushing).  In this study, the association between anxious 
arousal and anxious appearance for individuals with social anxiety was compared with the 
association for those with more typical levels of social anxiety.  The role of self-awareness 
factors and different kinds of global and specific anxious appearance measures (along with 
the relation between such measures as described below) was also included in the 
investigation. 
Unlike Clark and Wells’ (1995) interoceptive prediction we found that both SA and 
NSA individuals had moderately strong relationships between reports of anxious arousal and 
self-reported anxious appearance, despite SA individuals’ tendency to experience higher 
levels of anxious arousal during the interaction.  This finding was quite robust and seen at 
both global and multi-item levels of measurement.  Such a result suggests that an inclination 
to focus on bodily sensations and feelings during a social interaction is not an exclusive 
feature of experiencing social anxiety; rather, many individuals with normal levels of social 
anxiety would use such information in deriving how anxious they appear.  Further, this effect 
is consistent with Mansell & Clark’s (1999) study showing moderately strong correlations 
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between negative symptoms and perception of bodily sensations, for both low and high SA 
participants.   
We also found that trait levels of private and public body- and self-consciousness 
were essentially unrelated to social anxiety status, consistent with Miller et al.’s (1981) 
findings.  It is noteworthy that these findings occurred under conditions considered to evoke 
self-focused attention that is both private (i.e., “get acquainted” task) and public (i.e., video 
camera presence).  The four self-awareness traits had little direct impact on self-reports of 
anxious appearance for either SA or NSA individuals.  However, we found that the tendency 
to focus on observable aspects of body (i.e., public body-consciousness) appeared to 
moderate the relation between self-reports of arousal and appearance for NSA individuals, 
but not SA individuals.   
A closer inspection of this latter finding revealed that the SA individuals’ reports of 
appearance did not vary as a function of arousal when levels of public body-consciousness 
were taken into account.  This would imply that SA individuals’ appearance ratings were 
independent of levels of anxious symptoms and not influenced by tendencies to focus on 
observable aspects of body when this latter tendency is accounted for in the analysis.  In 
contrast, for NSA individuals, the relation between appearance and arousal does appear to 
vary with public body-consciousness levels such that those high on this trait would report 
more anxious appearance as arousal levels increase in an interaction.  This latter finding is 
consistent with Clark and Wells’ (1995) view that anxious arousal is strongly tied to anxious 
appearance ratings—but established for the wrong group!  That is, individuals with moderate 
levels of social anxiety, who are inclined to focus on publicly noticeable aspects of 
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appearance, rely heavily on anxious arousal to make judgments of how they appear to others.  
Increased arousal is thus associated with higher self-reports of anxious appearance for NSA 
individuals only, when public-consciousness was included.  Surprisingly, we did not find a 
trend for individuals with increased sensitivity to somatic awareness (i.e., private body-
consciousness) to show higher reports of arousal as with McEwan and Devins’ (1983) 
results.  Such a finding would have been consistent with Clark and Wells’ predictions that 
reports of anxious arousal are positively related to higher self-report of anxiety visibility. 
In Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, they propose that the tendency to focus on 
interoceptive information is problematic for SA individuals as it ultimately leads to 
overestimation of the visibility of their anxiety when compared to others’ ratings.  The 
literature describing differences between self- and other-reported ratings of anxious 
appearance is inconclusive, yet it is fair to say that SA individuals do not hold a pervasive 
tendency to overestimate anxious appearance in comparison with others’ reports of 
appearance in an interaction (as shown in Woody and Rodriguez, 2000).  The difficulty in 
developing absolute conclusions is partly based on determining which “other” (i.e., 
interaction partner vs. observer) should be used for comparison, as well as the complexity 
involved in measuring appearance consistently.  Although discrepancies between appearance 
ratings were not a significant feature of the current study, it would be neglectful to ignore this 
aspect when studying models of social anxiety per se.  In the current study, we are in a 
position to comment on how in sync raters are in perceptions of appearance, and will briefly 
discuss these relationships below. 
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We found that SA participants’ self-reported anxious appearance at the global level 
was not different from NSA participants’ self-reports of global appearance.  A difference did 
exist between SA and NSA individuals’ self-reported appearance at the specific level, such 
that SA individuals report more overt signs of anxiety during an interaction.  This finding is 
consistent with a number of previous studies (e.g., Alden & Wallace, 1995; Mellings & 
Alden, 2000) and supports our use of an analogue sample of university students with social 
anxiety.  In addition, visibility of anxiety as reported by partners and observers was 
systematically higher for SA than NSA individuals.   
Interestingly, in the present study, the correlations between NSA partner and observer 
ratings of appearance were weak overall.  The only significant positive (yet weak) relation 
between partners’ and observers’ scores was found for specific anxious appearance 
judgments of SA participants.  Although both types of raters reported higher levels of 
observable anxiety for SA individuals, the weak correlation result is consistent with the idea 
that partners and observers may be relying on different sources of information to make 
decisions about appearance as their ratings are out of sync with each other.28  One possibility 
is that partners also consider how they are feeling (i.e., degree of anxiety) when construing 
their opinion of others’ appearance.  In contrast to partners, observers are excluded from the 
direct interaction, and assumingly do not use their own levels of arousal when making 
judgments of appearance.   
                                                 
28 If ratings are considered in sync or “accurate”, they are expected to correlate strongly 
with other ratings of the same behaviour.  Inaccuracy “refers to being off in one’s perception 
in unsystematic ways” (p. 5) as random measurement error does not correlate with anything; 
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It is also possible that the poor correlation between observers’ and partners’ 
perspectives is a function of different degrees of training and levels of information available 
to these individuals.  First, observers practiced using the scales in a consistent manner prior 
to coding, while partners did not do so.  Observers also provided ratings for numerous 
participants, while partners completed scales for only themselves and for the person with 
whom they interacted.  Although observers watched videotapes of the full interactions, 
clearly there were limits to the information available in the videos.  Partners were not only 
involved in the interaction, but had a better “view” of participants, for example, sitting within 
two feet of each other and better access to not only unambiguous signs of anxiety (e.g., 
fidgeting), but also more subtle indicators not easily viewed from afar (e.g., perspiring).  
Overall, the important conclusion is that the “other” in any study of social anxiety plays an 
important role and his or her influence must be thoughtfully considered when making 
conclusions.   
4.4 Impressions on Partners 
While it is argued that both observers’ and partners’ opinions must be considered in 
interpersonal interaction studies, it is acknowledged that the SA individuals, particularly 
those selectively high on an interaction anxiousness scale, are most likely concerned with the 
impressions made on the people with whom they interact.  There are a number of different 
ways in which the impression made on an interaction partner can be measured, including 
appearance, social skills, likeability or even success in the task.  We focused on anxious 
                                                                                                                                                       
the more inaccurate a measure is the less it should correlate with other measures (Sadler, 
2001).   
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appearance and the partners’ ratings of a desire for future interaction—as these measures are 
arguably the most important outcome measures—given that SA individuals by definition are 
worried about appearing anxious and rejection from others during an interaction (Strahan & 
Conger, 1998).    
First, we simply tested whether desire for future interaction (a proxy measure for 
likeability) varied for SA and NSA individuals as rated by a NSA partner.  Similar levels of 
likeability were found across dyad types at the group level, despite greater degrees of 
perceived anxiety in SA individuals in comparison to NSA participants.  In an attempt to 
better understand what may influence partner-reported appearance ratings, we examined the 
relation between perceived levels of anxiety and likeability ratings by raters, observer-
reported appearance and raters’ own anxiety level.  The raters’ own level of anxious arousal 
was included, as presumably, individuals do not want to interact with partners who make 
them feel uncomfortable or experience anxious symptoms themselves, and we believed that 
this might influence appearance ratings or moderate the relation between likeability and 
appearance ratings.29  Interestingly, we found that anxious appearance of SA or NSA 
individuals as reported by partners was not predicted by overt signs of anxiety as judged by 
observers.  Rather, appearance ratings were strongly related to the raters’ own anxious 
arousal levels and how much they report liking the partners for whom they are making 
                                                 
29 Of note, self-reported arousal and appearance of NSA individuals who interacted with SA 
individuals or other NSA partners was similar, suggesting that on the whole, NSA individuals 
do not report more anxious arousal when interacting with an individual showing more 
visible signs of anxiety.   Observers judged NSA individuals who interacted with SA partners 
to be more anxious looking on SAS Factor Two (Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness).  While this 
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ratings.  Overall, the variance explained in the appearance ratings was less than 30 percent, 
implying that other factors also likely contribute in the development of appearance ratings 
formed by partners.  One potential influence on partners’ ratings of appearance in others 
could be task-focused attention, as increased task-focused attention has been shown to result 
in lower self-reports of anxiety (Bogels & Lamers, 2002).   In the current study, task-focused 
attention could be influenced by performance on the task, for example, how well participants 
“got to know one another” or success in the problem-solving task.30  
A closer inspection of the relation between partner-perceived appearance and 
likeability revealed some differences between NSA individuals who interacted with SA 
individuals and those who partnered with NSA individuals.  For NSA partners who interacted 
with SA individuals, we found that the relation between appearance and likeability was 
moderated by the raters’ arousal level, such that the relation between likeability and anxious 
appearance was stronger for those raters who experienced the most anxiety during the 
interaction, and weakest for those with lower levels of arousal.  For NSA individuals who 
interacted with other NSA partners, the relation between partners’ appearance and desire for 
a future interaction was unaffected by raters’ arousal levels.  Perhaps NSA individuals 
partnered with NSA individuals were more task-focused than NSA-SA dyads, and therefore, 
less attentive to one’s own arousal levels.  Subsequently, these NSA-NSA pairs would 
                                                                                                                                                       
could be considered evidence that NSA individuals find it less pleasant to interact with SA 
than NSA individuals, it is important to note that the difference was only by a half SD.   
30 Measures of these potential influences on performance were included in the study 
procedure, but not examined in the current analyses.  
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experience their interaction partner as more likeable or as displaying less anxiety.  Additional 
implications for theory and treatment are discussed below. 
4.5 Multi-item Scales: Anxious Arousal and Appearance  
An important aspect of the study, albeit a side interest to testing Schlenker and Leary (1982) 
and Clark and Wells’ (1995) models, was to understand the composition of the scales used to 
measure anxious arousal and appearance.  We completed a series of factor analyses that 
revealed each of the multi-item measures were composed of well-formed factors, and that 
these factors appeared to be similar to those found when the factor structure of SA and NSA 
groups was examined separately.  Ultimately, we were interested in testing whether global 
ratings of arousal and appearance were strongly related to composite multi-item scales and 
the factors of these scales.  To illustrate, a strong correlation between specific symptoms of 
anxiety and overall feeling of anxiety suggests that one’s report on how anxious he or she is 
feeling is some relatively accurate composite of the number and intensity of anxious 
indicators experienced.  A poor relation between these variables implies that overall anxiety 
experienced is a reflection of symptoms and possibly some other factors.  We also tested 
whether this relation between global and specific variables varied as a function of 
participants’ social anxiety status.  In review, the study showed that the relation between both 
global and specific ratings of arousal and appearance was not moderated by trait social 
anxiety status, suggesting that the manner in which global measures of arousal and 
appearance were used did not vary between SA and NSA individuals.  (Of note, when a 
statistically significant interaction with trait social anxiety and arousal was found the degree 
of additional variance explained was essentially negligible at around one percent).   
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Finally, it is recognized that psychometric properties of global 1-item ratings can be 
questionable.  Arguably, the face validity of the items “how anxious did you feel” and “how 
anxious do you think you appeared” is solid, and repeatedly used in other studies (e.g., 
Mansell & Clark, 1999).  Further, these 1-item ratings appear to have good reliability, as they 
hold moderately strong correlations with other scales (e.g., r = .45 for our 1-item rating of 
appearance and specific-ratings of anxious arousal from the current study) and the 
correlations between global and specific ratings and external variables are comparable (e.g., 
IAS correlation with global anxious arousal is r = .18 and r = .19 with specific anxious 
arousal ratings). 
Global ratings of anxious arousal appeared to be most strongly related to feeling 
shaky, unsteady, and cognitive symptoms (e.g., “feeling confused”) and related to blushing 
and feeling flushed to a lesser extent.  Though, overall, the weak to moderate levels of 
variance explained by composite scores in the prediction of global scores for anxious arousal 
(R2 = .25 to .27) suggests that asking one how anxious he or she feels is not equivalent to 
summing totals of commonly-experienced anxious arousal symptoms.  It is unlikely that the 
list of anxious symptoms was restricted (i.e., not exhaustive) and failed to capture some 
component of anxious arousal, as it contained commonly experienced physiological 
symptoms of anxiety and agoraphobia (adapted from Wells, 1997; Papsdorf & Alden, 1998; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  As well, nine of these symptoms were not 
experienced by either SA or NSA individuals during an interaction and were subsequently 
dropped from the factor analysis and total score.   
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It is probable that the 1-item global rating of arousal maybe more strongly reflective 
of just a few key anxious symptoms that vary on an individual basis (Herbert, Rheingold & 
Brandsma, 2001), and that the rest of the symptoms contributes only “noise” in the 
prediction.31 Rapee and Heimberg (1997) propose that the SA individual’s mental 
representation is characterized by the features he or she worries the most about presenting.  
An individual worried that sweating results in negative evaluation would conjure a mental 
representation dominated by excessive sweating (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  This line of 
thinking suggests that it may be more suitable in such studies to have individuals identify the 
idiosyncratically specific anxious symptoms contributing to their global rating structure.  
Undoubtedly, use of such scales in empirical inquiries makes systematic comparisons across 
studies a further challenge. 
In addition, the single item question of “how anxious did you feel?” implies that 
raters are providing an average of the physiological symptoms of anxiety experienced over 
the interaction.  Yet, anxiety may be better thought of as a composition of “cognitive, 
behavioural, and physiological components” (Rapee and Heimberg, 1995, p. 749; Turk et al., 
2001).  In our regression analysis of global and specific ratings, the focus was on the relation 
between the question “how anxious do you feel?” and predominantly physiological 
symptoms of anxiety.  A stronger association between global and specific measures might be 
expected if additional cognitive anxious symptoms (e.g., “mind went blank” and “sense of 
panic”) and/or behavioural anxiety symptoms (e.g., “shaky” or “trembling voice”) of anxiety 
                                                 
31 We could have examined Beta values for each anxious symptom in the prediction of global 
arousal; obviously, this would be an onerous task in relation to the study’s primary goals.  
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were used.  Of note, behavioural signs of anxiety were included in our measurements; 
however, they were categorized as observable indicators of anxious appearance, rather than 
interoceptive indicators of anxiety per se.   
It is also probable that how anxious one feels is related to a “felt sense” of anxiety 
rather than accumulation of anxious symptoms per se (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993 as cited in 
Clark & Wells, 1995).  Spurr and Stopa (2002) describe a “felt sense” as one source of 
information used by individuals with social anxiety in the development of self-
representations.   For example, an individual may describe feeling “like a geek” (p. 950, 
Spurr & Stopa, 2002) without a specific observable image of how that looks.  In this study, a 
“felt sense” can be considered a global encapsulation of one’s experience during an 
interaction, and relatively independent of occurrences of anxious symptoms, such as feeling 
“shaky” or “flush” (Spurr & Stopa, 2002).  If individuals tend to use a felt sense when 
describing how anxious they feel, we would not expect a strong correlation between global 
and more objective specific ratings of arousal.  We would, though, expect a difference in the 
strength of the relation between these types of ratings if only SA but not NSA individuals 
used such a phenomenon (as implied by Clark and Wells’ model).   
There are also a number of reasons why the global or overall ratings of anxious 
appearance used in the current study might not precisely match specific-item ratings.  
Though it could be argued that 1-item rating has poor psychometric properties as described 
above, it seems more likely that a measurement of overall anxious appearance is not simply a 
“sum” of its probable constituents as shown with global arousal ratings.  While it is also 
possible that our specific appearance scale did not include all the meaningful signs of 
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anxiety, that is, did not include all the right “parts,” this strikes us as unlikely, as we provided 
20 common signs of anxiety used in previous studies (e.g., Clark & Arkowitz, 1975).  In 
addition to general face validity, the signs of anxiety were broad and included indicators of 
self-manipulation, facial expressions, and speech dysfluencies.   
An assumedly straightforward rating of how anxious one appears may be more than 
an aggregate of overt signs of anxiety over the course of a considerably long interaction.  We 
speculate that global ratings may be a better indication of how a participant believed he or 
she appeared on average over the whole interaction, while specific reports of symptom 
frequency serve to be an important reflection of one’s experience during more discrete and 
possibly more memorable episodes of an interaction.  Recall that the specific anxious 
appearance scale is primarily composed of behavioural, observable indicators of anxiety 
(e.g., “left long gaps in the conversation,” “face turned red”) that either did not occur at all or 
were present, infrequently to frequently, in the familiarity or problem-solving tasks.  During 
a 15-minute interaction, SA individuals reported higher anxious appearance, implying that 
they tended to experience more intensity (or variety) of these behaviours in comparison to 
NSA individuals—this is, they recalled more anxious appearance from a noteworthy period 
in the interaction.  When simply asked how anxious one appeared during the experience, 
individuals may tend to consider how anxious they felt by the end of the interaction or over 
the whole experience, rather than from discrete episodes during the interaction.  (This might 
explain why SA individuals reported similar levels of appearance at the global level in 
comparison to NSA participants, yet reported more specific anxious appearances—maybe 
they had more of these noteworthy experiences, but on average, comparable experiences of 
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overall anxiety).  By and large, if global and specific arousal and appearance ratings were 
made after a briefer period of interaction, we may have found stronger relationships between 
global and multi-item measures for SA and NSA individuals.   
In sum, the above section highlights the incomplete understanding of the relation 
between the global and specific ratings for key anxiety measures.  We feel that it is essential 
to use both types of scales in such interaction studies (as we have done in most analyses), as 
this likely provides the most inclusive reflection of the participants’ and partners’ 
experiences.  While this series of analyses was a departure from the current study’s main 
goals, the conclusions are useful in the understanding of models of social anxiety disorder 
and emphasize the need for more research in the understanding global and specific ratings. 
4.6 Implications for Models and Treatment of Social Anxiety Disorder 
Theoretical perspectives explaining social anxiety disorder have often been categorized as 
one of three approaches: classical conditioning, social skills deficit or cognitive approaches 
(Leary, 1983b), with recent years seeing an explosion of cognitive-behavioural models 
(Hofmann & DiBartolo, 2001).  While numerous cognitive models have been presented and 
tested, no one model has surfaced as a clear winner.  Since its first presentation in 1995, 
Clark and Wells’ model of SA has been repeatedly examined (cited over 300 times) and 
produced substantial implications for treatment (Alden, Mellings & Ryder, 2001).  In the 
current study we hoped to test a few key aspects of social anxiety disorder theory, primarily 
emerging from Clark and Wells’ model, in a controlled, yet more realistic setting with 
empirically exhaustive and clinically useful measures.  In the following section we discuss 
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how the current findings influence a few vital aspects of social anxiety disorder theory, 
including impressions, anxious arousal, and appearance of anxiety. 
Within a cognitive-behavioural framework, it is clear that SA individuals’ 
expectations and pre-existing beliefs about making certain impressions are predicted to have 
a strong influence on the experience of anxiety during an interaction.  While the Clark and 
Wells (1995) theory would predict that SA individuals have unrealistically high expectations, 
our findings are inconsistent with such a suggestion.  Unlike the Clark and Wells theory, this 
study suggests that a model of social anxiety disorder must consider that SA individuals do 
not hold unrealistically high impression importance ratings when compared to NSA 
individuals.  Rather, the types of impressions SA individuals believe are important to make 
are similar to NSA individuals and include making a confident/non-anxious and neutral (i.e., 
innocuously sociable) impression on others.  SA individuals expect that they will be less 
likely to meet these varied impressions in comparison to NSA individuals.  This discrepancy 
between impression importance values and expectations to make such an impression explains 
why SA individuals experience more social anxiety in an interaction than NSA individuals.  
Our results are consistent with Schlenker and Leary’s (1982) prediction about 
discrepancies—the acknowledgement of which was largely ignored in Clark and Wells’ 
theory.  
Undeniably, the experience of anxiety during a social interaction is a key part of 
nearly any model of social anxiety disorder.  Marked experience of anxiety in a social 
situation is what primarily distinguishes SA individuals from those who do not experience 
chronically high levels of social anxiety.  Moreover, the experience of arousal in a situation 
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is believed to influence the development of mental representations of self (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997).  Our results suggest that SA and NSA individuals may be more alike in 
how they form self-representations of anxious appearance than predicted by Clark and Wells 
(1995).  Specifically, the general relation between arousal and self-ratings of appearance is 
moderately strong for both SA and NSA individuals!  We suspect that when other interaction 
studies fail to show similar results it is primarily a consequence of using low SA controls, 
rather than a more normalized comparison group.  Again, such a finding must be accounted 
for in theorizing of the mental self-representation development for social anxiety disorder. 
The one pronounced difference that did exist between SA participants and individuals 
within normal levels of trait social anxiety occurred when trait levels of public body-
consciousness were taken into account, a factor which is often ignored in many models of 
social anxiety disorder (viz., Clark and Wells, 1995; Turk, Lerner, Heimberg & Rapee, 2000; 
see Bogels and Lamers, 2002 and Spurr & Stopa, 200232).  In this particular analysis we 
found a “flat” relation between anxious symptoms and appearance for SA individuals, 
suggesting that for SA individuals, reports of appearance may be unrelated to how anxious 
they are feeling during an interaction.  If anxious appearance ratings are not based on arousal 
(when public body-consciousness is taken into account), presumably self-reported 
appearance ratings for SA individuals are based on some pre-existing beliefs.  This could 
                                                 
32 Spurr and Stopa (2002) describe the relevance of Carver & Scheier’s (1981) cybernetic 
theory of self-regulation (which includes reference of self-consciousness to theory of social 
anxiety).  They outline how normal social-psychological processes (i.e., self-
consciousness)—that were developed independent of social anxiety disorder—have important 




include an illusion of transparency belief—that is, that others can see how one really feels—
as a factor that drives the SA individuals’ self-perceptions (Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky, 
1998).   
When public body-consciousness is included, NSA individuals also have a tendency 
to report more visible anxiety at higher levels of arousal, implying that they hold beliefs that 
one’s internal states are apparent to others and believe that others are likely to attend to their 
external appearance.  These findings are congruent with the idea that NSA individuals hold 
an illusion of transparency and also a spotlight effect tendency (i.e., a belief that others attend 
very closely to their external appearance; Gilovich et al., 1998).  It is possible that these 
findings are particularly relevant for NSA participants during a social interaction as it is 
considered a condition of social evaluation (Brown and Stopa, 2007).  It should be 
acknowledged that these interpretations of transparency and spotlight effects are a loose 
extension of the current findings; nonetheless, the importance of including such social 
psychology phenomena, largely ignored in such studies (for an exception, see Brown and 
Stopa, 2007), into future investigations is made clear. 
For many cognitive models of social anxiety disorder, the perceived audience or the 
“others” in a social interaction are important components, but their specific role or impact is 
merely assumed.  For example, in the Clark and Wells’ (1995) model, the role of the SA 
individuals’ beliefs about the audience (and presumed ignorance of audience generated cues 
of one’s performance) is included.  However, the implied pivotal role of the partner in the 
interaction is inferred but not necessarily shown to be empirically validated.  Clark and Wells 
suggest that behaving in an anxious manner is “likely to make other people somewhat less 
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friendly and hence produce a negative interaction pattern that further contributes to the 
maintenance of social phobia” (p. 74).  Turk et al. (2001) stress that the characteristics of the 
audience, whether interaction partners, observers or strangers, influences how anxious the SA 
individual feels in a social event.  They note that anxiety “may function to reduce effective 
social performance and result in negative verbal and nonverbal feedback from the audience” 
but the manner in which this occurs is “indirect and ambiguous” (Turk et al., p. 297).   
The direct impact of appearing anxious on others in an interaction is often overlooked 
in models of social anxiety disorder; however, only a few studies support the claim that 
anxious appearance can have negative consequences on perception by others (such as Purdon 
et al., 2001).   A thorough model of social anxiety disorder should take into account the role 
of partners and or other audience members, and also provide testable predictions.  In the 
current study, anxious appearance as perceived by partners was examined, showing that 
anxious appearance in others is predicted by how much raters like their partner and how 
anxious raters feel (i.e., higher rater anxiety is associated with higher perceived visibility of 
anxiety).  Such information is pertinent in a model explaining the development and 
maintenance of social anxiety disorder, and in all, these findings emphasize how the 
interdependent role of partners in an interaction cannot be ignored in model development.        
Not surprisingly, treatment of social anxiety disorder is purportedly as varied as the 
models explaining this disorder.  In general, cognitive theories of treatment include a focus 
on challenging SA individuals’ beliefs about self and others, while social skill therapies 
concentrate on teaching SA clients how to interact with others.  Both frameworks might 
include some relaxation training, role playing and practice of interactions.  While it is 
 
 133 
impossible to speak to all components of treatment, this study’s results highlight some key 
features to be considered in therapy.   
Treatment of social anxiety disorder must address the clients’ importance values and 
expectations for achieving his or her idiosyncratically derived impressions.  This study 
suggests that therapists cannot assume that SA individuals’ expectations are unrealistically 
high or always positive; rather, different types of expectations (e.g., innocuously sociable, 
dominant/confident, non-anxious) must be objectively assessed for all types of situations.  
For example, clinicians tend to think of innocuous sociability as a mechanism to prevent 
making undesired impressions on partners (Leary, 2001).  However, if SA individuals have 
similar levels of “wanting to” and “expecting to” make such an impression, it is unlikely to 
cause them social anxiety during an interaction.  In accordance with Schlenker and Leary’s 
(1982) theory, it would be undesirable to then teach and expect SA individuals to behave in 
less innocuously sociable ways (i.e., to show less agreeableness), as this would likely lead to 
a discrepancy between impression importance and expectations, thus increasing anxiety!   
This argument can be guardedly extended to the use of safety behaviours also.  If SA 
individuals use safety behaviours, such as rehearsing sentences before they speak, in a way 
that helps them pull off a desired impression, they will be less likely to experience anxiety in 
a social interaction.  While this may be an overall treatment goal, individuals with social 
anxiety are reluctant to abandon these behaviours, as the absence of safety behaviours during 
interactions would certainly lead to discrepancies between impressions valued and 
expectations.  Nonetheless, the long-term negative consequences of using safety behaviours 
and the significance associated with such behaviours remains (Alden & Bieling, 1998; Otto, 
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1999).  Finally, it should also be considered that if a SA individual wants to appear confident 
and/or dominant in an interaction, but doubts his or her ability to do so; this latter feature 
needs to be the focus of treatment.  Treatment could include a skill-based training component 
to increase level of self-assuredness in an interaction, for example, or practicing interactions 
during which one learns to assess and modify expectations with restructuring of thoughts.   
In general, cognitive restructuring in therapy for social anxiety can have many aims.  
Clark and Wells’ (1995) model predicts that only SA individuals hold distorted self-
perceptions because of an apparently strong reliance on arousal levels in developing self-
reported appearance.  They would suggest that SA clients need to challenge their mistaken 
belief that their self-image (based on interoceptive information) is representative of how they 
are seen by others.  Treatment should then focus on training SA individuals to rely less on 
interoceptive information and more on external information when judging their own social 
performance.  The goal of treatment, for example, by using video feedback techniques during 
social encounters, would be to train individuals to become more “objective” (Harvey, Clark, 
Ehler, & Rapee, 2000)33.  In the current study, though, we found that both SA and NSA 
individuals have a tendency for moderate to strong correlations between how anxious they 
feel and believe they look to others.  The goal of treatment would be to modify the client’s 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, the weak correlation in judgments of appearance by partners and observers 
suggest some implications for treatment using camera feedback.  It is likely that camera 
feedback during therapy is most effective when it is tightly focused enough on individuals’ 
faces. Otherwise, clients would believe (possibly accurately) that they are conveying their 
anxiety in a myriad of ways too subtle for a camera at medium range to pick up.  By 
comparing observations at different levels of focus, it may be apparent that anxiety, if visible 




construal of what “looking anxious” means.  The interpretation that looking anxious equals 
incompetence in social situations is the target for change (rather than restructuring of the 
“distorted self”; Alden, Mellings & Ryder, 2001).  Of course, another possibility is to teach 
the client to feel less anxious in social situations, namely through exposure and/or skills 
training, because lower levels of anxiety are also associated with lower self-reports of 
anxious visibility.  Such a proposition also supports pharmacological treatment of social 
anxiety disorder, as there are arguable many effective and well-tolerated medications 
available to reduce in-situation anxiety (Robinson & Hood, 2007). 
SA clients may gain some reassurance in learning that most individuals tend to focus 
on their own arousal in social situations, and are inclined to report strong correlations 
between levels of arousal and self-reported appearance.  More importantly, the concern that 
anxious appearance by others leads to interpersonal rejection can be shown to be only 
somewhat true, as chronically SA individuals on the whole are not liked less by their NSA 
partners (despite being rated as appearing more anxious than NSA individuals).  While 
partner-perceived anxious appearance has a modest negative correlation with the desire for 
future interaction rating by partner, the strongest indicator of how one is seen by others is the 
anxiety level of the rater.  Therefore, if SA individuals are primarily concerned with how 
anxious they appear to others, they may be well served to learn how to alleviate anxiety in 
their interaction partners!  Although it is not often proposed in this manner, one way to 
reduce reports of how anxious one appears to others would be to explicitly manipulate 
attention in an interaction.  This could include behaving in ways that increase task-focused 
attention, as this has been associated with lowering subjective reports of anxiety by others 
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(Bogels & Lamers, 2002), and by extension of this speculative argument, perceived anxiety 
by others.   
Finally, the results comparing global and specific indicators of anxiety and 
appearance have implications for treatment.  Given the common goal of reducing anxiety 
during social situations, clinicians need to be aware that asking a client “how anxious do you  
feel?” may not be reflective of the sum of all his or her anxious symptoms, as typically 
assumed.  It may be essential to determine which symptoms, cognitive, physiological and 
behavioural, are most pertinent for each client to focus on changing during the course of 
therapy.  Then, these particular symptoms could become focal in the development of a 
treatment plan.   
4.7 Limitations and Future Studies 
As with most studies investigating the development of self-perceptions in social anxiety, the 
results are based on correlational information only.  Given the difficulty in experimentally 
manipulating anxious arousal (i.e., without the use of anxiolytics), most studies rely on 
measuring anxiety under controlled conditions.  We could argue that this particular study has 
a number of advantages over previous investigations faced with the same challenges, such as 
an exhaustive list of anxious symptoms and clinically-relevant and face-valid measures of 
appearance.  Certainly, a future study examining the development of self-perceptions could 
focus on the connection between arousal and appearance at a more fine-grained level.  For 
example, individuals could be asked to rate symptoms of arousal and simultaneously rate to 
what degree that symptom is used in judging how anxious they believe they appear to others.  
Or, SA individuals can be asked to directly report which factors (e.g., verbal behaviour, 
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anxiety-related behaviour, subjective anxiety, pro-social behaviour, partner-interest, partner 
comfort; Alden & Mellings, 2004) influence their self-ratings of appearance. 
This study used highly SA and NSA undergraduate students.  As expected, highly SA 
individuals did experience anxiety during the interaction, and more so than their NSA 
counterparts.  Although the literature suggests that research with highly SA individuals 
corresponds well to clinical groups (e.g., Stopa and Clark, 2001), one could argue that 
generalization to individuals with social anxiety disorder would require replication with 
clinical samples.  It is important to note that such beliefs imply that individuals with social 
phobia are categorically different from those with high levels of social anxiety, despite the 
theoretical view that individuals with high social anxiety share features with social phobia, 
and that these features tend to fall along a continuous dimension (Vriends, Becker, Meyer, 
Michael & Margraf, 2007).  This can be investigated by further validation of the trait 
measure of social anxiety used in the current study with clinical features of social anxiety 
disorder. 
   One potential limitation of this study is the use of partners that were untrained, non-
confederate individuals within normal levels of trait social anxiety.  Although using 
confederates that follow standard scripts arguably provides some gain in controllability of 
partners’ reactions and behaviours, we feel the use of and perspective from a natural partner 
is more analogous to a “real” interaction.  This might be particularly true for one of the 
outcome measures of interest—desire for future interaction; as such a rating is most 
meaningful from a “real-life” interaction partner. (Feasibly, one could argue that other, more 
pertinent, outcome measures exist).   
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 Along the same lines, we choose NSA individuals (who interacted with other NSA 
individuals) as the group to which SA individuals were compared.  While this may make our 
findings difficult to compare to studies in which low SA individuals were used as controls, 
our results are likely more robust given that the majority of interaction partners in real life 
will experience “within-normal” amounts of social anxiety..  Moreover, there is an obvious, 
if not empirically demonstrated, difference between individuals within the normal range of 
social anxiety and those identified as low socially anxious.  Those individuals very low on a 
social anxiety scale could be described as gregarious, highly extroverted and unique or 
infrequently found group of people, and not a suitable comparison group for those individuals 
with high social anxiety ratings.  Even so, the current study could be extended to include 
individuals across the full dimension of social anxiety to test if our predictions about 
differences in impression importance and expectations, and anxiety experiences hold for low 
SA individuals also.  
 We know that the presence of cameras during an interaction or performance has a 
tendency to increase self-awareness, and consequently self-focused attention (e.g., Vallacher, 
1978).  While individuals at all levels of self-awareness were included, it is feasible that the 
presence of cameras in the interaction setting had differential effects on individuals with SA 
or normal levels of social anxiety.  For example, would NSA individuals use interoceptive 
information to the same extent as SA individuals without the presence of a camera?  It is also 
possible that the increase in self-awareness led NSA individuals (particularly those high on 
trait levels of public body-consciousness) to take the “observer perspective” more than would 
be expected without cameras present?  In a future study it would be possible to compare how 
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self-reports of anxious arousal may vary while systematically varying the obvious presence 
or absence of a camera (Brown and Stopa, 2007).   
 Another way in which our study is limited is by the focus on the participant in the 
model as the unit of interest.  Although we found that on average, NSA partners of SA and 
NSA individuals had similar experiences; mutual influences between members of the dyad 
were not explored.  One possibility would be to reanalyze our data (viz., NSA-NSA group) 
using a structural equation model for interchangeable dyads (Woody & Sadler, 2005).  
Likely, we would require additional dyads to use structural equation modeling satisfactorily.  
Such a study could also help us understand to what degree (i.e., explained variance) 
individuals’ bodily sensations and feelings are employed, as well as what other types of 
information, such as partners’ arousal level might be used when deriving judgments.  
 Finally, it is important to acknowledge that, as with many previous studies, reports of 
anxiety and appearance judgments were made after the interaction was complete, and 
therefore, may be susceptible to post-event processing (e.g., Fehm, Schneider & Hoyer, 
2007).  Global measures were completed immediately after the entire interaction—composed 
of both an affiliation and structured problem-solving task, and participants were requested to 
avoid changing their original responses after completing specific ratings.  We may have 
found differences in ratings of global anxiety and appearance between groups if ratings were 
made at different intervals during the interaction—for example, after the unstructured “get 




Social anxiety disorder is one of the most prevalent mental health disorders and associated 
with a lifetime of distress and disability.  While a number of models of social anxiety 
disorder exist, Clark and Wells (1995) provide one of the most influential cognitive models 
and make a number of predictions about the experience of anxiety and self-representations 
for the individual with high levels of social anxiety.  In the current study we demonstrated 
that anxious arousal occurs when individuals desire to make a particular impression but 
doubt their ability to do so, irrespective of social anxiety status (Schlenker and Leary, 1982).  
While individuals with social anxiety were found to experience more anxiety in a social 
interaction and report more observable anxiety, both SA and NSA individuals appear to rely 
on their anxious experience when deriving how they appear to others.  Neither SA or NSA 
individuals were found to have a trait level tendency to be concerned about how others view 
oneself or to be more internally self-focused, but for NSA individuals who had a strong 
tendency to attend to publicly observable aspects of their body, the relation between arousal 
and self-reported appearance was particularly strong in comparison to SA individuals.  In 
addition, we showed that as a group SA and NSA individuals make comparable types of 
impressions on their partners during an interaction (e.g., the desire for a future encounter).  
Finally, we investigated the relation between clinically-useful (i.e., global ratings) and 
commonly-used empirical (e.g., multi-item behaviours) measures of anxiety and appearance, 
demonstrating the importance of furthering such investigations.  Implications for current 
theories and treatment of social anxiety disorder were discussed and the immense need for 
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Appendix A (Measures) 
Table A1. IAS measure 
Instructions: Rate the degree to which the statement is characteristic or true of yourself, by 
making a rating between 1 and 5, where:  















1. I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers. 1    2   3   4   5 
2. I usually feel uncomfortable when in a group of people I 
don’t know. 
1    2   3   4   5 
3. I am usually at ease when speaking to a member of the 
opposite sex. 
1    2   3   4   5 
4. I get nervous when I must talk to a teacher or boss. 1    2   3   4   5 
5. Parties often make me feel anxious and uncomfortable. 1    2   3   4   5 
6. I am probably less shy in social interactions than most 
people. 
1    2   3   4   5 
7. I sometimes feel tense when talking to people of my own 
sex if I don’t know them very well. 
1    2   3   4   5 
8. I would be nervous if I was being interviewed for a job. 1    2   3   4   5 
9. I wish I had more confidence in social situations. 1    2   3   4   5 
10. I seldom feel anxious in social situations. 1    2   3   4   5 
11. In general, I am a shy person. 1    2   3   4   5 
12. I often feel nervous when talking to someone to whom I 
am attracted. 
1    2   3   4   5 
13. I often feel nervous when calling someone I don’t know 
very well on the telephone. 
1    2   3   4   5 
14. I get nervous when I have to speak to someone in a 
position of authority. 
1    2   3   4   5 
15. I usually feel relaxed around other people, even people 
who are quite different from myself. 
1    2   3   4   5 
  
Note. Bold typeface items were reversed scored.  
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Table A2. Private and Public Self- and Body-Consciousness 
Instructions:  Please rate how well the following describes you.  Please circle only one 



















1. I am sensitive to internal bodily tensions. 1    2   3   4   5 
2. I’m concerned about my posture. 1    2   3   4   5 
3. I know immediately when my mouth or throat gets dry. 1    2   3   4   5 
4. It’s important for me that my skin looks nice, for example, has 
no blemishes. 
1    2   3   4   5 
5. I can often feel my heart beating. 1    2   3   4   5 
6. I am quick to sense the hunger contractions of my stomach. 1    2   3   4   5 
7. I’m very aware of changes in my body temperature. 1    2   3   4   5 
8. I think a lot about my body build. 1    2   3   4   5 
9. When I am with others, I want my hands to be clean and look 
nice. 
1    2   3   4   5 
10. I am very aware of my best and worst facial features. 1    2   3   4   5 
11. I like to make sure my hair looks right. 1    2   3   4   5 
12. I’m am always trying to figure myself out 1    2   3   4   5 
13. I’m often the subject of my own fantasies 1    2   3   4   5 
14. I am constantly examining my motives 1    2   3   4   5 
15. I’m alert to changes in my mood 1    2   3   4   5 
16. I’m concerned about what other people think of me 1    2   3   4   5 
17. I’m usually aware of my appearance 1    2   3   4   5 
18. I never scrutinize myself 1    2   3   4   5 
19. I’m generally attentive to my inner feelings 1    2   3   4   5 
20. One of the last things I do before I leave my house is look in 
the mirror 
1    2   3   4   5 
21. I’m concerned about my style of doing things 1    2   3   4   5 
22. I’m concerned about the way I present myself 1    2   3   4   5 
23. I’m self-conscious about the way I look 1    2   3   4   5 
24. Generally, I am not very aware of myself 1    2   3   4   5 
25. I reflect about myself a lot 1    2   3   4   5 
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26. I’m aware of the way my mind works when I work 
through a problem 
1    2   3   4   5 
27. I sometimes have feelings that I’m off somewhere 
watching myself 
1    2   3   4   5 
28. I usually worry about making a good impression 1    2   3   4   5 
 
Note. Items 1 to 11 are from the Body-Consciousness Scale (BCS); 12 to 28 are from the 
Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS).  Items from the private subscales are in bold typeface. 
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Table A3. Impression and Expectations 
Instructions:  Please indicate how important it is for you to make a positive impression on 
your partner.  Please circle only one answer. 
 


















How important is it for you to make a positive impression during the 
interaction?          
1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Instructions:  Please rate how important it is for you to make an impression, according to the 
following descriptors, on your partner during the interaction.  Please circle only one answer. 
 


















1. It is important for me to appear warm 1     2     3     4     5     6 
2. It is important for me to appear assertive 1     2     3     4     5     6 
3. It is important for me to appear courteous 1     2     3     4     5     6 
4. It is important for me to appear humourous 1     2     3     4     5     6 
5. It is important for me to appear polite 1     2     3     4     5     6 
6. It is important for me to not appear embarrassed 1     2     3     4     5     6 
7. It is important for me to not appear awkward 1     2     3     4     5     6 
8. It is important for me to appear comfortable 1     2     3     4     5     6 
9. It is important for me to appear interesting 1     2     3     4     5     6 
10. It is important for me to appear secure 1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Instructions:  Please rate to what extent you think you will display the following 
characteristics during the interaction.  Please circle only one answer. 












1. Warm 1     2     3     4     5     6 
2. Assertive 1     2     3     4     5     6 
3. Courteous 1     2     3     4     5     6 
4. Humourous 1     2     3     4     5     6 
5. Polite 1     2     3     4     5     6 
6. Embarrassed 1     2     3     4     5     6 
7. Awkward 1     2     3     4     5     6 
8. Comfortable 1     2     3     4     5     6 
9. Interesting 1     2     3     4     5     6 
10. Secure 1     2     3     4     5     6 
Note. Bold typeface items were reversed scored.  
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Table A4. Specific Anxiety Symptoms (SAS) 
Instructions:  In the shaded column below, please rate how well the following describes how 
you felt during the interactions.  In the non-shaded column please indicate how visible you 
believe these feelings were to your partner.  Please circle only one number per column.  
 













 Feelings Visibility 
1. I felt that I was trembling. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
2. I felt sweaty. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
3. I felt that my hands were shaking. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
4. My throat felt dry. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
5. I felt weak. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
6. My stomach was in knots. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
7. I felt nauseated. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
8. My mind went blank 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
9. My heart was pounding. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
10. I felt that things were unreal. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
11. I felt tense. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
12. I felt unsteady. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
13. I felt dizzy. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
14. I felt that I had hot flushes. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
15. I felt that my voice was trembling. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
16. I felt light-headed. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
17. I had chills. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
18. My face felt hot. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
19. I felt short of breath. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
20. My body or face felt stiff. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
21. I felt like my heart was racing. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
22. I felt shaky. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
23. My face felt flushed. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
24. I felt a sense of panic. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
25. I felt numbness in my parts of my 
body. 
1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
26. I had tingling in my fingertips. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
27. I had blurred or distorted vision. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
28. I had chest pain. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
29. I felt disoriented or confused. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 
30. I felt disconnected from my body. 1     2     3     4     5     6 1     2     3     4     5     6 




Note. Visibility ratings were not used in the current study. 
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Table A5. Overt Signs of Anxiety (OSA-Self)  
Instructions:  Please indicate to what extent you believed you displayed the following.  
Please circle only one number for each response. 
 



















1. I appeared to make low eye contact 1     2     3     4     5     6 
2. I appeared fidgety 1     2     3     4     5     6 
3. I appeared to be touching my face/body 1     2     3     4     5     6 
4. I appeared to make uncomfortable facial expressions  1     2     3     4     5     6 
5. My speech appeared dysfluent (e.g., stammering or hesitating) 1     2     3     4     5     6 
6. I appeared to make omissions in my speech  1     2     3     4     5     6 
7. I appeared to make slips of tongue 1     2     3     4     5     6 
8. I appeared to repeat words  1     2     3     4     5     6 
9. I appeared to have a non-expressive tone of voice 1     2     3     4     5     6 
10. I appeared to be perspiring  1     2     3     4     5     6 
11. I appeared jittery 1     2     3     4     5     6 
12. My voice appeared to be trembling 1     2     3     4     5     6 
13. My body or hands appeared to be shaking 1     2     3     4     5     6 
14. I appeared short of breath 1     2     3     4     5     6 
15. My body or face appeared stiff 1     2     3     4     5     6 
16. My face or body appeared to turn red 1     2     3     4     5     6 
17. I appeared to leave long gaps in the conversation 1     2     3     4     5     6 
18. I appeared to understand what my partner said 1     2     3     4     5     6 
19. I appeared to ask interesting questions 1     2     3     4     5     6 
20. I appeared to initiate conversations 1     2     3     4     5     6 
 
Note. Bold typeface items were reversed scored. The same items were used in the OSA-
Partner and OSA-Observer scales with modifications to the wording “I appeared” to “My 
partner” and “The participant,” respectively. 
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Table A6. Desire for Future Interaction (DFI) 
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you would like to engage in a variety of social 
activities with your partner.  Please circle only one number for each response. 
 











1. Would you like to meet this person again? 1     2     3     4     5 
2. Would you like to spend more time with him/her? 1     2     3     4     5 
3. Would you like to work with this person? 1     2     3     4     5 
4. Would you like to sit next to him/her on a 3-hour bus ride? 1     2     3     4     5 
5. Would you invite this person to visit you? 1     2     3     4     5 
6. Would you like to get to know this person better? 1     2     3     4     5 
7. Would you ask this person for advice? 1     2     3     4     5 




Appendix B (Cronbach’s Alphas) 
Table B1. Psychometric Properties (Cronbach’s Alphas) for Descriptive Measures 
 
  SA  NSA  Combined  
  
  
N = 117 to 120 N = 231 to 240  N = 362 to 369
    
IAS -- --  .82 
        
Self-awareness    
Private Body-Consciousness .65 .57 .61 
Public Body-Consciousness .76 .73 .75 
Private Self-Consciousness .75 .68 .72 
Public Self-Consciousness .81 .80 .81 
        
     
Impression Importance .86 .83 .84 
Impression Expectations .77 .71 .73 
        
Note. IAS = Interaction Anxiousness Scale.  Due to restriction of range for scores on the IAS 




Table B2. Psychometric Properties (Cronbach’s Alphas) for Dependent Measures 
 
  SA  NSA  Combined 
    
  N = 93 to 98 N = 112 to 122 N = 297 to 335 
    
SAS .87 .91 .88 
        
Overt Signs of Anxiety (OSA)    
OSA-Self .86 .82 .85 
OSA-by Partner .83 .86 .86  
OSA-by Observer – Group1   .91  .85  .77 
OSA- by Observer – Group 2 .91 .87 .80 
    
Global Anxious Appearance    
 Observer – Group 1 .81 .71 .88 
 Observer – Group 2  .78 .79  .88 
    
DFI .89 .92 .91 
 
Note.  SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms; DFI = Desire for Future Interaction.  The sample 
sizes were different for Observer Group 1 (SA, N = 28 to 29; NSA: N = 54 to 55) and 




Appendix C (Normality) 
Table C1. Normality Indices for Descriptive and Dependent Measures 
      
 N Skew Kurtosis K-S p 
      
IAS 324 .80 -.36 3.08 .00 
       
Self-awareness       
Private Body-Consciousness  322 .07 .48 1.73 .01 
Public Body-Consciousness 322 .21 .68 1.60 .01 
Private Self-Consciousness 321 .15 .06 .98 .30 
Public Self-Consciousness 322 .01 -.12 1.35 .05 
       
Impression Global 279 -.87 1.31 4.42 .00 
Impression importance 322 -.29 .84 1.38 .04 
Impression expectations 322 -.08 .11 1.02 .25 
       
SAS 316 1.53 1.96 3.23 .00 
       
Global Ratings      
Anxious Arousal-Self 316 .68 .18 4.67 .00 
Anxious Appearance-Self 316 .58 -.02 .47 .00 
Anxious Appearance-Partner  316 .88 .23 4.86 .00 
    Anxious Appearance-Observer 196 .31 -.47 1.36 .05 
       
Overt Signs of Anxiety      
OSA-Self 316 1.10 1.69 1.70 .01 
OSA-by Partner 316 1.72 4.00 2.09 .00 
OSA-by Observer 196 .73 .84 1.03 .24 
      
DFI 315 -1.32 -.572 .56 .02 
 
Note.  K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov; IAS = Interaction Anxiousness Scale; DFI = Desire for 
Future Interaction; OSA: Overt Signs of Anxiety scale. 
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Note. SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms. We examined the distribution of the SAS scale to 
determine whether transformation was required.  Visual inspection of Figure D1, Appendix 
D, suggests that the distribution is highly positively skewed.  We considered a transformation 
of this total score to see if the distribution could approach a more normal distribution.  
However, closer inspection of the frequency of scores (and testing of square root and log 
transformations) suggested that this was not a viable option as over 30% of the sample had 













scores within three consecutive values at the low end of the range (i.e., 31 to 33).  It is 
important to note that the main implication of leaving data untransformed (or a violation of 
normality) is a loss of power—with large samples, significance tests and confidence intervals 
are unaffected by violations of normality (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).  Given our sample 
size, this consequence was not a particular concern, and we chose to leave the item total 
scores untransformed.  Moreover, it was recognized that transformed scores pragmatically 
are difficult to interpret (often requiring a re-transformation to an original interpretable scale; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Finally, this decision is further supported as the results of the 
analyses of skew and kurtosis values did not produce violations according to these widely-
used criteria.   
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Appendix D (Rotated Component Matrices) 
Table D1. Rotated Component Matrix for Impression Importance Scale Principal 






1.      It is important for me to appear warm .24 .66 
2.      It is important for me to appear assertive .38 .37 
3.      It is important for me to appear courteous -.01 .87 
4.      It is important for me to appear humourous .28 .52 
5.      It is important for me to appear polite .09 .74 
6.      It is important for me to not appear embarrassed .86 .03 
7.      It is important for me to not appear awkward .89 .02 
8.      It is important for me to appear comfortable .74 .31 
9.      It is important for me to appear interesting .53 .49 
10.    It is important for me to appear secure .68 .37 
 
Note. Factor loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface. 
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Table D2. Rotated Component Matrix for Impression Expectations Scale Principal 









1.         Warm .58 .29 .04 
2.         Assertive .05 .64 -.01 
3.         Courteous .87 .10 -.02 
4.         Humourous .09 .76 -.05 
5.         Polite .89 .05 -.10 
6.         Embarrassed -.08 .01 .89 
7.         Awkward -.03 -.04 .91 
8.         Comfortable .24 .51 .49 
9.         Interesting .30 .78 .07 
10.       Secure .46 .43 .36 
 
Note. Factor loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface. 
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Table D3. Rotated Component Matrix for Specific Anxiety Symptoms (SAS; Reduced 
Items) Principal Components Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
 






1.  I felt that I was trembling. .71 .28 -.16 
2.  I felt sweaty. .46 -.07 .33 
3.  I felt that my hands were shaking. .73 .14 -.09 
4.  My throat felt dry. .54 .06 .19 
5.  I felt weak. .29 .41 .23 
6.  My stomach was in knots. .26 .38 .35 
8.  My mind went blank .00 .56 .25 
9.  My heart was pounding. .59 .14 .30 
10.  I felt that things were unreal -.03 .49 .17 
11.  I felt tense. .50 .54 .09 
12.  I felt unsteady. .41 .64 .01 
14.  I felt that I had hot flushes. .03 .22 .67 
15.  I felt that my voice was trembling. .45 .44 .09 
16.  I felt light-headed. .13 .44 .09 
18.  My face felt hot. .13 .14 .87 
21.  I felt like my heart was racing. .56 .01 .34 
22.  I felt shaky. .68 .32 .08 
23.  My face felt flushed. .17 .17 .82 
24.  I felt a sense of panic. .19 .63 .21 
29.  I felt disoriented or confused. .08 .77 .01 
31.  My face felt red. .11 .28 .81 
 
Note. Factor loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface. 
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Table D4. Rotated Component Matrix for Overt Signs of Anxiety (OSA-Self) Principal 










1.  I appeared to make low eye contact .39 .00 .28 .12 
2.  I appeared fidgety .12 .08 .81 .09 
3.  I appeared to be touching my face/body .15 .05 .70 -.02 
4.  I appeared to make uncomfortable facial 
expressions .44 .20 .43 .14 
5.  My speech appeared dysfluent (e.g., stammering or 
hesitating) .79 .17 .11 .04 
6.  I appeared to make omissions in my speech .80 .16 .10 .05 
7.  I appeared to make slips of tongue .73 .21 .11 .03 
8.  I appeared to repeat words .72 .08 .17 .00 
9.  I appeared to have a non-expressive tone of voice .46 .29 -.19 .08 
10.  I appeared to be perspiring .20 .62 -.02 .04 
11.  I appeared jittery .05 .54 .56 .06 
12.  My voice appeared to be trembling .43 .64 .00 .03 
13.  My body or hands appeared to be shaking .12 .64 .39 .01 
14.   I appeared short of breath .26 .77 -.02 .06 
15.  My body or face appeared stiff .14 .69 .04 .09 
16.  My face or body appeared to turn red -.03 .63 .27 .06 
17.   I appeared to leave long gaps in the conversation .44 .11 .14 .38 
18.  I appeared to understand what my partner said .01 .28 .05 .41 
19.  I appeared to ask interesting questions .04 .11 -.01 .88 
20.  I appeared to initiate conversations .13 -.12 .07 .80 
     
Note. Factor loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface. 
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Table D5. Rotated Component Matrix for Overt Signs of Anxiety-of Partner (OSA-






1.  Low eye contact .37 .19 
2.  Fidgeting .65 -.02 
3.  Touching face/body .57 -.15 
4.  Uncomfortable facial expressions .63 .15 
5.  Speech dysfluencies (e.g., stammering, hesitating) .66 .24 
6.  Omissions in speech .71 .25 
7.  Slips of tongue .70 .14 
8.  Repeating words .63 .09 
9.  Non-expressive tone of voice .35 .59 
10.  Perspiring    .51 .18 
11.  Appearing jittery .73 .27 
12.  Trembling voice .69 .28 
13.  Shaking body or hands .63 .16 
14.  Shortness of breath .60 .17 
15.  Stiff body or face .47 .37 
16.  Face or body turning red .51 .09 
17.  Left long gaps in the conversation .28 .58 
18.  Understood what I said .15 .32 
19.  Asked interesting questions -.02 .82 
20.  Initiated conversations -.08 .81 
 
Note. Factor loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface. 
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Table D6. Rotated Component Matrix for Overt Signs of Anxiety-Observer (OSA-










1.  Low eye contact .60 .51 .02 -.12 
2.  Fidgeting -.09 .83 -.01 .10 
3.  Touching face/body -.05 .70 -.01 .20 
4.  Uncomfortable facial expressions .67 .32 .13 -.17 
5.  Speech dysfluencies (e.g., stammering, hesitating) .46 .06 .25 .61 
6.  Omissions in speech .20 -.08 .15 .77 
7.  Slips of tongue -.06 .16 .14 .50 
8.  Repeating words -.22 .00 .34 .50 
9.  Non-expressive tone of voice .78 -.09 .06 -.10 
10.  Perspiring    -.01 .16 .74 -.11 
11.  Appearing jittery -.09 .60 .08 -.22 
12.  Trembling voice .09 .02 .87 .20 
13.  Shaking body or hands -.04 .08 .09 -.34 
14.  Shortness of breath -.05 -.07 .86 .18 
15.  Stiff body or face .61 -.50 .02 -.01 
16.  Face or body turning red .05 .42 .13 -.39 
17.  Left long gaps in the conversation .82 -.10 -.08 .14 
18.  Understood what I said .44 .04 -.02 .43 
19.  Asked interesting questions .77 -.15 .01 .27 
20.  Initiated conversations .75 -.15 -.16 .17 
 
Note. Factor Loadings > or = .4 are denoted in bold typeface.  
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Appendix E (Global and Specific Measures) 
Figure E1. Global anxious arousal as a function of Factor One (upper) and Factor Two 




















































Note: SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms scale.  Figure E1 (upper) illustrates the regression 
of self-reported global anxious arousal with the SAS Factor One (Shaking/Trembling) and 
the interaction of SAS Factor One and trait social anxiety (IAS).  The original regression 
equation was simplified by eliminating the main effects of the other SAS factors, and 
including only the mean IAS main effect and its interaction with the first factor.  The 
regression equation was: Y' = .405 + .035 X IAS + .088 X Factor One + -.002 X IAS X SAS 
Factor One.  Figure E1 (lower) illustrates the regression of global anxious arousal with SAS  
Factor Two (Derealization/Cognitive) and the interaction of this factor and trait social 
anxiety; Y = .283 + .053 X IAS +.078 X SAS Factor Two + .003 X IAS X SAS Factor Two.  
In both examples, higher levels of trait social anxiety were associated with a weaker relation 
of arousal and each of the respective SAS Factors.  
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Table E1. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Global and Specific Anxious Arousal and Appearance Ratings 
Variable Beta t p Adjusted 
R2 
R2 F Sig. 
Global Self-reported Anxious Arousal 
Step 1    .25 .25 52.60 .00 
IAS  .02 .39 .70     
SAS .50 9.98 .00     
Step 2     .01 5.68 .02 
IAS  .49 2.41 .02     
SAS .58 9.60 .00     
SAS X IAS -.51 -2.38 .02     
         
Step 1    .26 .27 29.27 .00 
IAS .00 .05 .96     
SAS-Factor One .33 3.67 .00     
SAS-Factor Two .25 3.01 .00     
SAS-Factor Three -.04 -.72 .47     
Step 2     .02 3.02 .03 
IAS .49 2.87 .00     
SAS-Factor One .32 2.64 .01     
SAS-Factor Two .36 3.14 .00     
SAS-Factor Three -.03 -.40 .69     
IAS X SAS-Factor One .01 .05 .96     
IAS X SAS-Factor Two -.46 -1.62 .11     
IAS X SAS-Factor Three -.09 .49 .63     
         
Global Self-reported Anxious Appearance 
 
Step 1a    .17 .18 33.45 .00 
IAS  -.08 -.42 .18     
OSA-Self .39 5.76 .00     
         
Step 1a    .22 .23 18.74 .00 
IAS  -.01 -.06 .96     
OSA-Self Factor One -.05 -.60 .55     
OSA-Self Factor Two .32 3.63 .00     
OSA-Self Factor Three .18 2.11 .04     
OSA-Self Factor Four .09 1.32 .19     
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Global Anxious Appearance of Partner 
       
Step 1a    .23 .23 46.73 .00 
IAS  -.07 -1.43 .15     
OSA-of Partner .48 9.60 .00     
         
Step 1a    .21 .22 28.59 .00 
IAS  -.07 -1.41 .16     
OSA-of Partner Factor One     .37 6.02 .00     
OSA-of Partner Factor Two .14 2.23 .03     
 
 
Note.  IAS = Interaction anxiousness scale; SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms Scale; SAS-
Factor One = Shaking/Trembling; SAS-Factor Two = Derealization/Cognitive; SAS-Factor 
Three = Blushing/Feeling flushed; OSA-Self Factor One = Speech dysfluencies; OSA-Self 
Factor Two = Visual signs of anxiety; OSA-Self Factor Three = Initiation of interaction; 
OSA-Self Factor Four = Self-manipulation/Fidgetiness; OSA-of Partner Factor One = Visual 
Signs/Dysfluent Speech; OSA-of Partner Factor Two = Conversational style.  
a The global variable of interest was predicted from IAS, the specific measure of interest 
(Step 1) and the interaction of the predictors (Step 2).  Regression was significant in Step 1 
only; coefficients shown are from Step 1.  
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Appendix F (Means and SDs) 
Table F1. N, Means and SDs for Descriptive and Dependent Measures 
    
 SA NSA 
 
 
  N Mean SD N Mean SD p 
        
IAS 102 58.86 4.97 222 42.47 3.26 < .001
          
Self-awareness   
Private Body-Consciousness 99 38.00 19.87 220 31.02 18.85 >.05
Public Body-Consciousness 99 15.78 7.83 220 14.21 8.25 >.05
Private Self-Consciousness 99 10.00 6.88 220 8.20 6.40 >.05
Public Self-Consciousness 99 12.22 9.42 220 8.61 7.71 .04
    
Impression Global 88 3.91 1.03 188 3.93 1.01 >.05
   
Impression Importance Total 101 39.54 7.70 221 39.62 7.55 >.05
Factor One: Confident/Non-
anxious 
94 23.01 5.49 220 22.82 5.37 >.05
Factor Two:  Innocuous 
Sociability 
94 31.55 6.21 220 32.33 6.03 >.05
   
Impression Expectations Total 101 34.88 5.61 221 38.40 5.47 < .001
Factor One: Innocuous Sociability 94 18.69 3.45 220 19.70 3.43 .02
Factor Two: Dominant/Confident 94 15.32 3.61 220 17.39 3.35 < .001
Factor Three: Non-anxious 94 16.61 3.53 220 19.24 3.33 .03
   
SAS Total 99 39.77 9.63 122 36.77 8.5 .01
Factor One: Shaking/Trembling 92 15.34 5.17 122 13.64 4.71 .01
Factor Two: Derealization/ 
Cognitive 
92 16.09 5.05 122 14.51 4.37 .02
Factor Three: Blushing/Feeling 
Flushed 
92 10.75 3.67 122 9.81 2.89 .05
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Global Ratings   
Anxious Arousal-Self 99 2.28 .89 122 2.13 .10 >.05
Anxious Appearance-Self 99 2.52 1.00 122 2.32 .90 >.05
Anxious Appearance-by Partner  97 2.39 1.16 122 2.03 .95 .02
Anxious Appearance-by Observer 57 3.03 .75 82 2.62 .59 .001
   
OSA-Self Total 99 43.36 12.35 122 38.50 9.46 .001
Factor One: Speech dysfluencies 92 19.90 7.68 122 22.79 3.43 .02
Factor Two: Visual signs of  
Anxiety  
92 10.66 3.74 122 8.86 2.08 .002
Factor Three: Initiation of  
interaction 
92 11.29 4.20 122 5.09 1.32 >.05
Factor Four: Self-manipulation/ 
Fidgetiness 
92 11.57 3.60 122 7.62 1.9 >.05
   
OSA-by Partner Total 96 35.83 10.57 122 31.57 8.48 .002
Factor One: Visual signs of 
Anxiety 
92 23.23 6.45 122 22.21 6.85 >.05
Factor Two: Conversational style 92 13.40 4.18 122 12.41 4.06 >.05
   
OSA-Observer Total 57 40.74 5.29 82 38.47 3.86 .007
Factor One: Conversational style 52 24.66 4.96 82 22.78 3.43 .016
Factor Two: Self-manipulation/ 
Fidgetiness 
52 10.00 2.81 82 8.86 2.08 .002
Factor Three: Tremulousness 52 5.00 .68 82 5.09 1.32 >.05
Factor Four: Speech dysfluencies 52 7.62 1.62 82 7.62 1.91 >.05
   
DFI (by partners) 98 25.31 6.55 122 25.38 7.28 >.05
 
 
Note. IAS = Interaction Anxiousness Scale; SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms; OSA = 
Overt Signs of Anxiety. DFI = Desire for Future Interaction.  For measures completed before 
the interaction, the full NSA sample means are provided; while post-interaction measures 
only include NSA individuals who partnered with NSA individuals.  Bonferroni adjusted p 
value for 35 independent t-tests is p = .001. 
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Appendix G (Correlation Matrix) 
Table G1. Correlations between Arousal, Appearance and Self-Awareness Traits for SA and NSA individuals 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1  Global Anxious Arousal .12 .62b .11 .18 .37b .30b -.02 .23 .05 .16 -.04 .21c .16
2  Global Anxious Appearance-Self .66a .19  .09 .22 .45b .45b -.01 -.04 .21c .24c -.01 .16 .14
3  Global Anxious Appearance-Partner .20b .15 .14  .23 .03 .18 .42b .30c -.01 .02 -.03 .07 .03
4  Global Anxious Appearance-Observer .95 .29b .10 .33b .07 .35b .28c .54b -.03 -.01 .01 .11 -.01
5  SAS  .58a .39a .26b .20b  .21 .61b -.16 -.13 .11 .06 .00 .14 .20
6  OSA-Self  .35a .41a .22b .12 .52a  .04 -.07 .14 .00 .01 .11 .09 .26
7  OSA-Partner .14 .01 .55a .05 .11 .08 .05 .29c -.04 -.15 -.07 -.09 -.11
8  OSA-Observer .16 .16 .10 .73a .18 .12 .20  .20 -.15 .13 -.08 .19 -.01
9  Private BCS -.04 -.09 .01 .03 .00 .07 .00 -.04 .07  .59b .39b .55b .02
10  Public BCS -.07 -.09 -.11 -.01 .00 .11 -.11 .00 .32a .13  .28b .75b -.10
11  Private SCS .03 -.02 .11 .06 .19b .09 .18b .01 .31a .20b -.04 .34b -.05
12  Public SCS .06 .04 -.01 -.13 .13 .16 -.09 -.19b .22b .73a .24b .07  -.10
13  IAS .18c .14 .15 .24c .19c .18c .11 .19 -.07 .04 .11 .11 .09
 
Note. SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptom Scale; OSA = Overt Signs of Anxiety; BCS= Body-Consciousness; SCS = Private Self-
Consciousness; IAS = Interaction Anxiousness Scale.  Correlations for the SA participants (N = 93 to 98) are shown above the 
diagonal; while correlations for NSA participants in the NSA-NSA dyads (N = 112 to 122) are shown below the diagonal.  
Correlations involving OSA are based on smaller N.   The pairwise intraclass correlations (rxx’) for the NSA-NSA dyads are listed 
along the shaded diagonal.  This correlation is an index of the “absolute similarity between the two exchangeable partners in the dyad” 
(Gonzalez & Griffin, 1997, p. 276) and its test of significance indicates whether the dyadic similarity is significantly different from 
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zero.  Variables used in determining correlations between global and specific self-, partner- and observer-reported anxious appearance 
are highlighted in bold typeface. 
ap < .001.  bp < .01. cp < .05. 
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Appendix H (Regression Summaries) 
Table H1. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting 
Global and Specific Anxious Symptoms from Measures of Impression Importance 
and Expectations 
     
Variable Beta t p Adjusted 
R2 
R2 F Sig. 
Global Anxious Arousal 
 
       
Step 1    .02 .03 3.99 .02 
IMP    .16 2.61 .01     
EXP    -.13 -2.05 .04     
        
Step 1    .02 .02 3.07 .05 
IMP-Global .10 1.61 .11     
EXP    -.14 -2.23 .03     
        
Specific Anxiety Symptoms      
        
Step 1a    .06 .06 10.64 .00 
IMP    .25 4.18 .00     
EXP    -.21 -3.48 .00     
        
Step 1a    .04 .04 6.10 .00 
IMP-Global .14 2.19 .03     
EXP    -.20 -3.20 .00     
         
Step 1a    .00 .01 1.55 .22 
IMP-Factor Two .12 1.68 .10     
EXP-Factor One -.04 -.60 .55     
         
Step 1a    .11 .12 2.29 .00 
IMP-Factor One .23 4.31 .00     
EXP-Factor Two -.27 -5.01 .00     
         
Step 1a    .07 .08 13.66 .00 
IMP-Factor Two .14 2.47 .01     
EXP-Factor Three -.27 -4.94 .00     
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Step 1    .05 .06 9.50 .00 
IMP-Factor One .26 4.32 .00     
EXP-Factor Two -.12 -2.12 .04     
Step 2     .03 3.84 .01 
IMP-Factor One .23 3.94 .00     
EXP-Factor Two -.12 -2.07 .04     
IMP-Factor One2 .04 .60 .55     
EXP-Factor Two2 .21 3.21 .00     
IMP-Factor One X EXP- 
  Factor Two 
 
-.20 -2.59 .01     
        
Specific Anxiety Symptoms (with IAS predictor included) 
         
Step 1b    .07 .08 9.31 .00 
IAS .15 2.51 .01     
IMP    .23 3.83 .00     
EXP    -.15 -2.30 .02     
         
Step 1b    .07 .08 9.42 .00 
IAS .17 2.96 .00     
IMP-Factor One .23 3.87 .00     
EXP-Factor Two -.06 -.89 .37     
         
Step 1b    .04 .05 5.35 .00 
IAS .20 3.58 .00     
IMP-Factor Two .11 1.52 .13     
EXP-Factor One .00 .02 .99     
         
Step 1b    .12 .12 14.61 .00 
IAS .10 1.73 .08     
IMP-Factor One .23 4.24 .00     
EXP-Factor Three -.23 -3.89 .00     
         
Step 1b    .08 .09 1.37 .00 
IAS .11 1.89 .06     
IMP-Factor Two .14 2.50 .01     
EXP-Factor Three -.23 -3.79 .00     
 
Note. SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms scale; IMP = Impression Rating Total; EXP = 
Expression Rating Total; IMP-Global = Impression Global rating score; IMP-Factor One = 
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Confident/Non-anxious Impression; IMP-Factor Two = Innocuous Sociability Impression; 
EXP-Factor One = Innocuous Sociability Expectations; EXP-Factor Two = 
Dominant/Confident Expectations; EXP-Factor Three = Non-Anxious.  
a The regressions included SAS regressed on the impression importance and expectations 
(Step 1) and the second-order terms (impression importance squared, expectations squared) 
and the product of the two components entered in Step 2.  None of these models were 
significant after Step 1; the results are shown for the first step only.  
b These regressions were completed with impression importance, expectations total and the 
trait social anxiety measure (Step 1) and the interactions of trait social anxiety and each of 
impression and expectation variables (Step 2).  None of these regressions were significant 
after Step 1 and the coefficients shown are from Step 1. 
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Table H2. Regression Summaries for Tests of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model 
Table H2a. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting 
Global Anxious Appearance for NSA participants 





Global Anxious Appearance       
        
Step 1        
Anxious Arousal .65 9.13 .00 .42 .43 44.02 .00 
G-AA-by Partner .03 .35 .73     
        
Step 1        
Anxious Arousal  .62 7.21 .00 .44 .45 31.78 .00 
G-AA-by Observer .17 1.94 .06     
        
Step 1        
Private BCS -.07 -.95 .35 .42 .43 29.62 .00 
Anxious Arousal .65 9.08 .00     
G-AA-by Partner .03 .36 .72     
(G-AA-by Observer) (.19) (2.15) (.04)     
        
Step 1        
Public BCS -.04 -.57 .57 .42 .43 29.28 .00 
Anxious Arousal .65 9.06 .00     
G-AA-by Partner .02 .29 .77     
(G-AA-by Observer) (.17) (1.94) (.06)     
        
Step 1        
Private SCS -.04 -.60 .55 .42 .43 29.31 .00 
Anxious Arousal .65 9.11 .00     
G-AA-by Partner .03 .41 .68     
(G-AA-by Observer) (.17) (1.9) (.06)     
        
Step 1        
Public SCS .00 .04 .97 .42 .43 29.09 .00 
Anxious Arousal .65 9.07 .00     
G-AA-by Partner .02 .35 .73     




Note.  G-AA = Global Anxious Appearance; SCS = Self-Consciousness Scale; BCS = Body-
Consciousness Scale.  Anxious arousal refers to Global 1-item measure of anxious arousal.  
The latter four regressions including the self-awareness traits were completed with Global 
AA-Observer replacing Global AA-Partner (Step 1: Global Anxious Arousal, Self-awareness 
Trait; Step 2: Anxious Arousal X Self-awareness Trait; Step 3: Global AA-Observer).  In 
each of these models Step 3 was significant (p = .04) or approaching significance (p = .06); 
but the R2change was small (from .02 to .04).  The interaction was not found to be a significant 
predictor and was dropped from the model.  The regression was repeated with all of the main 
effects only in Step 1.  The coefficients for the OSA-by Observer and R2change in Step 2 of the 
model are provided in brackets. 
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Table H2b. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting 
Specific Anxious Appearance for NSA participants 
 





OSA-Self       
        
        
Step 1    .25 .27 21.28 .00 
SAS .51 6.45 .00     
OSA-by Partner .02 .29 .77     
        
Step 1    .22 .24 11.90 .00 
SAS .48 4.72 .00     
OSA-by Observer .04 .36 .72     
        
Step 1    .25 .27 14.4 .00 
Private BCS .07 .86 .39     
SAS .51 6.44 .     
OSA-by Partner .02 .29 .77     
        
Step 1    .26 .28 14.94 .00 
Public -BCS .11 1.39 .17     
SAS .51 6.46 .00     
OSA-by Partner .04 .44 .66     
Step 2     .05  .00 
Public -BCS .13 1.71 .09     
SAS .55 7.00 .00     
OSA-by Partner .04 .35 .72     
Public BCS X SAS .22 2.75 .01     
(OSA-by Observer) (.03) (.36) (.72)  (.05)  (.02) 
        
Step 1    .25 .27 14.07 .00 
Private SCS -.01 -.16 .87     
SAS .52 6.35 .00     
OSA-by Partner .03 .31 .75     
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Step 1    .26 .28 .14.71 .00 
Public SCS .10 1.19 .24     
SAS .50 6.23 .00     
OSA-by Partner .03 .42 .68     
 
Note. SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms; OSA = Overt Signs of Anxiety; SCS = Self-
Consciousness Scale; BCS = Body-Consciousness Scale.  The latter four regressions 
including the self-awareness traits were completed with OSA-by Observer replacing OSA-by 
Partner (Step 1: SAS, Self-awareness trait; Step 2: SAS X Self-awareness trait; Step 3: OSA-
by Observer).  Step 3 was not significant for any of the models and Step 2 was significant for 
public BCS only (R2change = .05, p =.02) only.  The OSA-by Observer was included in Step 1 
along with the other main effects and the public BCS model was re-run in two steps with the 
interaction included in Step 2.  The coefficients for the OSA-by Observer are shown above; 
the coefficient for the interaction of SAS X public BCS from Step 2 was Beta = .23, p = .02.  
When OSA-by Observer was included alone in Step 2 (no interaction in model) there was no 
significant R2change (p > .05) for the private BCS, private SCS or public SCS models.  These 
regressions were repeated with all of the main effects in one step.  None of the OSA-by 
Observer coefficients in these three models were significant (all Beta = .03 to .05; p > .05).  
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Table H2c. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting 
Global Anxious Appearance for SA participants 
        





Global Anxious Appearance 
 
       
        
Step 1        
Anxious Arousal .61 7.51 .00 .37 .38 28.00 .00 
G-AA-by Partner .03 .37 .71     
        
Step 1        
Anxious Arousal  .60 5.62 .00 .38 .40 17.99 .00 
G-AA-by Observer .11 1.04 .30     
        
Step 1        
Private BCS .04 .44 .66 .36 .38 19.10 .00 
Anxious Arousal .61 7.23 .00     
G-AA-by Partner  .03 .35 .73     
        
Step 1        
Public BCS .15 1.85 .07 .38 .40 2.84 .00 
Anxious Arousal .59 7.22 .00     
G-AA-by Partner  .03 .37 .71     
        
Step 1        
Private SCS .02 .20 .85 .36 .38 19.02 .00 
Anxious Arousal .61 7.47 .00     
G-AA-by Partner  .03 .38 .71     
        
Step 1        
Public SCS .04 .44 .66 .36 .38 19.10 . 
Anxious Arousal .61 7.23 .00     
G-AA-by Partner  .04 .35 .73     
 
Note.  G-AA = Global Anxious Appearance; SCS = Self-Consciousness Scale; BCS = Body-
Consciousness Scale.  Anxious Arousal refers to Global 1-item measure of anxious arousal.   
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The latter four regressions including the self-awareness traits were completed with G-AA-by 
Observer replacing G-AA-by Partner (Step 1: Global Anxious Arousal, Self-awareness trait; 
Step 2: Anxious Arousal X Self-awareness trait; Step 3: G-AA-by Observer).  The G-AA-by 
Observer variable was not significant predictor (p > .05) in any of the models, and the 
regressions were repeated with all of the main effects only in Step 1.  The coefficients for the 
G-AA-by Observer were not found to be significant predictors in any of the models (all Beta 
= .11 to .12, p > .05).   
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Table H2d. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting 
Specific Anxious Appearance (OSA-Self) for SA participants 
 





OSA-Self       
       
       
Step 1    .36 .37 28.11 .00
SAS .62 .746 .00    
OSA-by Partner .03 .41 .68    
       
Step 1    .42 .44 21.58 .00
SAS .66 6.42 .00    
OSA-by Observer .22 2.19 .03    
       
Step 1    .36 .38 18.83 .00
Private BCS -.06 -.71 .48    
SAS .65 7.77 .    
OSA-by Partner .03 .35 .73    
Step 2     .02  .07
Private BCS X SAS -.15 -1.83 .07    
(OSA-by Observer) (.21) (2.10) (.05)  (.05)  (.03)
       
Step 1    .36 .38 18.58 .00
Public BCS .03 .37 .71    
SAS .62 7.42 .00    
OSA-by Partner       
Step 2     .03  .04
Public BCS .02 -2.1 .04    
SAS .63 7.72 .00    
OSA-by Partner .02 .18 .86    
Public BCS X SAS -.17 -2.10 .04    
(OSA-by Observer) (.25) (2.40) (.02)  (.05)  (.03)
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Step 1    .37 .39 19.44 .00
Private SCS .11 1.30 .20    
SAS .62 7.51 .00    
Step 2     .03  .02
Private SCS .14 1.70 .09    
SAS .61 7.59 .00    
OSA-by Partner .05 .64 .53    
Private SCS X SAS -.18 -2.29 .02    
(OSA-by Observer) (.24) (2.30) (.02)  (.05)  (.02)
       
Step 1    .35 .37 18.54 .00
Public SCS .03 .38 .71    
SAS .65 7.66 .00    
OSA-by Partner .04 .53 .60    
Step 2     .02  .07
Public SCS X SAS -.16 -1.84 .07    
(OSA-by Observer) (.22) (2.14) (.04)  (.05)  (.04)
 
Note.  SAS = Specific Anxiety Symptoms; OSA = Overt Signs of Anxiety; SCS = Self-
Consciousness Scale; BCS = Body-Consciousness Scale.  The latter four regressions 
including the self-awareness traits were completed with OSA-by Observer replacing OSA-by 
Partner  (Step 1: SAS, Self-awareness trait; Step 2: SAS X Self-awareness trait; Step 3: OSA-
by Observer).  In each of these models Step 3 was significant (p < .05) or approaching (p = 
.07; private SCS); but the R2change was small for each of the models (from .03 to .06).  The 
interaction was not a significant predictor in any of the models, and was dropped from the 
model.  The regression was repeated with SAS and the self-awareness trait (Step 1) and 
OSA-by Observer (Step 2).  The coefficients for the OSA-by Observer and R2change in Step 2 
of the model are provided in brackets.  
 
